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Introduction 
In 2009, the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) aired a special program “Japan 
Debut,”  a series of documentaries to commemorate the 150th anniversary of the 
opening of the Yokohama port. Subtitled “First-class Nation of Asia,” the series features 
Taiwan in its first episode, delving into the colonization of the island from 1895 to 
1945, and gives prominence to interviews with a handful of Taiwanese elderlies who 
experienced the occupation first-handedly. The episode shows how Japan, in its fervent 
pursuit of becoming a “first-class nation (a-)”  to emulate western powers, 
clobbered local oppositional forces through violent means, and then exploited the island 
and its people. It underscores how the occupation met with stubborn resistance by the 
Taiwanese natives and how the rebel movements were ruthlessly clamped down by the 
imperial power. Highlights reveal how the empire, in defining its Taiwanese subjects as 
an inferior species and employing segregation policies to anchor their inferiority, 
consequently distilled deep-rooted anti-Japan sentiments among the people. The 
program, produced by a major Japanese media agency and hence carrying substantial 
weight in representing the Japanese voice, seems to be self-reflective and self-
deprecating in its presentation of Imperial Japan’s colonizing process. Interestingly, 
however, its depiction of Japan as a callous colonizer aroused unexpected controversy 
and polarized opinions among Taiwanese questioning NHK’s historical viewpoint of 
that colony–Taiwan. 
Concerned how the documentary would undermine current Taiwan-Japan 
relationship, for instance, Taiwanese associations like Taiwanese Residents Association 
in Japan 4ĎƲkǙ, Friends of Lee Teng-hui Association in Japan 4hƨıȣ
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RQ, as well as a handful of conservative Japanese organizations protested against 
NHK.1  Among those who were interviewed in the documentary was Ke De-san ɠŬ
?, a Japanese-educated 87-year-old man, an elite in his times. After the episode was 
aired, Ke protested that, while he addressed both merits and demerits of the Japanese 
rule, NHK chose to air only his criticism of colonial discrimination and exploitation. He 
spoke of his concern that NHK’s selective editing would falsely convey an anti-Japan 
sentiment to the Japanese audience, and subsequently harm Taiwan’s relations with 
Japan. Ke was joined by over eight thousand people (among whom 150 were 
Taiwanese) in his questioning of NHK’s “unbalanced”  presentation of the historical 
period. Ke and other protesters’  reaction further instigated criticism in online political 
forums, questioning the station’s stance. While the former colonized in Asia demands 
apology from Japan for its wartime brutality, a protest against NHK’s seemingly 
repentant piece on how Japan had wronged its colonized people seems to go against the 
grain of postwar political correctness. NHK’s penitent remembrance towards Taiwan’s 
colonial past, perhaps, sits nicely with the expectations of the postcolonial generation in 
Taiwan. But for Ke and other Taiwanese like him, NHK’s relegation of Japan’s colonial 
presence in Taiwan as malevolent violence, in turn, is an oversimplification or 
misreading of their memory. Ke and his fellow protesters objected the story that NHK 
has placed on top of the formerly colonized, whose stringent view of their colonial 
experience as victimization did not adequately attend to the diverse aspects of that 
experience. 
If the expressed nostalgia raised an awkward problem for NHK’s (or Japan’s) self-
reflection as a former colonizer, the ostensible yearning for a ruling that is linked to 
oppression is no less an embarrassing narrative for the Taiwanese. The postcolonial 
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generation’s understanding and reconstruction of such memories in Taiwan are also a 
contested dialectics of remembering and forgetting. What’s more, the political 
oppression of nearly 40 years (1949-1987) of martial law imposed by Chiang Kai-
shek’s Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) that replaced Imperial Japan after World War II 
further widened the generational gap of historical memories. To quickly sino-nize 
Taiwan, the KMT administration imposed language policies that suppressed Taiwanese 
dialects (including Hoklo, Hakka and aboriginal languages) as well as any vestige of 
Japanese, rendering the generation of men and women that had thus far relied on the 
Japanese language to acquire information illiterate and muted. For the next generation, 
the nationalist ruler further implemented Sinocentric curriculums that indoctrinated the 
pupils with anti-communism, and with Chinese nationalism centering on the ideology 
that Chiang’s “Free China”  would eventually recover the land they lost to the Chinese 
communists.2 
Wu Nien-jen’s 1994 autobiographical film, Tousan: A Borrowed Life ȟ, is a 
paradoxically vivid and vague rendition of such a postcolonial generation and its 
attempt to reconstruct the life and memories of its predecessors—an attempt caught in 
the interstices of two political hegemonies, namely Chinese nationalism and Japanese 
colonialism. In A Borrowed Life, Wu fixes his attention on Sega, his tousan (Ʃʞʰ, 
Japanese for father), through the innocent, often obstructed gaze of a child. Because 
Sega seldom talks about himself and his past to his children, his life is pieced together 
by bits of adult conversations or episodes that the child cannot quite grasp. Without 
making much of it, the child overhears that, as a teenager, Sega witnessed the slaughter 
of Taiwanese elites in front of Chiayi train station during the infamous 228 Incident.3 
After setting up a makeshift ritual on the side of the street to pay tribute to a doctor who 
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was killed, his then employer fired him for fear of being dragged into the dangerous 
chaos. Sega fled from the southern town of Chiayi to the northern tip of the island, and 
became a miner earning meager wages barely enough to support his family. For him, 
everything Japanese is of superior quality: Japan-made products work better and last 
longer; Japanese swear words communicate his contempt better; even Japanese 
pornographic models are more attractive than those in America’s Playboy magazine. If 
he is at home, he tunes in to Japanese radio news, and his greatest wish is to visit Mount 
Fuji and the Imperial Palace in Tokyo one day. From the child’s limited purview, 
tousan’s dogged fondness of Japanese commodities and adherence to a “Japan”  that he 
has never visited is inexplicable. But neither the child nor his siblings display an active 
interest in pursuing the matter. Inside the familial context, tousan’s anachronous 
attachment to “Japan” creates a rift between himself and his Chinese-educated children. 
One afternoon he tries to help his daughter whose assignment requires her to draw the 
national flag of Republic of China (Taiwan). He colors the symbol of the sun red, and 
enrages his young daughter, who laments that it is all wrong. “Go take a look at Japan’s 
hinomaru flag!”  he yells in response. “The sun should be red! You are cursed by the 
devil if you see a white sun.”  Exasperated, his daughter curses him in mandarin 
Chinese, calling him a “traitor (to the Chinese nation)! A running dog! A Wang Jing-
wei!”4 This heated, emotional exchange between father and daughter demonstrates how 
political conflicts in the history enters the private domains of domesticity, and how 
identities shaped by opposing regimes divide two generations in a family (see figure 
1.1). Whereas tousan uses “Japan”  as his standard point of reference to define the 
Chinese, or even the American, the young daughter is taught at school to use a 
Sinocentrism-based loyalty as a rule of thumb. 
 In the film, Wu positions his child self as a passive observer, neither passing 
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judgment on nor offering justification for his father’s actions as a failing patriarch. His 
obstructed understanding of his father and, in turn, his father’s incapacity to effectively 
articulate his past nostalgia and present discontent, echo the experience of others in their 
respective generations. The similarity the film-goers find between Wu’s tousan and their 
own silenced fathers and grandfathers demonstrates how this generational distance is a 
collective experience shared in different families. At the end of A Borrowed Life, tousan
—who at this point is plagued by a lung disease acquired in the mines, which makes it 
painful for him to breathe—chooses to end his life by leaping out a hospital window. 
Wu’s narrator speaks as he stands on the other side of a curtain, staring at the projected 
silhouettes of doctors trying to revive his father’s lifeless body: “as I stood there, lost in 
reverie, I suddenly remembered when, many years ago, tousan took me to the cinemas 
but went on his own spree at some mysterious place (a bordello), leaving me in a dark 
place filled with weak sobs.”  This scene encapsulates the curtains of cultural and 
political barrier that separates the postcolonial generation’s effort to perceive the past 
and the actual memories itself. As the postcolonial generation inherits memories of the 
colonial, they seem to be held at the threshold, trying to make sense of the shadows and 
lights of the past (see Figure 1.2).  
All of the films (as well as some media presentations of the term koumin in Chapter 
2) selected for this study are produced by the younger,  postcolonial generation who 
have not  experienced the Japanese colonial  period,  but  have grown up with related 
behaviors, anecdotes and images. One of the threads I use to tie together the various 
presentations  of  memories  in  this  thesis  is  Marianne  Hirsch’s  conceptualizing  of 
“postmemory,”5  which  specifically  foregrounds  the  importance  and  validity  of  the 
“generation  after”  as  a  carrier  of  a  memory  that  “belonged”  to  another  generation, 
despite its inclination towards the imaginative. Although Hirsch examined the case of 
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the  descendants  of  holocaust  survivors,  her  affirmation  of  remembrance  without 
experience is particularly significant, at this critical junction, to the nascent boom of the 
young Taiwanese engagement with memories of the colonial period. Given how such 
colonial  memories  had  been  purposefully  discontinued  by  the  state,  the  younger 
generation’s remembering involves not only overcoming social amnesia, but even more 
work lying in the area of reconciling with, or removing a politically transposed memory. 
From this I deduce that the re-production of the “Japanese past” and its reception by the 
society are heavily based on one’s “imaginative investment.” 
The construction of postmemory affirms how the present is instrumental in 
shaping the past in collective memory.6 However, I find its emphasis placed on the 
imagined and creative perception of “postgeneration” suggest that the extra emotions 
postgenerational memories re-create, gravitating towards the personal realm of 
remembrance, before it is transmitted into the public sphere. In other words, not only 
would postmemory be teeming with presentism, but it would also be overflowing with 
personal emotions. 
In  Taiwan,  the construction of “postmemory” is twice removed from the actual 
colonial memory and history due to the postwar education that hinged on Sinocentrism, 
which inclines to relegate Japanese culture exclusively as an oppressive other. However, 
when playing back the fragmented, mediated episodes of memory, each soundbite and 
pixel resonates with personal meaning and emotions. The emotional factor, 
compounded by a nationalist education, suggests that the younger Taiwanese 
generation’s reshaping of the colonial memory is thus, as Hirsch puts it, “mediated […] 
through an imaginative investment and creation.”7  Today, more than 20 years after Wu 
Nien-jen’s film cinematically depicting the liminality of his generation’s understanding 
of another generation’s nostalgia for a condemned past, how is “Japan”  manifested in 
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modern Taiwan? How have we reshaped our views towards tousan and others like him
—whose colonial nostalgia poses certain political problematics? I believe that in face of 
current political contentions with China, Taiwan is rethinking its relationship with 
Chinese nationalism and Japanese colonialism. Whatever fragments the tousans 
wittingly or unwittingly communicated to their children are now repeatedly revisited 
and renegotiated.  
My dissertation intends to study the trajectory of how “Japan”  has transformed in 
postcolonial Taiwan, by way of closely reading contemporary Taiwanese films and their 
paratexts. As the Taiwanese commemorate the 71st anniversary of the end of WWII in 
2016, I contend that we, like Wu Nien-jen’s self-portrayal as a sympathetic, yet 
befuddled child, have time and again attempted to revisit what was behind the curtains. 
The texts I analyze in this dissertation, whether cinematic, literary, or journalistic, 
significantly represent an effort to lift the curtains.Together they form a patchwork of 
personal loss, shame and Taiwan’s slow, unique process of self de-colonization. I 
suggest that for the postcolonial Taiwanese, the editing and resurrection of fragments of 
memory to the collective consciousness is a discursive means of coming to terms with 
what was inflicted upon Taiwan. Just as the prewar Japanese imperialists needed to 
justify their occupation of Taiwan by claiming that it is for the good of “Greater East 
Asia,”  the Taiwanese ex-colonized, too, currently need to negotiate their foothold in 
why matters of their hearts seem to conflict with those in others’  heads. For instance, 
part of Ke’s concern stems from NHK’s elimination of his acknowledgement of wartime 
engineer Hatta Yoichi’s ĴǍw  contributions to Taiwan and his relationship with 
Hatta’s son. For him, this particular account of memory is as valid as the highlighted 
discrimination he suffered in an elite Taipei high school he attended with Japanese 
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youths. Due to NHK’s option to select the negative comments over positive ones for a 
uniformed storyline, the interviewee’s memory is thus mutilated and compromised. In 
order to come to terms with past trauma with full understanding, both the good and the 
bad must be examined, though the questions of what was good and what was bad are at 
best slippery because they hinge on “memory.”  I contend that, like Wu Nien-jen’s on-
screen surrogate, Taiwan navigates the contested terrain of colonial history with an 
abundance of empathy for the last generation, but from contrasting, limited, and at times 
unreliable vantage points that make a singular definition of colonial memory 
impossible. 
In particular, while the “bad”  of colonialism seems irrefutable, what “good”  could 
have come of it is a terrain of contestation. Taiwanese literature professor Chu Huei-chu 
claims that it is an “unconditional embracing and admiration for modernity” that nursed 
this postwar pro-Japan complex. Chu observes that when Taiwanese nativists reminisce 
about their Japanese past, infrastructures and modernized constructions are used as 
evidence to rationalize Japan’s imperial rule: transportation network, education system, 
and basic infrastructure were established as early as the 1920s; and to meet Imperial 
Japan’s military needs, Taiwan was efficiently industrialized in the late 1930s. As 
Japan’s rule entered western modernity, philosophy, culture and concept of “nation,” 
Taiwan subsequently rose from an immigrant society to something closer to a 
“metropolitan.”  As these imported western goods and ideas emitted an appealing 
“fragrance of civilization,”  “the Japanese colonial rule came to embody more than 
suppression and exploitation.”8 This enticing “fragrance,”  having been introduced by 
the Japanese, would therefore always be infused with a strong scent of Japaneseness. 
However, I argue that, although the embrace of modernity may be “unconditional”  as 
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Chu suggests, the former colonized does not lack in criticism against the colonizers’ 
intentions. If the NHK documentary accounted for anything, it is that Japan’s former 
subjects are well aware of the coercion and exploitation that went hand in hand with 
colonization. The formerly colonized’s desire to culturally identify with a modernizing 
society is burned by the acute awareness that they cannot lay claim to legitimate 
ownership of such culture. 
Whatever fringe benefits one may reap, colonial hierarchy perpetuates the 
Otherness of the subaltern. As an old Taiwanese man formerly conscripted as a Japanese 
soldier said in his interview for the NHK special, “even if young Japanese may not 
understand, please publicize this message to the Japanese people who are over eighty 
years old: I hope they will be able to know to what extent the Taiwanese have gone to 
help the Japanese. We have given our lives to the nation.”  While this segment could 
easily evoke sympathy in the viewers for their servitude to an apathetic regimen, I 
contend that the old man’s plea serves more than as evidence of indoctrination. Perhaps 
the reason these former subjects of the Rising Sun strive for recognition by their former 
oppressor is not that they need to cling on to past memories, but that they do not want to 
be forgotten. 
Yet why do the colonized generation fear oblivion? Moreover why do they seek 
recognition from the authority that supposedly oppressed them? This is a question often 
posed to Taiwan by other Asian countries, and even by Taiwanese themselves. While 
many are eager to provide an answer attributing the cause to either the success of 
colonial “enslavement”  education, or disillusionment with the Chinese nationalist 
regime, both combined have limitations explaining the relationship between the tousan 
generation and their “Japan.”  This dissertation aims to reexamine “Japan”  in modern 
day Taiwan (which includes the colonized generation as well as the supposedly 
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baggage-free postcolonial generations) by looking into the memories of tousans and 
kaasans (mother in Japanese) in relation to the island’s marginal yet strategic position 
between the competing neighboring superpowers of Japan and China. 
In Taiwan’s case, the theoretical tools to discuss colonialism are not readily 
available because Japanese colonialism is so different from its western counterparts. It 
is different, for instance, because of its racial and ethnic relations. While white men 
from a European empire ruled their colored subjects, the Japanese were governing a 
race that did not look dissimilar from them, and once the colonized mastered the 
Japanese language, he or she could ostensibly pass for a “real Japanese.” Furthermore, 
post-colonial theories cannot be fitted into Taiwan because the Chinese Nationalist 
KMT administration is considered by some Taiwanese scholars as yet another colonizer 
since the KMT government’s main interest lay in regaining its strength after the war, 
while using the island’s resources.9 Their initial plan was to use the island of Taiwan as 
a military base to recover “China” from communist occupation.10 Their resolution to 
eventually return to the space currently occupied by People’s Republic of China is 
further demonstrated by Chiang Kai-shek’s will to “temporarily place”  his grave, 
without proper burial, at the Cihu Mausoleum until KMT’s victory in recapturing the 
purloined motherland.11 After WWII, KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek was appointed by 
General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers to take over 
Taiwan, and hence the Taiwanese wish for self-determination and independence from 
“foreign” ruling was suspended indefinitely. 
The status of the KMT government (Republic of China) experienced upheaval in 
1971, when it was replaced by People’s Republic Of China in the United Nations, and 
again in 1979 when diplomatic ties with the United States were severed. To consolidate 
their legitimacy and position as rulers of the Taiwanese, it was crucial for the KMT to 
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create a memory to be shared by mainlanders and Taiwanese locals alike. They resorted 
to shared ancestry, and Chinese Nationalism, to emphasize the shared destiny of these 
two conflicted groups. This is evident in the flurry of patriotic songs that were marketed 
as pop songs and continuously broadcasted through mass media, such as “Descendants 
of the Dragon” (1978), “Ching-hai Prairies”  (1981), which stressed that, bonded by 
blood, Taiwanese residents are truly Chinese, and are inheritors of five thousand years 
of Chinese glory. Meanwhile textbooks in schools have continued to focus on facts 
about Chinese history and geography, whereas information about the island remains 
peripheral. 
The Taiwanese is comprised of several ethnicities—Hoklo, Hakka, Aboriginal, and 
waishengren £Ơ
, an overgeneralizing term that encompasses all the mainland 
Chinese that arrived after 1945, despite differences among themselves. However, when 
we discuss “Japan”  within the nationalist framework, it is necessary to distinguish two 
groups—  bendiren h0
 and waishengren  £Ơ
. Both come from historical 
backgrounds that are closely intertwined with “Japan,”  but due to the colonial structure 
and Sino-Japanese wars, each could have completely opposing viewpoints. Cultural 
critics have noted how pro-Japan attitude is linked to pro-Taiwanese independence 
groups, and anti-Japanese sentiments have much to do with pro-China stances. Their 
different Japanese experiences are apparently what set the Taiwanese natives apart from 
the Chinese newcomers. The tension between supporters of these opposing teams is 
further complicated by the phenomenon of “Japanophiles”  (4Ƽ)—a term that was 
coined in the early 1990s observing how Japan is sweeping the young Taiwanese off 
their feet with its “soft power,” a cultural power that has followers in the two conflicting 
groups. 
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It is true that KMT successfully distilled in the people a sense of national integrity 
as a “China”  of a uniformed language, heritage, and definite boundaries. The portrait 
that KMT promoted of China was a unified nation-state in which every subject speaks 
in the same tongue, shares the same blood lineage, and upholds the same ideology (see 
figure 1.3). After WWII, in the context of the Cold War, the Taiwanese were educated to 
believe that their future lies in China, when KMT leads them in recovering the land 
purloined by the Chinese Communists. However, Taiwan’s being expelled from the 
United Nations in 1972 dispelled the myth of its unshakable sovereignty and legitimacy 
as “China” in the international arena. The world now recognized Chiang’s rival state as 
the real China. This, compounded with the local people’s frustrations with KMT’s 
internal ruling, further undermined the foundations of Taiwanese subjectivity. 
Therefore, Taiwan’s case in its relations with Japan not only reveals the insufficiency of 
postcolonial theory, but also points to a necessity to reconsider how an individual’s 
perceived past can meander into the public domain and becomes collective memory, 
and, in turn, how memory itself becomes part of the national identity. Normative 
decolonization occurs when former subjects examine the colonial legacy and challenge 
previously established narratives, but in the case of Taiwan, the decolonization process 
of the subjects is hindered by a transposed nationalist framework that readily deems 
such legacy as nothing more than enslavement. When official history writing is deemed 
questionable, private personal memories thus become instrumental in the collective 
constructing of a subjectivity free from the imposition of yet another subjugating 
identity. 
The complicated and contradictory nature of Ke’s reaction towards NHK, then, 
cannot be summed up by postcolonial theories but invites us to investigate Taiwan’s 
problems, which also resist postcolonial theories. In his essay “The Dosan (tousan) 
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Generation,”  Leo Ching examines the same NHK episode and points out that the 
“nostalgia”  of the Japanized generation is the result of a desire to distinguish one’s 
Taiwanese subjectivity from China, that by strengthening one’s relations with Japan, the 
ties with China could be watered down. Ching notes that “these attitudes are associated 
not with “Japan” per se, but with the perceived Japanese ‘period’.”12 Taking a cue from 
Ching’s study, I want to extend the discussion of tousans’ linkage with a “Japan” locked 
in the past, by focusing on the act of memory.13 Tousans’ view of “Japan” is not merely 
rosy sentiments of longing, but their memory is a political act of coming to terms with 
one’s past and reclaiming one’s subjectivity. In this dissertation, I argue that memory is 
a political act and can be shared, not confined to a particular individual or period of 
time. The person who experienced an event is the sole owner of the memory, but once it 
is mediated, it could transform into collective memory. The mass media is an efficient 
way to transmit the original soundbites and picture to any receiving end, creating what 
Benedict Anderson calls an “imagined community.”  This is the reason I choose to 
investigate Taiwan’s colonial memories through films, online forums, and written/oral 
literature. 
My research seeks to examine the ways in which the collective memory of Japan, 
or the imagination of “Japan,”  affects the collective search for a Taiwanese subjectivity 
and a distinctively Taiwanese identification. I use several exemplar films, 
documentaries and literary work that span several different genres to examine the 
sentiments of the “silenced generation”  towards Japan, and closely study recent 
Taiwanese films made by successors of the said generation, dealing with “Japan,”  and 
their possible “idea of their fathers’  idea of Japan.”  Media coverage of the films and 
ensuing cultural critiques will also be the subject of my research. 
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I am aware that the project of examining favorable accounts of colonial memory is 
a perilous one because it runs the risk of corroborating Japan’s neoconservative group’s 
attempt to justify the empire’s controversial acts during wartime. The Taiwanese 
colonial nostalgia is at times dangerously self-denigrating when linked to the Japanese 
right wing nationalists, who contend that wartime Japanese occupation in various Asian 
colonies can be invariably justified due to economical development and modernization 
following Japanese ruling. Yet the multiplicity and conflicting ideologies, however 
irrational or illogical, are important clues to investigating the complicated power 
structure and identity formation, which transcends the Taiwanese/Japanese, oppressed/
oppressor, colonized/colonizer, subservience/resistance binaries. My focus lies not on 
Japan per se, nor is my work a revisionist attempt to recreate Japanese colonialism in a 
favorable light. Instead I direct my attention to how, not only the tousans’  generation, 
but also modern Taiwan, comes to terms with its past as the colonized, and realizes that, 
by negating the past, a nation’s trauma can not be undone. In an attempt to map out the 
numerous threads of colonial remembrance, I also examine the presentation of colonial 
memories from various aspects: from the testimonials of a marginalized demographic 
group to that of social elites, from documentaries to cinematic imaginations, and from 
Taiwanese to Japanese presentation. 
The dissertation is organized thematically. My first chapter investigates the 
memories of Taiwanese comfort women. Naturally, the traumatic experiences that they 
endured while serving in “comfort stations,”  a euphemism for Japanese military 
brothels, and which the United Nations has decreed a system of sexual slavery in 1996, 
is a far cry from the colonial nostalgia that others of the same Japanized generation 
might express. The site of my analysis is two documentaries commissioned by the 
Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation (TWRF), Grandmother’s Secret in 1997, and Song 
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of the Reed in 2013. Both films serve the same purpose of raising social awareness of 
the women’s plight, and demanding the Japanese government for compensation and a 
formal apology. I examine why the TWRF found it necessary to produce two 
documentaries featuring the trauma testimonies of the same women. By juxtaposing the 
two films, I trace a shift in their portrayal of “Japan.”  As the 1997 film provides a raw, 
harrowing introduction to the women’s trauma, their female bodies and innocence are 
presented as having fallen prey to a callous, perverse “Japan.”  Sixteen years forward, 
although Song of the Reed interviews the same subjects, it seems to have eliminated the 
nationalistic narrative that relegates the “Japanese”  as the same cruel, perverse enemy 
that the Nationalist Chinese had engaged in an eight-year-long War of Resistance with. 
Rather, Song of the Reed addresses the problematics of the victim and colonial nostalgia
—in particular, how its subjects’ discourses stray from aforementioned narrative, 
articulating their memory even if it does not adhere to a victim’s storyline. 
I contend that the Song of the Reed is a conscious effort—on director Wu Hsiu-
ching’s part as well as the TWRF—to restore the women’s subjectivity, and that such 
effort reflects a societal change in perceiving the women’s tragedy in relation to a 
superimposed nationalist framework. Her highlighting the healing workshops that the 
women attended is instrumental in shedding light on the individuality of their life 
stories, which often undermines a unified, established “perfect victim” narrative. 
I will also reconsider the prevalent belief that the comfort women issue is further 
marginalized in Taiwan due to its incongruity with a “new historical narrative,”  with 
which Taiwan distinguishes itself from China.14 By investigating the publication of 
Kobayashi Yoshinori’s Taiwan-ron in Taiwan, and the ensuing incidents of protests, 
apologies, and mitigation, I argue that the importance of this issue is not marginalized, 
but in fact highly politicized. Indeed, the Taiwanese comfort women issue is treated 
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differently from comfort women narratives in other countries, because of its incongruity 
within the complex postcolonial relationship between Taiwan and Japan as its former 
colonizer. The binarism of victim/oppressor, and Taiwan nationalism/Japan colonialism, 
only provides a partial view of the women’s memories. The women’s traumatic 
memories and those of colonial nostalgia, however, need not to be mutually exclusive. 
From the shift of focus in the two TWRF documentaries on Taiwanese comfort women, 
I observe a cognizant move away from the traditional narrative of the colonized that 
constructs  “Japan”  as a perverse Other to one that allows diverse presentations of 
“Japan.” Furthermore, to break free from Taiwan’s particular entanglement in 
politicizing/nationalizing an essentially humanist issue, I suggest that the redress 
movement advocates need to procure justice for Taiwanese comfort women outside the 
nationalist framework, by accommodating varying, at times contradictory, colonial 
memories. 
In Chapter Two, I track the trajectory of the term “koumin ǡì,”  an antiquated 
word from the Japanese times that remains in active use in modern Taiwan, its complex 
significance existing only in the particularity of Taiwan’s current sociopolitical context. 
Its original honorific meaning “subjects of the emperor”  has taken on a significant 
transformation. Today its implications have multiplied, but the term is generally used 
colloquially to ridicule the Taiwanese (by the Taiwanese) if they are politically or 
culturally inclined towards Japan, therefore betraying the established “Chinese” identity. 
Its particularity in the spatial and historical context of postcolonial Taiwan reflects a 
collective anxiety of liminality, an identity oscillating between Chinese nationalism and 
Japanese colonialism. 
 Specifically Chapter Two is interested in the desire and search for Taiwanese 
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identity that the Koumin writers ǡìm/ ironically tease out. Their literary works 
depict an acute awareness of the difference between a Taiwanese and an imperial 
subject, while mapping out the necessary steps that a non-Japanese subject takes to 
become a koumin—  a “true Japanese.” Prior to the lifting of martial law, they were 
branded as scandalous and received harsh criticism from the literary circle in postwar 
Taiwan. But since the 90s, they were excavated by scholars seeking alternative 
interpretations of their work. 
Among the authors of Koumin literature that faced defacement after the surrender 
of Japan, I chose Chou Chin-po (ÍÄƱ) as my subject in Chapter Two because his 
refusal to redress himself after the war seems to resonate with the colonial nostalgia 
articulated by other writers of his time. While they scrambled to rectify their names and 
offer interpretations to conform to Chinese Nationalist mainstream notion of Japan as 
the enemy state and claimed that they themselves, too, were victims, Chou kept his 
silence even when editors of Collection of Taiwanese Literature branded his work, “The 
Volunteer Soldier,” as “utter Koumin literature”—a text that, “written by ignorant 
youths that destroyed part of the Taiwanese national consciousness,” represents “the fact 
that the enslavement (ɛØ) movement was successful.”15  Chou  is not unlike his peers 
who found themselves muted after the war; Chou, who chose not to offer any self-
explanations, perhaps resembles those who stubbornly held on to their idea of “Japanese 
spirit/value.” In an attempt to understand the obstinacy of his koumin stigma, I closely 
read the text of  “Volunteer Solider” to examine its exclusion from “realistic novels that 
portrayed the Taiwanese’s struggles of undergoing kouminka movement.”16 
All that was unsaid by Chou Chin-po strike a cord with Taiwan’s former President 
Lee Teng-hui’s vocality of his own Japaneseness. Lee’s seemingly unabashed 
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proclamation of being a Japanese person before WWII ended, or when he visited the 
Yasukuni Shrine after the war to pay tribute to his brother whose spirit was enshrined 
there, never fails to draw criticism. And like critics of Chou, critics of Lee also try to 
contain him in the word, Koumin, a “‘Japanese’  without the recognition of Japanese 
citizenship.” But there is also a significant difference between them. While Chou Chin-
bo’s literary efforts are embedded in history, Lee Teng-hui’s indefinable identity of 
“becoming Japanese/Taiwanese”  is a present continuous operation. In other words, 
whereas Chou was a koumin under a colonial framework, Lee is a postcolonial koumin 
as his constant links to past and present Japan is seen as a desire for continuation of his 
Japanese experience. To investigate Lee’s supposed desire to continue a colonial Japan/
Taiwan relationship, I examine the anxiety and commotion that Lee stirred in the 
Taiwanese media in the summer of 2015, when he confessedly stated, in an essay 
submitted to Japan’s Voice magazine, his devotion in fighting for the Japanese Empire 
during his conscription. There came normative attacks on his betrayal to his “Chinese 
roots” as well as his position as the former president of the Republic of China. But there 
were also voices that redirected attention to the element of memory in his recount. I 
argue that the dialectics of remembering and forgetting evoked by Lee’s constant 
provocation is essential to redressing the memories of “becoming Japanese”  and 
“koumin” as the postcolonial Taiwanese move on to “becoming Taiwanese.”
In Chapter Three, I will discuss contemporary films produced by the younger 
generation who had not undergone Japanese education, paying attention to how the 
director, who was educated by KMT-edited textbooks that emphasized Japan’s crimes 
and inhumanity during wartime, viewed the previous generation’s  notion of “Japan.” 
French historian Pierre Nora, in his study of the relation between history and memory, 
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remarks that collective memory is  “in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of 
remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to 
manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being dormant and periodically 
revived.”17 Recent Taiwanese films that touch upon the topic of colonial “Japan,”  and 
the reception and interpretation by the viewers, closely mirror the collective memory’s 
quality of being in a constant flux. Furthermore, the “memory” that is invented in the 
films is more than a romanticization of the Japanese colonial past or simply a 
background to foil the storyline. I will examine the media representation of the 
Japanized generation’s memory by studying the following films by the now-renowned 
director, Wei Te-sheng: Cape No. 7 (2008), Seediq Bale (2011), and Kano (2014, 
produced by Wei and directed by Umin Boya) as well as the entailing critiques 
regarding their presentation of  “Japan.” 
The first section of Chapter Three discusses the element of in-betweenness 
prevalent in the films, as the characters struggle with multiple identities. The second 
part investigates the sense of liminality18 in Wei’s construction of “Taiwanese 
identity”—a throbbing, incomplete sense of being neither here nor there; a constant 
state of “becoming.”  In both sections, I close in on the cinematic texts. Cape No. 7 is a 
blockbuster whose success is considered something of a social phenomenon in Taiwan. 
Despite the film’s popularity, however, its portrayal of an unfinished love story between 
a Japanese teacher and his deserted Taiwanese student prodded the sensitive nerves of 
some viewers who believed that the Taiwanese schoolgirl’s yearning for the love of 
Japanese teacher represents “Taiwan’s own yearning to be recolonized,”19 and prompted 
some critics to question the “Taiwanese subjectivity.”20 While the plot is purely 
fictional, and the wartime romance receives little actual screen time, the reactions it 
spurred demonstrate that the memories of Taiwan’s colonial history and “Japan”  are 
!                                                                                                                           20
susceptible to different interpretations. 
Next I look into the release of Seediq Bale in 2011, the year that marked the 
hundredth anniversary of the Chinese Nationalist government. Celebrations aside, the 
most popular topic of the year, most Taiwanese would point out, was the release of 
Wei’s Seediq Bale, a high-budget epic film that portrays the story of the Wushe Incident 
from the perspective of the aboriginals rather than the dominant Han-Chinese ethnic 
group. While the media focused on the production of the film as “pride of Taiwan,” the 
film inevitably triggered a string of political and historical discussions revolving around 
the presentation of historical realism, heroism versus savagery, as well as the shaping of 
the Japanese characters. In an interview, Wei mentions that when he invited Japanese 
actors to perform in this film, he had specified to them that “the film is not going to 
vilify the Japanese.” However, his attempt seems to have slipped through some viewers, 
who exclaimed their thrill as the Seediq rebels charge at and slaughter the Japanese 
troops. The public recalls the nationalistic criticism Wei had received for Cape No. 7, 
and wonders what they have to say now that Seediq Bale centers on the aboriginals’ 
resistance against Japanese rule. 
The 2014 production of Kano completes Wei’s “Taiwan trilogy”  (or “koumin 
trilogy,”  as some argue). The film, set in 1931, is a story about a tri-racial mongrel 
baseball team struggling to achieve its ultimate glory to play at Japan’s revered Koshien 
Baseball Tournament under the guidance of a Spartan Japanese coach. Although fans 
contend that the film should be enjoyed purely as a chronicling of Taiwan’s sports 
history, its historical particularity and Wei’s insertions of colonial elements all suggest 
that it cannot be read simply as a sports bildungsroman. The presentation of overall 
harmony among the races of Hoklo Taiwanese, Aboriginal, and Japanese working 
towards one unified goal invited criticism questioning the preproduction of this ideal 
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“template of colonial policy,”  comparing it to colonial Japan’s propagandist film, 
Sayon’s Bell (ʲʶʸʨĝ, 1943) which portrayed an aboriginal girl’s willing servility 
to the Japanese empire. A propagandist reading of film that portrays a colonial ideal at 
this juncture in Taiwanese history makes very little sense. Such interpretation is more 
telling in revealing the critique’s uneasiness with colonial history than Wei’s 
sentimentalized depiction of prosperity and modernity under Japanese rule. In this vein, 
one can observe the construction of a new tradition of postmemory in the dialectics 
between the colonial sensibilities presented Wei Te-sheng’s films and their nationalistic 
critics. The opposing camps’  ceaseless conversations regarding the memories 
demonstrate the younger generation’s ambition to reclaim or conserve the once-
manipulated, or deleted, past. 
Chapter Four focuses on three documentaries produced by Japanese directors, 
Taiwan Jinsei (2008) and Taiwan Identity (2013) by Sakai Atsuko, and Wansei Back 
Home (2015) by Tanaka Mika (who is half Taiwanese). Their works on a collection of 
interviews with the Japanized Taiwanese (Sakai), and Taiwanized Japanese (Tanaka), 
arguably epitomize a missing dialogue between Japan and the Taiwanese tousans and 
kaasans who have thus far articulated a desirable Japanese experience to an audience 
that do not share the same sentiments. In Taiwan Jinsei, Sakai aims to shed light, to the 
Japanese audience, on how a group of Taiwanese elders who “were once Japanese” 
lived after the “real”  Japanese left, and how some of them held on to their previous 
identity and “Japanese spirit.”  Her second documentary, Taiwan Identity, looks into a 
darker page in the history of Taiwan, discussing the ensuing turmoil that the Japanized 
Taiwanese’s now-wrong identity has brought upon them—the infamous 228 Massacre 
and White Terror—and their perpetual sense of displacement, of being neither Japanese 
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nor truly Taiwanese. 
Tanaka Mika’s Wansei Back Home focuses on subjects whose direction of gaze 
moves in a diagonally opposite direction. Wansei ǟ$ is a derogatory term to describe 
Japanese who were born in Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945). 
After their repatriation to Japan after WWII ended, they felt a distinctive 
“Taiwaneseness”  in them that separated them from the other Japanese, and perceived 
Taiwan as their “homeland.”  Similar to the “tousans”  in Taiwan, the wanseis also 
endured silencing and obscurity due to discrimination against the “impurity”  of their 
(Japanese) identity. And like the tousans, the silencing was unable to contain their 
mounting, problematic nostalgia for the past. Tanaka’s Wansei Back Home reverses the 
course of home-coming, strongly suggesting that the wanseis’s returning to Taiwan to 
seek their roots is another form of repatriation. 
Juxtaposing both the Japanized Taiwanese’s and the Taiwanized Japanese’s 
diasporas in their respective “homelands”  poses an important rupture in the perception 
of colonial history. Theirs are narratives that cannot be contained in the binarism of the 
colonizer/colonized or the master/subaltern. I also argue that their colonial nostalgia is 
not a yearning for the return of colonialism, but a selective remembrance to keep values 
that they associate with the particular temporal context, or in Pierre Nora’s words, 
“certain sites where historical continuity persists.”21  Interestingly, the different subjects 
of Taiwan Jinsei and Wansei Back Home are delineated both as people who were 
“tossed about and teased by torrents of history ʹƒʧŊƮʞʮʡ”  by the Japanese 
(see figure 1.5), suggesting a sense of futility of personal struggles against the grand 
narrative of history. Perhaps it is with the sense of futility that Sakai’s and Tanaka’s 
documentaries invoke empathy in the viewers for the elders’  collectively “wrong” 
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identities. I contend that the preservation and reshaping of these memories are the 
younger generation’s effort to reincorporate what was left out of official history back 
into the fold of collective memory. 
Unlike Ke De-san’s generation, the younger Taiwanese did not experience the 
imposition of allegiance from Japan to KMT’s (Taiwanese) “China.” They do not need 
to struggle with contradicting pulls between the oppressed experience as a colonized, 
and the attractive advancement of modernity. Their mass consumption of the “fragrance 
of modernity” via trendy gadgets or the ever enticing J-pop culture is more or less guilt-
free. Identifying with Japanese character in a film or TV show could well be contained 
neatly in realms of consumerism. However, like Ke and the people of his time, their 
memory of Taiwan’s colonial past, though obtained by a secondhand postmemory, is 
shaped by the social context in which they live. While this form of memory feels more 
distant, it is no less tangible. As the official writing of history in Taiwan is deemed a 
suspicious source of information, the act of (post)memory is a competition with those in 
the dominant position for the privilege of articulating Taiwan’s past. With the change in 
political climate, “what is Taiwanese?” has become an important question, and the 
Chinese popular memory created by the KMT was insufficient in distinguishing the 
Taiwanese subjectivity. Hence, the once obfuscated Japanese past is enlisted in a new 
dialectic of remembering and forgetting. How is remembrance of “Japan” significant in 
balancing the equilibrium of Chinese nationalism? To what purpose had the new 
generation “manipulated” or “appropriated” their grandparents’ memory? These are 
some of the questions I would like to find the answers to. Taiwan today seems 
indecisive, disparate, or even schizophrenic in its historic viewpoints, as the title of Ke’s 
autobiography, My motherland is Japan, my fatherland is Taiwan: confessions of a 
“Japanese-speaking tribe” Taiwanese, (2005, ŵ-ʩ4hʽȃ-ʩĎǟ: Ýʭ4hă
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ƼĎǟ
ʨĈ) implies. Taiwan’s plethora of past occupations by foreign hands have 
each left their fingerprint on what constitute legitimacy, justice, or the “truth.” Hence, 
the young generation’s de-colonization efforts, interpretation of “Japan” in their culture 
and formation of “becoming Taiwanese” is, in fact, no less complicated than Ke’s 
generation. 
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Chapter 1 
Revisiting Trauma, Re-Visioning “Japan”:  
the Remaking of Taiwanese Comfort Women Documentary 
A young man in the audience raised his hand during the discussion session at the 
screening of Song of the Reed (ȺʁRĄ) in 2013.1 Song of the Reed is a Taiwanese 
documentary highlighting the life stories of five survivors of military sexual slavery 
(comfort women) during the Asia-Pacific War. He commented on one comfort woman’s 
testimony, in which a potential romance with a Japanese soldier was briefly mentioned. 
“She must have remembered wrong,”  said the man, expressing his incredulity of the 
testimony. “Such a [Japanese] figure,”  he continued, “probably did not exist. He must 
have been made up by her wishful thinking.” His dubiety at the elder woman’s memory 
is perhaps due to the awareness of the shifty nature of memories. But more likely it has 
to do with the incongruity between this anecdote and the paradigmatic narratives of the 
comfort women: stories about abducted women who were forcibly thrown into sexual 
slavery to aggressive Japanese soldiers. The film’s incidental capturing of a “good” 
memory during traumatic times reveals how memories often stray from prescriptive 
scenarios of justice and national dignity. 
Indeed, trauma testimonies at times deviate from our notions of a “perfect victim.” 
The young man’s skepticism also reflects the ambivalence and anxiety of the current 
Taiwanese consciousness in determining what contradictory roles Japan played in the 
colonial past. Were the Japanese exploitive masters or benevolent instructors? After 
nearly 70 years of the island’s unresolved colonialism and re-colonization by the 
Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang; hereafter KMT), Taiwanese, both the Japanized 
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and their KMT-educated descendants, still find themselves in a tangled web of 
(Japanese) nostalgia and (Chinese) nationalism. Many a Japanese-educated elder would 
give a nostalgic testimony of the Japan Era. A few would even go so far as to wishfully 
consider themselves actual Japanese.2 
It is typically assumed, however, that the Taiwanese comfort women who lived 
during the same period as they did would remember differently. They would depict the 
Japanese colonizers as militant and brutal, just as other East Asian communities like 
China and Korea do. Their memories of Japan seem displaced in the small interstice 
between a Chinese nationalist antagonism towards a war enemy and a paradoxical 
Taiwanese nostalgia for an ex-ruler. I expected the Taiwanese comfort women’s redress 
movement to be a straightforward quest for an official acknowledgment from Japan. 
However, in the course of my research on this subject, I have come to see it as a 
paradoxical, discursive discourse that challenges not only Japan, but Taiwan’s own 
reflection upon its status as a formerly colonized, and its concept of itself as a “nation,” 
and the incongruity within its own “imagined community.” 
This chapter focuses on the aspect of memories that touch on the comfort women 
issue—not just of the survivors themselves, but also of other colonial subjects who lived 
with them during the same period. Compared to the exorbitant amount of media hype on 
Japanese colonial occupation of Taiwan, studies on and records of Taiwanese comfort 
women seem scarce. As the women recount their painful experiences with a militantly 
brutal system that swindled them out of their sexual innocence and normal lives, 
sometimes they are met with counter-memories from their Taiwanese contemporaries 
who came to the defense of their offender. For example, memories of those who 
believed in the integrity of the Japanese military of providing better management and 
care for the comfort stations, and those who alluded to the practice in poor households 
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that sold their daughters into prostitution. 
The first section of this chapter examines the two films—Grandmother’s Secret: the 
stories of Taiwanese Comfort Women and Song of the Reed—both produced by the 
Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation (TWRF), documenting the comfort women’s highly 
politicized stories of their protest against the Japanese government and their survival. 
Specifically it draws attention to the shift in focus in the continued endeavor of the two 
documentaries, and the discrepancy between personal memories, and the impact created 
on postcolonial narratives in Taiwan. The earlier production’s telling of the women’s 
stories puts forth a strong accusation against a perverse, brutal “Japan,” placing the onus 
of making amends entirely on the perpetrator; whereas the recent presentation takes on a 
psychotherapeutic approach, highlighting a more pluralistic portrayal of “Japan” as well 
as some of the victims’  willingness to come to terms with “Japan.”  The shift from 
condemnation to reconciliation not only reshapes the victim’s relationship with trauma 
memory, but it also implies a renewed gaze on Imperial Japan. The second section will 
be devoted to the analysis of personal and political boundaries of these memories, and 
how they contest with other colonial memories. The discourses of the two films move in 
diametrically opposing directions: Grandmother’s Secret pushes the personal trauma 
outward into the public sphere to inform, whereas Song of the Reed pulls the issue 
inward, focusing on the objective process of healing. I also use Kobayashi Yoshinori '
ſƁƙ’s Taiwan Ron  ĎƲé to illustrate the tension and contentions between the 
positive memories of the Japanese colonial regime and the comfort women movement 
narratives, which often lean toward nationalistic criticism against “Japan”  as a national 
enemy. Colonial memories presented in Taiwan Ron that argue coercion was not 
involved in the conscription of the women do not necessarily signify support for the 
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Japanese military’s organized sexual violence, nor an attempt to cover up for Japan’s 
war crimes, but, if taken as a fact, demonstrate the limitation of one’s knowledge and 
experience. I agree that justice needs to be demanded, but I argue that contesting 
memories need not negate each other; instead, looking into the area of disputed 
memories could reveal the complexities of relationships between the colonized and their 
colonizers, as well as the internal relationship among the former colonized. Not only is 
it necessary to help the women to come to terms with their trauma, but the internal 
oppositions inside Taiwan regarding the colonial past must come to terms with each 
other. 
The Secret and the Song 
Song of the Reed, a 2013 production, is the second documentary on the comfort women 
presented by TWRF, featuring the aging former comfort women and the process of 
making peace with their past. The film’s predecessor was produced in 1997, five years 
after the initial outcries emerged against the Japanese military’s systematic sexual 
violence during World War II. Song of the Reed interviewed the same subjects, who 
delivered similar accounts of their terrible experiences as they did 16 years before. But 
why do we need another film on this same subject? How does the 2013 documentary’s 
revisiting of the Taiwanese comfort women depart from its predecessor? As the 
memories of Japan as a perpetrator persist, did time serve to harden, or soften the gaze 
towards this “public enemy?” 
Titled Grandmother’s Secret: the Stories of Taiwanese Comfort Women (ůɷƕ
ƚ˃Ďȴʑǲǌʒč@), the 1997 documentary provided a platform for the 
women to divulge their illicit pasts to the public, secrets that they had hidden from their 
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own families out of shame and fear of dishonor. Captured on camera, their pain and 
accusations against the Japanese government were raw and dramatic (see Figure 2.1). In 
one footage, a woman flings her body against her mother’s gravestone, wailing like a 
child. “If only you knew what they did to me!” she weeps bitterly. In another, she lifts a 
corner of her shirt to reveal a long, red, gnarling scar that resulted from being injured 
while working as a comfort woman. The grating sound bites and striking images 
viscerally convey the harsh reality that the women faced, and carve out a space in 
viewers’  collective memory for the women’s trauma. Beside the gory exposure of old 
scars, physical and emotional, which were directly inflicted by the Japanese military, 
this film also sheds light on the indirect wounds it imposed—the women’s sense of 
shame and their broken lives after their return. 
In this documentary, some of the interviews were conducted at the site where the 
women’s torment took place. Strolling down a path in leafy rural Hualian, Lin Shen-
chung ſƏ leads her interviewer to the abandoned mine where she was first raped as 
a 17-year-old girl, and then repeatedly and surreptitiously trucked back, along with 
other young girls, to the pitch dark cave everyday for more torment and humiliation. 
One of the interviewers, human rights attorney and founder of TWRF, Wang Ching-feng 
Ş§ǫ, gently rubs her back and apologizes for having to bring her back. Apologetic as 
Wang is, “bringing her back,”  revisiting the locale of the infliction is an important 
element in this film. At the time of filming, it was clear that the women’s personal 
trauma needed to enter the public sphere, where it would encounter an audience, who 
has been unknowingly sharing the same space as the trauma, would listen and learn of 
what happened. The title “Grandmother’s Secret”  suggests reluctance on the women’s 
part to divulge these particularly traumatic memories, but also, perhaps inappropriately, 
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lures the viewers with the prospect of learning someone’s clandestine past. Given the 
humanitarian nature of TWRF, this choice of presentation is perhaps a strategy on the 
foundation’s part to bend the disinterested Taiwanese public’s ear to listen to what the 
women need to say. 
The documentary brought another comfort woman, Lu Man-mei ɬÚĮ, overseas 
to Hainan Island ôĚ to tell her story. “Everything is different now,”  she repeats to 
her interviewer, waving a hand at the landscape and new building structures. A school 
stands at the site where her comfort station once was. The shot shifts to innocent faces 
of young school girls, whose obliviousness to the old woman’s sufferings and the 
history of the locale is transparent. The camera then shifts again, to a local man 
explaining that the tiles on his roof are taken from the wartime Japanese constructions 
and that he lined the material on his roof using the same techniques the Japanese had 
used. This clip is indicative of how easily comfort women can be swept under the rug of 
history, had Lu Man-mei not revisited the site and retell her story. While remnants of 
old building blocks are repurposed and shift shape into another institution, the women’s 
trauma takes on the invisible form of internal struggle. 
“Long ago when a bride-to-be is rejected after the engagement, the man’s family 
would have to pay hush money (ȳȍÙ, translated into “fee to hide shame”) to 
compensate for the damage of her reputation,”  Lu Man-mei says when she speaks of 
asking for compensation from the Japanese government.3 It is telling that she compares 
her experience of rape and sexual torment to that of a rejected bride. According to 
traditional codes of ethics, for a woman to be turned down by her betrothed, whether or 
not the marriage has been consummated, results in her virtue being irreversibly sullied. 
The rejection brings shame not only onto the woman, but her entire clan. Having been 
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passed on by numerous men to other men, Lu Man-mei’s association of her past as a 
comfort women with the repeated denouncement of a banished bride, reflects her 
mourning of not just her tormented youth, but the irretrievable loss of her value as a 
woman. The damaged prospect of a marriage and how a tarnished reputation hinders her 
rehabilitation in a patriarchal society add insult to the bodily injuries that were inflicted 
upon her.4 Indeed, as the film reveals, after their return most interviewees faced 
rejection from family members and later their husbands. To avoid gossip they start anew 
by uprooting and relocating to other towns, but there further hardship awaits for women 
with scarce resource and no support. All interviewees struggle with poverty and broken 
relationships with their partners. They see this post-comfort-women struggle as a direct 
consequence of the Japanese army’s abuse, and therefore hold Japan accountable for 
their rape, and everything that happens since then. 
 In interviews in Grandmother’s Secret, several women emphasize their sexual 
inexperience prior to their captivity. Between sobs, Huang A-tao ŎůǇ  discloses that 
she was a “clean and pure maiden”  at the time of victimization; in Lin Shen-chung’s 
testimony, a male voice (that belongs to her translator, as she speaks little Chinese) tells/
translates that she was a seventeen-year-old virgin. This was before the 2001 publication 
of Taiwan Ron, a Japanese comic by Kobayashi Yoshinori which somehow ignited the 
pointless argument regarding whether all comfort women should be considered victims 
if some had volunteered their bodies. The stress on sexual inexperience does not really 
count as an attempt to clarify against doubts regarding their virtue. It is reported that 
some of the women were already working as prostitutes prior to working for the 
military brothels, or may have voluntarily applied for the position rather than being 
coerced into it. The emphasis on their sexual innocence in the film risks perpetuating 
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that their pain is only grievable if their bodies were untouched by debauchery before 
their downfall, that their cause is worth supporting and blames are placeable on the 
Japanese if they were “good women.”  The implications, while dismissible to the 
modern viewer, are telling of the ostracization the Taiwanese society displayed to the 
women after their fall from grace. (Indeed, the observation of family banishment or self-
imposed exile recurs in the second documentary and I will discuss the harsh 
environment for the comfort women’s rehabilitation later in the chapter.) Taiwan’s 
predominantly patriarchal ideology at the time, as presented in Grandmother’s  Secret, 
which evaluated a woman’s virtue by her (lack of) sexuality, could be considered an 
accomplice in the tormenting of the women. 
In stark contrast to the women’s innocence, the film’s portrayal of Japanese image 
is not only brutal, but also dark and perverse. Wu Hsiu-mei’s ȄǕĮ testimony 
describes her cell in Guandong, China, and how her bed was positioned underneath a 
small sky window in the ceiling. Many times, either during “work” or during her break, 
she sees a silhouette of a man looming over the window, peering into her space. Her 
narration voices over an irksome animation of a man’s dark shadow growing in a 
window, against the backdrop of a moonlit night, his eyes glistening and peering down 
at the woman. This animation depicts not only the Japanese violation into the women’s 
physical boundary, but the invasion of their psychological domain. While the portrayal 
is based on the woman’s narration, the ghoulish characterization is based on the 
director’s simulation of the comfort woman’s fear. The director’s attempt to give the 
intruders outside the window a terrifying quality renders them a horrible Other, one that 
the Taiwanese viewers ought to despise and expel. Or perhaps, given the comfort 
women’s then marginalized and forsaken position, the caricature is a tactic to embrace 
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this Other back into the fold by creating an even more aberrant Other. 
This was in the early stages of readying the appeals to Tokyo, when the Taiwanese 
society was still muddled with the conceptualization of “comfort women.”5 
Grandmother’s Secret cannot afford to rely on nuance to convey the women’s suffering 
and urgency. Hence the cameras readily zoom in on the spectacles of heightened drama, 
urging the viewers to look closely at writhing scars and tearful grimaces. The women’s 
innocence and pain offer a sharp contrast against the coercion and brutality of Imperial 
Japan and later, the coolness and indifference of a post-war Japanese government.  The 
purpose of the documentary was clear—to inform the Taiwanese public of the elder 
women’s ordeal and to gather enough momentum to demand accountability from a 
powerful government. It prompted the women to revisit the site of victimization, and 
remap the repressed past. Even so, the Tokyo Supreme Court rejected their final appeal 
in 2009, and until today the Japanese government has not yet issued an apology or 
compensation that the women and their support groups deem acceptable. 
In 2013, the making of Song of the Reed took a dramatic turn on the same issue. 
Urging the Japanese government for formal apology and proper compensation is still 
relevant and resolute, but the emphasis has shifted to helping the former comfort 
women make peace with their trauma (see Figure 2.2). Like its 1997 predecessor, it is 
charged with emotions and its camera still closely follows facial expressions of the 
surviving women, clinging onto their every word and emotion. However, instead of 
focusing on the spectacles of trauma, director Wu Hsiu-ching ȄǕɳ takes the 
approach of highlighting their healing process through documenting the Comfort 
Women Healing Workshops, hosted by TWRF. The women’s stories are retold through 
sessions of group therapy, which allows the viewers to see the women forming 
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relationships and connecting with one another through their mourning. This greatly 
departs from the previous documentary where there is a clear cut between the segments 
of each woman’s story. 
Along with soothing violin background music, Song of the Reed inserts quotes from 
the Ecclesiastes 3:7: “A time to kill, and a time to heal; a time to break down, and a time 
to build up; a time to weep, and a time to laugh; a time to mourn, and a time to dance; 
[…] A time to rend, and a time to sew; a time to keep silence, a time to speak.”  This 
religious passage, titled “To Everything There is a Season,”  instills a sense of calmness 
among the women experiencing tumultuous upheavals of emotions. It is significant 
because it offers “a structure of feeling”  to the documentary that aims to capture 
divergent sides of the stories. When each incident is given an allotted frame in time, 
pain and trauma can be expected to eventually yield to the (seemingly impossible) task 
of healing. 
In this respect, it is interesting to note that, quite contrary to previous productions 
(films and books) on the subject of the trauma of comfort women, Song of the Reed 
includes positive presentations related to colonial “Japan.”  In one of the group therapy 
sessions, the elder women dance merrily to “Momotaro,”  (see Figure 2.3) a traditional 
Japanese children’s ballad that many of the colonized generation are familiar with. 
Conceivably, they may have learned this song as children, and it is linked to their 
memory of an age that harks back to innocence and purity, when their bodies and minds 
were still unspoiled by war. The choice of this song suggests that TWRF and the 
survivors, though struggling with a Japanese-inflicted trauma, do not exclude “Japan” 
memories when “a time to dance” approaches. Wittingly or unwittingly, the atrocities of 
a Japanese military brothel and the better times in life that contained Japanese 
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influences are rendered separable.  
Though tackling a highly sensitive and nationalistic issue, Song of the Reed is also 
different from other productions in that it offers an alternative image of comfort women 
as well as the “Japanese,”  with the inclusion of long-time Japanese sympathizers, who 
appeared to have established camaraderie with the women. The Japanese supporters 
were also interviewed and given air time to express their thoughts, lending “Japan” a 
more direct form of representation than secondary presentation through the testimonies 
of the women. The documentary, for instance, underscores visits to Taiwan by members 
of a support group from Japan including Aitani Kunio źǴɔǎ, an attorney, and Shiba 
Yoko ɏƥ*, Asai Kiriko ǖȪɱ*. Shots of them engaged in warm greetings with the 
women display softer, more personal links between the citizens of the two nations 
regarding this thorny subject. “We’ve been friends for decades, haven’t we?”  Aitani 
says in a footage, to a bed-ridden Lu Man-mei, one of the survivors, who converses 
with him fluently in Japanese. One supporter from Kyoto is quoted as having said, 
while reflecting on the urgency of issuing a state apology, “very soon [after all the 
comfort women pass away], the people who can forgive us will no longer be there.” The 
portrayal of these Japanese figures challenges the normative portrayal of Japan as a 
cool, uncaring political mechanism, impervious to discussions of Japan’s past war 
crimes. The documentary’s highlight on friendship between the Taiwanese comfort 
women and their Japanese sympathizers seems to exude optimism regarding the 
possibility of reconciliation between the colonized and the colonizer (albeit not the 
actual colonizer/perpetrator themselves). 
Even so, Song of the Reed’s takes of the elder women often suggest that the women 
have lived in a liminal space between life and death since their time in captivity, which 
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ranged from one to three years. They are now in their 80s or 90s, making their time as 
comfort women a relatively small portion in their long lives. Wu’s shots of Hsiu-mei as 
she sits alone in her living room offers the viewers a taste of liminality for what seems 
like an eternity. The woman’s expression does not reveal to the viewers whether she is 
staring into a television or mere blankness. The only motion comes from her electric fan 
that mechanically breathes air into the shot. She appears to be doing nothing, or she 
could be waiting—for the next sentence in an ongoing conversation, or for someone to 
enter the room. This moment of nothingness is magnified through the camera, and 
impregnated with meaning (see Figure 2.4). More than twenty years have passed since 
their first protest, and the women are still waiting for a closure.  
The quality of liminality does not eclipse Wu’s portrayal of the women’s 
subjectivity in articulating their trauma, however. Wu separates “the comfort woman 
experience” from the women themselves, and rewrites trauma by breaking the mold of a 
stereotypical image of abuse victims. Situated in the interstices of grand narratives of 
nations, the comfort women are easily seen as a faceless group sharing the same 
tragedy. In the earlier days of protests, the women guarded their privacy by covering 
their faces with wide brim hats and masks; in some press conferences, they sat 
collectively behind a large board revealing only their feet. But Wu’s documentary shows 
that, though sharing similar grief and the same goal, the group of individuals have more 
than one corporate, monolithic voice. In filming the women’s healing process, she 
captured varying degrees of various emotions: the expected anger and anguish, but also 
forgiveness and moments of peace. An exalting highlight of the film is a scene of (self-) 
reconciliation when Hsiu-mei quietly talks to a token, an empty chair draped in fabrics 
of her choice, which represents all the Japanese soldiers who tormented her: “regardless 
of our entangled past, I now set you free. I forgive you.”  She then tells another token 
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that symbolizes her young self: “I also forgive you. I know you had a difficult time. You 
were cheated. I know you did not mean for it to happen.”  In a televised interview, Wu 
concludes that Song of the Reed represents the reconciliation between nations and 
people.6 While Hsiu-mei’s testimony and forgiveness concern only herself, it is an 
uplifting indication of a possibility that the comfort woman, a marginalized figure 
whose perpetrator has not admitted to committing his crimes, can make peace with 
trauma and her past self. Focusing on their healing process somehow liberates the 
women from the passive role of a victim, because it allows them to strip off the sense of 
shame from the label of “comfort women,”  and voice their “forgiveness”  to their 
perpetrator. It is ironic that such forgiveness is unasked for. It seems that they are 
pitching this pardon into the void at best because there is no actual recipient. It only 
serves to demonstrate their willingness to come to terms with a terrible past. This 
forgiveness in no way absolves the Japanese government of its duties to make amends, 
as TWRF, which produced the documentaries, is adamant in their pursuit of procuring 
adequate compensation. However, despite the unresolved status regarding state 
compensation and formal apologies, the 2013 Taiwanese documentary offers an 
alternative route to remedy a national trauma. Song  of  the  Reed’s shift of focus to 
comfort women as a humanitarian issue, rather than a transnational political one, lifts 
the trauma above the contentions of political dispute. 
The Comfort Women Issue in Taiwan 
Deemed a Japan-friendly country, Taiwan is often considered an anomaly from other 
former Japanese colonies. Yet the voices of the Taiwanese comfort women who suffered 
outrageous sexual and psychological abuse—abuse condoned by the Imperial Japanese 
Army—remain an incongruent factor contributing to the ambivalence of the Taiwanese 
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gaze towards Japan. The women’s identity as Taiwanese and as comfort women resists 
categorization, like a jagged piece of puzzle that would not fit into place. They share a 
common perpetrator with the comfort women from Korea and China where hostility 
against Japan remains high for 70 years after the war ended. Their compatriots, 
however, often harbor favorable views of Imperial Japan, looking towards the vestiges 
of modernizing effort from the colonial past of Taiwan—robust architecture and well-
crafted infrastructures still in use. Though the atrocious details in their testimonies—
coercion, daily rape and abuse by succession of soldiers, irreparable damages to their 
bodies and rehabilitation into society—garnered attention and sympathy from their 
countrymen, the reluctant momentum it gathered was not enough to make demands to 
the Japanese government for a formal apology and compensation in a similar powerful 
fashion as the Koreans did.7 There is an impression that those who gave their cause the 
most vocal support are people who fled to Taiwan from mainland China with General 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist troops, who also see Japan as the common aggressor.8 In 
the following pages, I will discuss how contending memories of the Japanese era and 
the frictions between different political ideologies affect the presentation and formation 
of the Taiwanese comfort women discourse. 
In February 1992, a former representative at the House of Representatives in the 
National Diet of Japan, Hideko Itoh ȊǕ*, uncovered three telegraphs in the 
archives of the library of the National Institute of Defense Studies in Japan. Dated 
March 12th, 1942, they were requests sent to the Japanese Army to ship fifty healthy 
“comfort personnel”  to Borneo. The personnel were girls conscripted by the Japanese 
military commander in Taiwan at the request of the South Regions Headquarters. The 
evidence of Taiwanese comfort women’s existence thus came to light, and immediately 
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TWRF rose to the task of investigating and collecting testimonials of the survivors. 
Their effort has managed to raise some previously unheard voices. However, due to 
Taiwan’s complex relationship with Japan, the women’s personal past and even their 
private bodies have become a public arena, where opposing political discourses are 
pitted against each other, each fighting for the right to interpret the trauma. The 
women’s stories were quickly incorporated by oppositional camps to create a narrative 
of “Japan”  that fits with their ideology. Yet what makes this more complex is that the 
women’s memories, experiences, and perspectives are diverse and occasionally deviate 
from a paradigmatic narrative. For over twenty years, with lukewarm sympathy, the 
Taiwanese society is still trying to figure out how to place their comfort women within 
the framework of Taiwanese subjectivity and its relationship with its former colonizer. 
Wu Tzu-hsuan notes in her research that the comfort women redress movements 
have not met with adequate support from the Taiwanese people not only due to bias and 
overall disinterest in their cause,9 but also the hindrance by the “Japanese generation’s” 
belief that these women entered the service voluntarily. In her defense for the redress 
movement, she vehemently dismisses such belief as unsubstantiated by any “historical 
documents to prove their allegations.”  Wu’s castigation of the lack of support for the 
comfort women in Taiwan does make an important point: the redress movement runs 
the double tasks of beseeching the Japanese government to recognize their pain, and 
justifying themselves as actual victims not just to the Japanese but also to their own 
people. However, Wu’s failure to honor contending memories, whether she approves or 
not, highlights the dilemma of oral history—its limit of representing one person’s 
personal experience and perspective. And more often than not, memories have the 
tendency not to fully corroborate with “historical documents.” 
Political scientist Shogo Suzuki also notes in his 2011 research the “dearth”  of 
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attention paid to Taiwanese comfort women. He indicates that the memories of the 
Taiwanese comfort women have been overridden by a “new historical narrative” in 
Taiwan’s pursuit of constructing a Chinese Other, namely, a “new”  brand of identity 
created to distinguish Taiwan from China, and to counter KMT’s Sinocentric education.
10   This “new narrative”  would emphasize the benign aspects of the Japanese colonial 
regime, while drawing attention to KMT’s historical wrongs. And as an unintended 
result, the comfort women’s plight received less support as it runs against the grain of 
this narrative. He further draws example from presidential advisor Shi Wen-long  þd
Ũ’s comments—presented in the form of comics by Yoshinori Kobayashi’s 2001 
publication of Taiwan Ron—which denies that comfort women were forcibly recruited. 
Under such a political climate, Taiwanese comfort women lack a consolidated national 
force to push for an apology from the Japanese government, partly due to political 
disputes over the construction of Taiwanese identity. He attributes the inadequate 
attention for Taiwanese comfort women to the insufficient memory space on the part of 
Taiwanese society, so that other memories are prioritized over comfort women 
memories for societal acknowledgment and the nation’s to-do list. 
 I contend that arguments between political parties (mainly, parties that uphold a 
more Sinocentric philosophy and a more pro-independence liaison) did not further 
aggravate the comfort women issue’s marginalization in the Taiwanese society, or have 
kept in check the memories resurfacing since the 1990s. The comfort women issue had 
not been pushed out of collective memory by “competing memories,”  but contrarily, it 
became the center of attention in the battles of the parties. Indeed, since the comfort 
women plight first came to the knowledge of the public in 1992, it has been more or less 
deemed as a KMT campaign. It seems to sit better with the KMT notion of a wartime 
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“Japan,”  one that instigated the Rape of Nanking, that resulted in the slaughter of 
hundreds of thousands of civilians; one that the Nationalist Chinese (KMT) were at war 
with for eight years, resulting in a weakened Chinese nation and broken homes. In this 
vein, the Japanese brutality inflicted upon the women is counted towards the brutality 
against Chinese during the Sino-Japanese war. When KMT retreated to Taiwan, one of 
its tasks was to construct a unified, homogenous Chinese identity, and any Taiwanese 
counter-Japan efforts were considered or incorporated as part of its campaign. However, 
I argue that Taiwan’s construction of what Shogo Suzuki refers to as a “Chinese Other” 
identity does not necessarily exclude the memories of comfort women. There is more to 
Taiwan’s construction of subjectivity than the Japan/China dichotomy, and indeed, if 
Taiwan positions itself as “Chinese Other,”  memories that are incongruous with the 
Othering will be pushed further out of the collective memory. But these memories do 
not negate the trauma articulation of the Taiwanese comfort women. 
In Japan, history textbooks have evoked criticism regarding the limited presentation 
or exclusion of the information on comfort women.11 Since the first appending of 
comfort women history in 2001, Taiwanese history textbooks have not been less 
contentious. In July 2015, a group of high school students stormed the Ministry of 
Education in Taiwan and staged a sit-in against the ministry’s approval of “minor 
readjustment”  to curriculum guidelines. Among many proposed changes, the textbook 
presentation of comfort women rose to the center of argument. The curriculum 
committee proposed to append a passage that states “all comfort women were forced,” 
whose accuracy was questioned by a student activist.12 The exchange revived the old 
“volunteer or forced”  debate, and quickly steered into precarious directions. As heated 
debates and legal threats by the ministry ensued, the events culminated in one of the 
leader student activists committing suicide. Some interpreted his death as a drastic 
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measure to push for change to the curriculum guidelines, which are considered by 
protesters to have “pro-China links.”13 
Nearly a month after the student’s death, United Daily News ĳ²ê published an 
essay in an opinion column indicating that if the student had watched Song of the Reed 
and had been enlightened by its “provided evidence” of the plight of comfort women, he 
would not have taken his life for a false political belief.14 The editorial then suggested 
that the student’s tragedy had been incited by the Democratic Progressive Party ìȀ 
presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen and her party’s support of a wrong curriculum 
guideline, and urged them to watch the documentary as well. TWRF promptly reacted 
the following day, releasing a public statement against the editorial that the fight for 
comfort women is a humanitarian issue, and strongly condemns any media or party to 
use the women, the documentary, or the Foundation for their political gain.15 This is the 
second statement that TWRF released regarding the curriculum changes to the 
presentation of comfort women. It states that such actions obfuscate focus on the 
women’s adversity, and impede the growth of the comfort women narrative in Taiwan. 
As the only organization in Taiwan that advocated for the comfort women’s redress 
movement for the past two decades, the statement speaks volumes in reclaiming the 
victims of Japanese war crimes from the framework of Sino-Japanese opposition and 
patriarchal discourse. This exchange illustrates how readily Taiwanese cultural 
hegemony dominates the interpretation of female trauma, and that TWRF has honed its 
awareness on the trespassing of nationalist discourse upon the female body and female 
voice. 
As psychoanalyst Peng Jenyu points out in her studies, the Taiwanese public tends 
to link the efforts of TWRF and comfort women to the KMT party and its liaisons.16 It 
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is because, when understood within the nationalist framework of pro-unification with 
China or pro-Taiwan independence, the comfort women issue becomes one that could 
sting the pro-independence camp and their liaisons with a benign version of 
“Japan”  (either present or past). Dismissive of the editorial’s politicization of the 
women’s tragedy, the TWRF statement shows its resistance against affiliation with this 
political background, and steers in the direction of something more universal than the 
China/Japan dichotomy. Concluding the statement, TWRF further underlines its 
neutrality to any political parties, attesting that the foundation belongs to the whole 
“Taiwanese society,”  and that in search for the possibility to reconcile, opposition and 
hatred need to be cast aside. However, this should not be read as acquitting Japan of the 
responsibility for their war crimes. Although the advocates of Taiwanese comfort 
women strive to elevate the issue above the domestic, ideological disagreements, it is 
hard to say if such de-politicization effort could extend to transnational discourse. When 
met with challenges of varying historical viewpoints, political mobilization, or 
international justice, the private/domestic discourse of Taiwanese comfort women could 
once again face problematics of being instrumentalized and their cause risks becoming 
dissipated, or incorporated into the domineering discourse. 
From the arguments between the aforementioned camps emerged a difficult 
question that had long left the comfort women debate unsettled: “was the woman a 
willing participant?”  Peng has insightfully reframed this question by posing a new 
question of whether Japan’s “comfort women system”  is seen as sexual slavery or 
sexual industry.17 At first glance, her query may seem unnecessary, for in 1996, the 
United Nations concluded in a special report to U.N. Human Rights Commission that 
Japan needs to make amends for its involvement in forcing women into sexual slavery. 
Since then, this special report has ruled as consensus in the countries dealing with the 
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comfort women issue. Peng’s observation, however, sheds light on the complexity of 
the issue, and in particular, on why “willing participation”  rhetorics continues to gnaw 
at the issue. The comfort women received treatments that greatly differed depending on 
the location, the degree of aggravation of the war, and the women’s race. In the case of 
Taiwanese comfort women, they were often sent to privately owned brothels, whose 
operation required visiting soldiers to purchase tickets to receive sexual service. This 
ostensible form of business transaction obscures the hidden nature of rape and slavery, 
and feeds the rhetoric that a military prostitute is, in fact, a wage-paying job that women 
of challenging social strata would willingly apply for. However, regardless of the 
methods of conscription, Peng agrees that, given the inhuman treatment of the female 
bodies and the suppression of free will in the brothels, along with the imminent threat of 
death, the system is essentially sexual slavery. Indeed, most of the Taiwanese comfort 
women were born from families of lower social strata, and while some may have 
entered the service knowing its true nature,18 the abuse they endured in the camps does 
not deny them their victimhood.  
“Willing participant or not?” appears to be a cruel, irrelevant question to pose to the 
victims of sexual violence, but its repeated, and perhaps inevitable, emergence indicates 
the public’s desire to weigh the extent of Japan’s crimes. The effect, or damage it causes 
to aggravate or lessen Japan’s responsibility for the women is beyond the scope of my 
discussion. My focus is how these exchanges from opposing sides shape the view of the 
younger Taiwanese generation, including the aforementioned student activists, on 
Taiwan’s relationship with Japan. The descendants of the Japanized generation did not 
experience the colonial period firsthand. Their judgment of Japan is shaped by 
anecdotes in their private circle of family (which could be positive), and history lessons 
they took at school, designed and written by the KMT government (which are most 
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likely negative).19 The supporters of the comfort women nicknamed them “ah-ma,”  or 
Grandmother, perhaps in an attempt to draw more familial empathy from the public on 
this issue. By appropriating the women as everyone’s own grandmother, the women’s 
personal humiliation expands to the level of a national indignation, and their trauma 
becomes inheritable by the whole community. 
During a 2003 workshop session for former comfort women,20 the women were 
asked to extract good memories from their harrowing past. About half of the attending 
women had something to speak of regarding positive encounters with “good Japanese 
men.”  They reminisced about gentleman-like Japanese soldiers who were their love 
interests in the war zones. At least two women used the word “love”  to describe their 
relationship, while some said they were grateful to the said men for having treated them 
kindly. Such romance, born out of “transaction”  and born into multiple facets of taboo
—race, nation, sexuality, victim/oppressor relation—is significant in its simultaneous 
innocence and transgression. These memories are seldom discussed and rarely 
publicized, not because their transgressions are unable to serve any discourses, but 
because such memory can instead pose as a debilitating undercurrent. The memories of 
romance that were extracted from this particular workshop were presented in “Ah-ma’s 
Paper Airplane” ůɷƳÕX,  a website launched by ten Taiwan University students 
(see Figure 2.5). As they stated, their intention for creating this platform is to create 
interest in their generation about the comfort women issue, using a younger, more 
creative design. All data and material on the site are credited to TWRF, though on 
TWRF’s own webpage, this particular documentation cannot be found. The curation of 
memories on this project calls attention to the young generation’s ambition to 
reconstruct the past. Their selection of the presentation of trauma memories reflects not 
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only the appeal of romance to younger audience, but suggests the capacity to 
accommodate the almost infinitely complex experiences of a comfort woman and its 
potential risks of debilitating the nationalistic framework. Romantic relationship with or 
a desire for a Japanese soldier not only paints him in a favorable light, but seems likely 
to weaken the demand for redress from a supposedly brutal “Japan.” In this vein, a new 
dynamic and interpretation of trauma, Taiwan and its coloniality is to be expected. 
Where normative presentation of trauma stresses the glooms of victimhood, the younger 
generation seems to be eager to explore other aspects of the traumatic experience.   
As women of tarnished reputation and bottom social and economics strata, former 
comfort women remain the subaltern of the subalterns throughout their lives. 
Ostensibly, their stories appear to have been engulfed in the interstices of nationalism 
and colonialism. But in a turn of speech, the testimonies of the Taiwanese comfort 
women can be subversive to both of the political frameworks. Their memory of trauma 
may repudiate the Japanized generation’s popular narrative of a pragmatic Japanese 
rule, but memories of a lost lover render the testimony flawed and incongruous with 
establishing the Japanese colonizer as an aggressor. Is it possible to honor the comfort 
women’s loss while acknowledging benign memories of  colonial Japanese experience? 
Interestingly, the comfort women themselves do not seem to discriminate against these 
memories, but TWRF has opted to curate them out of their webpage.   
In the colonial/national rhetoric, a pursuit for personal justice can easily expand to 
become a quest for national dignity. When one accepts a comfort woman as a victim of 
Japanese violence, one needs to be convinced that Imperial Japan was a violent assailant 
who infringed upon not only the women’s personal dignity, but also debased the dignity 
of their people and nation. In order to maximize the momentum to press the Japanese 
government to respond, I believe the national dignity was tactically enlisted by TWRF 
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in their earlier pursuit to form a cohesive social consciousness. However, to hear one of 
the abused members to divulge her desire for a Japanese soldier adds to the volatility of 
the Taiwanese construct of such dignity, similar to how the Japanized generation’s 
positive memories are accused of eclipsing the Taiwanese subjectivity. 
Taiwanese Comfort Women Issue and “Japan” 
On several occasions, the postwar Japanese government has apologized for the 
atrocities committed against comfort women during the war. However, the apologies 
have not been deemed acceptable, due to their lacking in the Diet’s backing and the 
tendency to be contested by rightwing, conservative officials, rendering them invalid. 
This section, however, is not interested in analyzing Japan’s foreign policies and 
hesitance, but I am more interested in highlighting Taiwan’s notion of “Japan” as 
affected by these apologies to explore the changes of the two countries’ postcolonial 
relationship. 
One of the most notable prototypes of apologies occurred on August 4th, 1993. 
Chief Cabinet Minister Yohei Kono Ɵƺƥ¹  confirmed that the wartime Japanese 
military was involved in operating comfort stations, and that many women were 
recruited “against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.”  He further extended 
his apologies and remorse to “all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered 
immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort 
women.”21 However, his apologies had not been pre-approved nor adopted by the 
Japanese Diet, and therefore regarded as Kono’s individual regrets. In 1995, on the 50th 
anniversary of the end of WWII, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama ǀÛřÎ  made 
an address that Japan’s “colonial rule and aggression […] caused tremendous damage 
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and suffering,”  and expressed his “remorse and […] heartfelt apology.”22  As of 
December 2015 when Japan offered South Korea a “final,”  “irreversible”  apology to 
Korean comfort women, the Murayama Statement was the only one backed by the 
Japanese Cabinet, therefore deemed as the only official apology that Japan has made for 
its wartime aggressions.23 However, for the comfort women, as well as for other groups, 
such as the representatives of the British former prisoners of War, it was considered 
defective for its lack of clarity. 
In June 1995, the Murayama administration made an effort to set up Asia Women’s 
Fund (AWF) to issue compensation to comfort women. The fund was rejected by 
countries including South Korea and Taiwan. This is mostly due to its operation relying 
heavily on civil volunteers and private donations to provide monetary compensation, 
which was largely interpreted by Korean and Taiwanese activists as Japan’s poorly 
veiled attempt to dodge legal responsibility for its war crimes.  Although a handful of 
women accepted the fund in Korea, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and Taiwan, others 
were promptly discouraged from doing so by the distrust of Japan’s intentions. In 
Taiwan, TWRF lobbied the then Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian ǈfɜ  (President of 
Taiwan, 2000-2008) and Province Governor James Soong ɋƶɉ  to provide the 
women with state subsidy and medical support so that they would not have to accept the 
fund out of want. TWRF’s Reports on Comfort Women cite that the Taiwanese comfort 
women were encouraged not to accept money from AWF, a Japanese “half-public, half-
private”  organization,24 which required the women to give up any accusations against 
the Japanese government. To keep the women from giving in, the Taiwanese 
government provided NT$500,000 for each woman, which was matched by private 
donations, allowing each woman to receive NT$ 1 million for waiting out for a formal 
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apology and compensation.25 TWRF’s firm stance and publicizing on refusing 
compensation through AWF deepened the Taiwanese public’s impression that Japan is 
coyly shunning proper redress. But at this time, the Taiwanese responses towards 
Japan’s dealing with the issue were delimited to diplomatic formalities. According to 
Professor Yeh De-Lan’s report, it was not until the 2001 publishing of Taiwan Ron that 
the Taiwanese society took serious interest in the issue.26 
The publication of Kobayashi Yoshinori’s (1953- ) comic book Taiwan Ron touched 
upon a delicate nerve in Taiwan’s ambivalent relationship with Japan. Kobayashi 
expresses in Taiwan Ron a tiredness from a self-defeating historical view (ƪƒěˁ
roughly translated as self-castrating historical view). On his trips to Taiwan, he declares 
to have recovered the Japanese glory that he has been searching for, alive and well in 
the formerly colonized people. He attributed the benevolent qualities he found in the 
people to their colonial education and urges his Japanese audience to find pride and 
honor in their nation once again. Though he demonstrates an extensive understanding of 
Taiwanese history, his viewpoint is undoubtedly biased and questionable in his 
interpretations of colonialism and Japanese legacy. His portrayal of Japanese 
colonialism leans heavily towards the modernity aspect—proclaiming that Taiwan’s 
prosperity grew from Japan’s colonial legacy—without addressing the nature of 
colonialism nor the price that the colonized had to pay for this modernization. 
The comic sold well in Japan. In Taiwan, copies were going like hot cakes as a mob 
of legislators and supporters raided the largest bookstore in Taipei, grabbed the books, 
and burned them on the sidewalk along with a Japanese flag. Elmer Feng, the legislator 
who led the action, denounced the book and said that publishing of the book “injured 
Taiwan’s national dignity.”  By national dignity, Feng was referring to Kobayashi’s 
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interview with Shi Wen-long (1928- )—pro-independence supporter, founder of a 
successful conglomerate, and Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian’s presidential 
advisor—who was quoted as having said that the Taiwanese comfort women voluntarily 
responded to the Japanese army’s call for military prostitutes. Shi was forced to publicly 
apologize for his crude remarks even though Kobayashi later admitted that Shi had not 
actually mentioned that the comfort women offered themselves to better their lives, but 
that it was a “generally known concept in Japan.”27  While pan-blue (referring to KMT 
Party and their alliances) politicians burned books, the pan-green (referring to Chen 
Shui-bian’s DPP and alliance parties) politicians were buying the books in bulk as their 
protest. The brawl lasted for weeks, eventually culminating in the government’s brief 
ban on Kobayashi’s entry in the country.28 
The unravelling of the events provided an opportunity for open discussion 
regarding the comfort women issue in Taiwan and revealed how provocative and 
emotional this issue can be to an initially “disinterested”  public. Unfortunately, as 
Professor Chen Kuan-hsing points out in his Reflections on Taiwan Ron, the general 
public’s conversation stopped short at political partisan debates. Peng questioned in her 
2014 study why the brief mentioning of comfort women could conjure so much 
contention. The plethora of biased observations that Kobayashi made, including his 
emphasis on corruptions and aggressions of the Chinese Nationalist Party’s rule and 
watering down Japan’s own colonial rule, did not make it on the discussion tables. She 
observes how Taiwan Ron’s presentation of comfort women became the battleground of 
extreme supporters of pro-(China) unification and pro-(Taiwan) independence: “as if 
comfort women trauma can be directly related to waisheng group’s (£Ơ, roughly 
translated as mainlander, referring to Chinese that migrated to Taiwan after WWII) 
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traumatization, and promoting the comfort women cause relegates you to the anti-Japan 
camp. As if independence supporters will naturally love Japan, and uphold Japanese 
militarism.”29 Indeed, what Taiwan Ron amplified was not only Kobayashi’s Japanese 
yearning for past glory, but Taiwan’s overall politicizing of Japan’s colonial legacy. 
This is well-demonstrated by what Koo Kwang-ming—a long-time Taiwan 
independence-advocate—told a reporter from New York Times:  “[the protesters] appear 
to be going after Japan, but they are going after Chen’s government.”30 In this vein, the 
comfort women issue is a ruse used to invoke guilt and shame in the Taiwanese who 
remember Japan in a more favorable light. As the collective sexual violation is elevated 
from a personal level into the public sphere, and the comfort women’s personal trauma 
becomes a matter of national dignity, people with positive views of Japan’s colonial rule 
are easily stupefied by the simple question: “what about the comfort women?”  Indeed, 
how can one comfortably pursue a pretty rosy picture of the colonial days, a time when 
their sisters lived in hell? 
I contend that apart from being trapped in the dichotomy of two ideologies, another 
possibility that the argument highlights here is the battle of memories. Shi Wen-long’s 
comments are admittedly insensitive and crude to the plight of comfort women. 
However, if his belief in the legitimacy of the army’s recruiting system was sincere, 
would it actually stem from memories of what he learned of it during the colonial 
period? His knowledge of what truly occurred may be flawed, but (under that 
presumption that he believes in what he remembers) can one accuse him of false 
memory? In other words, if a memory is preferred or ends up dominating another, it is 
possibly because it fits better into the mainstream discourse, but not because the 
memory is inferior or wrong. Even when the majority’s memory overrides that of the 
minority’s, there is no guarantee that the suppressed memory is completely diminished. 
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Rather, it is merely temporarily written over, a palimpsest of the preferred narratives of 
the successive rulers. 
Varying life experiences define the delimitations of memory. This is not only due to 
temporal boundaries, but also because no memory is omniscient at the time of an 
occurrence. This is perhaps what makes Shi Wen-long’s supposed testimony for Taiwan- 
Ron so vulnerable. While he may have wholeheartedly believed in the integrity of the 
Japanese Army’s recruiting methodology, his absolution is only privy to his own 
cognition. 
Wu Tze-hsuan notes in her thesis that she was puzzled by the “odd Passion for 
Taiwan”  displayed by Alice King (Ä>Ǡ,  1934-  ), a presidential counselor for 
President Chen Shui-bian at the time of Taiwan Ron’s publication. A fierce 
independence advocate featured in the comic book, King bluntly announced in a 
televised debate that she has neither time nor interest to aid the comfort women in their 
appeal to Tokyo. She also dismisses her debate partner’s statement that “there is only 
one historical truth.”31 King argues that a history written by each nation represents its 
own standpoint  and does not necessarily represent the truth. To those who have readily 
accepted the victimhood of comfort women, that numerous testimonies claim most 
comfort women volunteered themselves either for the state’s great cause or because the 
military brothels provided better work benefits seems highly insensitive and plain 
wrong. Indeed, when a 96-year-old elder I interviewed in 2011 stated that, to his 
knowledge, there were no forced comfort women, I was simply taken aback. However, 
as Professor of Taiwanese history Lee Xiao-feng proposes, these are their memories.32 
Memories differ from historical facts in that they are highly personal, their accuracy is 
questionable (though may not need to be), and they do not adhere to any set of agenda 
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unless their owner willfully wants them to be. 
In March 2007, when the U.S. Congress introduced a resolution that urged Japan to 
“formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept history responsibility […] for its 
Imperial Armed Forces’ coercion of young women into sexual slavery,” Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe responded to it by remarking that there was no concrete evidence of 
coercion33 while Abe’s Foreign Minister Aso Taro Ɗ$Jș reacted by calling it an 
“extremely regrettable”  bill, which was “not based on objective facts.”34 But then, on 
April 26th, 2007, Shinzo Abe expressed his “deep-hearted sympathies that my people (I 
find his use of  “my people”  very interesting. Is he apologizing to victims who were 
“Japanese”?) had to serve as Comfort Women. […] I express my apologies”  in a joint 
press conference with President Bush in Washington.35 This apology, perhaps 
inappropriately, was accepted by Bush, who expressed appreciation for Abe’s “candor.” 
Shortly thereafter, in July 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a 
resolution that demanded Japan to acknowledge and accept its war responsibility, as did 
the European Union, the Netherlands, and Canada.36 Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan 
followed suit on November 11th, 2008, by passing its own “Taiwanese Comfort Women 
Resolution.”37  The resolution came as a form of internal reconciliation in Taiwan, as 
legislators from the opposing camps of KMT and DPP issued a joint proposal to the 
government. While official backings for the women’s long quest seem “exhilarating,” as 
TWRF enthusiastically put it in its newsletter to “Friends of Comfort Women,”38  up 
until the present no further progress was made regarding a satisfactory apology and 
compensation. 
Fast forward to December 28th of 2015, the new Shinzo Abe government made 
amends with South Korea, granting an $8.3 million for compensation and a formal, 
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irreversible apology.39 Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou immediately instructed the 
Taiwan representative in Tokyo to push Japan for a negotiation on the same issue. But 
for some in Taiwan, it seems doubtful for the Taiwanese comfort women to be granted 
the same wish. New Party Legislator, and former president of TWRF, Yeh Yu-lan Ǆʇ
ƫ, blamed the Taiwanese society for “pandering to Japan”  ȯ4, using the 
aforementioned anti-curriculum guideline protest as an example.40 She then lambasted 
former President Lee Deng-hui (1988-2000) for his proclamation that the comfort 
women issue has “already been resolved.”  Lee was under fire earlier that year for 
accepting an interview with Japan’s Voice magazine, in which he stated that he 
considered Japan as his “motherland” when he served the Japanese military during 
WWII. Regarding the comfort women issue, he is convinced that it has been resolved, 
possibly referring to a relevant clause to 1952 agreement of the San Francisco Peace 
treaty, which ran: “in order to display generosity and friendship to the people of Japan, 
the Republic of China [Taiwan] voluntarily gives up claims to the services that Japan is 
obligated to provide according to Article 14, Clause A, Line one of the treaty of San 
Francisco.”41 
Varying political agendas render varying interpretations and meanings to the 
comfort women’s memories. Protesters and campaigners of the comfort women issue 
have expanded the women’s personal tragedy to that of a national scale. The personal-
ness of these memories was used as evidence to testify against Japan’s ability to be a 
fair ruler to its colonial subjects. On one hand, memories of Imperial Japan as a strict 
yet lawful ruler created lingering impressions that it would only conscript women of 
questionable virtue to the army; on the other, memories as comfort women is a direct 
testament and condemnation against such conviction. The conviction may be faulty, but 
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memories cannot be because they rely on what the present makes of them. The diversity 
of memories may be the reason that the Taiwanese comfort women seem to have a 
smaller voice and a smaller platform while the comfort women campaigners in Korea 
and China seem to have formed a more or less united, and hence, more powerful voice. 
Conclusion 
At the end of 2015, the seventieth anniversary marking the end of WWII, the TWRF 
announced their plan to build a museum to document the lives and ways of living of 
Taiwanese women since the 1900s, highlighting the comfort women stories. The group 
of museum organizers told a Los Angeles Times correspondent that “it has been a long, 
lonely quest to get the Taiwanese to remember [the] women.”42 This is not because the 
people are forgetful, but perhaps due to a conscious decision to override memories of 
this trauma. Polls show that the majority of Taiwanese people in 2016 see themselves as 
Taiwanese, while the number of those who consider themselves Chinese have flatlined.
43 For many, to speak of antagonism against wartime Japan is an indication of political 
affinity with Communist China, who has always proclaimed that Taiwan is part of 
China. Executive director Kang Shu-hua further disclosed that fundraising for this 
project has been difficult, because the people see the comfort women as a political issue, 
or “a matter of hatred toward Japan,” resulting in scant support. 
But from the shift of focus we see in Song of the Reed, TWRF has come a long way 
from the accusatory narrative that emphasized brutality and Othering of Japan. Named 
“Ah-ma Museum,”  the museum’s Chinese name is directly translated into 
“Grandmother’s Home.” Unlike the government-approved Martyrs’ Shrine of the Loyal 
ȞƜɿ, it is not a temple that enshrines national heroes, but a more neutral space 
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(museum) that offers the public a place to remember and to recognize the violence 
inflicted upon women throughout history. To acquire the fund to materialize the 
memories, the Foundation resorted to a popular online platform of crowd-funding. That 
the funding is sourced from individuals from around the internet, whose faces are 
unseen and motives unknown, liberates the project from partisanship. This would return 
focus and subjectivity to the women and their memories, and hopefully, break the grasp 
of nationalist rhetorics on the issue. However, as with all museums, the items chosen for 
exhibition reflect partiality and preference. How will the memories be curated? Who has 
the power to curate the presentation of trauma? These are questions that we must keep 
asking. 
TWRF states in their website the necessity to record the comfort women’s 
testimonies that “history should not be forgotten though the women have perished.”44 I 
contend that the movement to gain justice should not be fueled by nationalistic rhetoric 
of us against the Other, or of opposing political camps that choose to support the women 
or the Japanese government based on their political stands. We need a new, alternative 
approach to pursue the comfort women issue, not only for survivors who still remain, 
but also for us, the unwilling keepers of the tangled, ambivalent web of memories. 
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Chapter 2 
 “Why Use ‘Keigo’ If You Are Not a ‘Koumin’?”:  
Kouminka and Its Discontent 
The Taipei mayoral election approached the final, fervent stage in November 2014. In a 
desperate attempt to drum up votes, some politicians resorted to the invocation of the 
antiquated ghost of “enslavement by Japanese colonialism,” trusting that its 
sensationalism would draw in certain supporters. One of the candidates, Ko Wen-je ɠ
dȻ, came under attack regarding his ancestral history. Ko’s grandfather had complied 
with the Japanese name-changing policies during the colonial times. Ko’s main 
opponent was Chinese Nationalist Party (hereafter KMT, ,ìȀ) candidate Lien Sean, 
and his father, Lien Chan íà, who had been the honorary Chairman of the KMT and 
former Taiwanese Vice President, addressed Ko as Aoyama Wen-je ċÛdȻ, and 
made conjectures about his national identification for having been brought up in a 
family that had been Japanized in the past. “I can’t say what you would call that,” 
prompted Lien. The audience he was addressing—namely, the Chinese Anti-
Independence National Protection Mobilization Meeting ,
ĒđŒ,L¾—
responded in consonance: “Traitor (to the Han race) ƻɂ!”1 The following day, another 
heavyweight KMT veteran, former Taiwanese Premier Hau Pei-tsun ʃɁǀ further 
drove home the point, referring to Ko as a descendent of a koumin ǡì, Imperial 
Japan’s loyal subjects.2 In this frame, all who complied with colonial policies is 
categorized as a brainwashed subject of Japanese colonialism, which Hau asserted also 
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includes former President Lee Teng-hui ƨıȣ. The anachronistic accusation and its 
implications were met with immediate refutation by historians and commentators in 
online forums, arguing that the Taiwanese were not in the position to decide against 
policies when the island was ceded to Japan in 1895.  
Among the tidal waves of critics against Lien and Hau’s vitriol, Taiwanese history 
dignitary and democracy activist Chen Fang-ming’s essay was among the most read and 
widely distributed in the social media. Chen called the employment of the epithet 
humiliating3: “To call a Taiwanese traitor or koumin is extremely cruel. The Taiwanese 
never chose to become Japanese. Taiwan was mindlessly ceded to Japan […] during a 
time when China was too incompetent to heed even its own safety. ” He likened the 
former koumins to French writer Guy de Maupassant’s “Boule de Suif/Butterball,” a 
young woman who unwilling sleeps with a Prussian enemy to save the lives of her 
fellow French companions, only to be scorned later by the now-saved companions for 
losing her dignity.4 Chen concludes, “Such is the preposterousness of human nature, to 
push one’s daughter into the fire pit (Taiwanese colloquial meaning to sell into a 
brothel) and at the same time ask her to guard her virtues.” As a prominent figure of 
democratic movements and native history in Taiwan, Chen is not usually one to uphold 
a Sinocentric historic view. However, in his retort against Lien and Hao’s accusation, 
his comparison of Taiwanese koumins to the tragic fate of “Butterball,” seems to have 
inadvertently fallen into the trappings of Chinese nationalistic framework. In what way 
should being called a koumin humiliating? Specifically what is the virtue that Taiwanese 
had supposedly lost? Here, the measurement of humiliation and virtue of a Taiwanese 
under Japanese rule seems to slip too easily into the Chinese nationalist politics. 
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Lien’s defeat in the mayoral election later in December 2014, however, does not 
mean koumin stopped being used as a dirty word in Taiwan. For instance, in July 2015, 
a news anchor was ridiculed for flaunting inappropriate usage of the Japanese language 
when she interviewed a famous Japanese actor. She was booed by netizens for using an 
impolite form of Japanese, “ʡʨʟʙʤʟʬʚʿ” (roughly translated as “ya having a 
good time?”) in a semi-formal circumstance. A Taiwanese entertainer came to her 
rescue, suggesting that proper Japanese need not be expected of the newswoman. He 
commented: “Why use honorific speech (Ǣă, keigo) if you are not an imperial 
Japanese subject (koumin)?”5 The casual usage of the word, even if outside political 
contexts, is revealing regarding the Taiwanese people’s ambivalent relationship with 
their colonial past, and begs further discussion on the multiple definitions and use of 
koumin after WWII. 
Forty years after Japan obtained Taiwan as its colony, and at the height of the 
second Sino-Japanese war tensions, the Japanese government mobilized the Kouminka 
movement ǡìØÐL, a radical form of assimilation campaign with the intention to 
turn the Taiwanese into “true Japanese,” true subjects of the emperor. While 
assimilation (kØ, douka) had long been part of Japan’s colonial policy, due to the 
impending war the kouminka movement was more systematically implemented, and 
with a greater sense of urgency. This was done to enlist not only more manpower to 
pitch into the battlefields, but also to ensure the Taiwanese people’s loyalty to aid the 
Empire. According to Leo Ching, the kouminka movement is more than an intensified 
version of assimilation policy that Imperial Japan had employed since the early stages 
of its occupation. Ching delineates kouminka as an internalization of a subjective strife 
over two identities and maintains that “the politics of identity in [kouminka] represented 
!                                                                                                                           60
the ways in which the onus of becoming Japanese had shifted from the colonial state to 
the colonial subjects.”6 
To become a “true Japanese” required making the following changes: master the 
national language (-ă, kokugo, which refers to Japanese); alter one’s family name to a 
Japanese one; join the volunteer soldier campaign; and reform native religion and 
customs. Although the changes were not strictly enforced in Taiwan, the people who 
complied were able to receive benefits, such as extra supplies and food rationing for 
their households; members of families who were certified as kokugo katei (-ă/ǋ, 
national language household) were given priority over others to enter choice schools or 
given jobs in government-run companies. According to historian Chou Wan-yao’s 
research, the act of being certified is theoretically considered an honor.7 Her findings 
further relate that the way the colonized rose to the calling of volunteer soldiers often 
had less to do with succumbing to the empire, but more to do with proving one’s 
capacity, that they can do better than the ethnically Japanese.8 Given the provision of 
material rewards, or a competitive will to demonstrate one’s ability, it is difficult to 
gauge whether the people’s motives were truly inspired by the Empire’s call. 
While neither the true motivation nor extent of Taiwanese commitment to their 
colonizer could be measured, their postwar KMT rulers regarded all people who had 
lived under Japanese rule as having been “enslaved,” and “poisoned” by colonial 
education. Hence they were in dire need of re-reformation regarding their national 
identification, and were rendered disqualified from their previous posts. Forced away 
from their singed homes in China, memories blistering from warring with Japan, the 
newcomers had an opposite view of Japan from the Taiwanese, who underwent a decade 
of intensive assimilation policies (1936-1945). The Chinese people’s distrust and vitriol 
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towards their enemy, Japanese, were projected onto the former subjects of the emperor. 
For these subjects, KMT’s determination to de-Japanize the island was yet another 
demand to reconstruct one’s identification. Without the “correct” national identification, 
or capacity to learn a new tongue (Mandarin Chinese) quickly, many of the Japanized 
generation, not necessarily limited to those who were affirmed model koumins, were 
subsequently subjected to decades of shaming, still evident in today’s news 
(aforementioned). 
This chapter discusses the koumin and its mutating definition in Taiwan—first as 
Imperial Japan’s image of a paradigmatic subject, and later as a symbol of defamation 
for “betraying one’s (Chinese) roots,” or a stigma exemplifying “self-imposed servility” 
for those who hold their colonial experiences and Japan in a favorable view. I shall 
analyze the term and its implications and ramifications in the Taiwanese society using 
the literary works of “kouminka writers,” including Chou Chin-po’s “The Volunteer,” 
and examine how current discourses of former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui and 
his contemporaries regarding Taiwan’s relationship with Japan resonate with the 
characters in the wartime literature. To read the koumin as submission to a foreign 
regime, and/or to re-envision it as resistance in disguise, are only partial representations 
of the colonized generation. I contend that acknowledging the nuanced complexity and 
precariousness of the Taiwanese’s reliance on their colonizer for survival is an important 
step towards decolonization in postcolonial Taiwan.  
Chou Chin-po and “The Volunteer” 
I will examine Chou Chin-po’s ÍÄƱ works as literary forms of documentary of what 
it meant to be a koumin for a Taiwanese intellectual, and what he believed it would take 
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to be finally recognized as such. The “kouminka writers” refer to the writers who 
supported Japan’s assimilation policies and believed in the prospect of its success. Their 
works often reflected their engrossment in the topic and a few received high acclaim 
from the colonial authorities (“The Volunteer” was winner of the Bungei Taiwan literary 
award dƎĎǟǊ in 1942). There were a handful of writers boxed in by the Kouminka 
writers label after the war, when support of Japan became dangerously outmoded, and 
some of the now defamed writers made several public attempts to reverse the danger 
they landed in. Chou Chin-po’s own silence and almost complete banishment from the 
literary circle since the end of the war stands out from the rest. During his lifetime he 
had not attempted to defend his works. For over five decades, his works were banished 
from various editions of Taiwanese Literature anthologies, whose collection of the 
Japanese period leaned towards literature that portray social injustice and clashes with 
the authorities. 
Together with  Chen Huo-chuan’s “The Path” (ǈçǵ) and Wang Chang-hsiung’s 
“Raging Torrents”(Şʋǎ), “The Volunteer” (Shiganhei, ŅĆǑ) was to be the 
epitome of “conscripted literature” by the colonial authorities, also known as Koumin 
literature after the war. In postwar Taiwan, however, while Chen’s and Wang’s works 
were reevaluated as “realistic novels that portrayed the Taiwanese struggles of 
undergoing the kouminka movement,” Chou remained uncontestedly stigmatized due to 
his own silence and the Taiwanese literary circle’s refusal to translate and introduce his 
ill-reputed work to the public.9 
As Chou’s characters in “The Volunteer” actively engage the idea of fully 
“becoming Japanese,” it is not difficult to see why this piece was conscripted by the 
kouminka movement. However, a closer reading may reveal covert subplots that lie 
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hidden behind its overt kouminka master plot. Stepping outside the traitor/collaborator 
binary, but still remaining in an ethno-national framework, I see his work as a record of 
the inner altercation of striking a balance between dual identities (colonized, yet 
“Japanese”), and the struggles of accepting oneself as “true” to that identity. My reading 
of “The Volunteer” is two-folds: it faithfully reflects a colonial subject’s earnest desire 
to be considered equally as one of them/“real Japanese,” and at the same time it 
articulates an intellectual’s anxiety to closing the gap between a culturally backward 
Taiwan and the modernized, metropolitan idea of “Japan.” I contend that, as a work 
born under a time of constrictive identity politics, Chou Chin-po did not portray his 
characters as blind followers of dominant discourse. He gave them a platform to display 
their complacency as successful mimics of Japanese mannerism, as well as their anxiety 
due to this mimicry: of perpetually being mere copies of an original; of not being 
“original” enough. The presentation of an “original Japanese” is noticeably absent, 
emphasizing the fact that the discussion between the colonized subjects is strictly a 
Taiwanese interpretation of “Japan,” a Taiwanese imagination of Japanese gaze on the 
colonized. His work illustrates how the Taiwanese subject, either wholly or selectively, 
conforms to the outlined image of a “true subject of the emperor” so as to negotiate his 
position in and against the empire. 
“The Volunteer” opens with a pensive protagonist, “I,” now trapped and closed in 
by mundaneness of his work and family life, reminiscing about his student life in 
Tokyo. Waiting at the dock to welcome his brother-in-law Cho Meiki ºbƌ, who is 
home on vacation from his studies in Tokyo, “I” meets Ko Shinroku WĶ, a friend 
who has also come to greet Meiki for the first time. Because of Shinroku’s well-
groomed appearance and perfect command of the Japanese language, “I” was under the 
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impression that he was an inlander (naichi, Japan proper),10 or had graduated from the 
same elite high school that both he and Meiki attended. He is surprised when Shinroku 
reveals that he had only attended an elementary school for Taiwanese pupils.11 After 
catching up with Meiki, Shinroku left them for the day. But “I” finds this figure so 
intriguing that he further inquires whether his parents’ marriage is between an inlander 
and a Taiwanese. Meiki’s reply is no. Shinroku has not continued his education since 
graduating from public school. He has acquired his command of the National Language 
and Japanese mannerism working at a Japanese food shop.12 Shinroku even “wears his 
hakama (traditional Japanese trousers) far more correctly than I can,” Meiki stresses. 
Shinroku is apparently less socially and economically privileged than the other two 
characters, who both extended their education overseas in the “liberating” metropolis of 
Tokyo. However, his limited formal education and resources do not impair the 
authenticity of his Japanized mannerism, good enough to be mistaken as an inlander, or 
at least, of inland-Taiwanese birth, by the seasoned “I.” His successful mimicry seems 
to have derived from a sincere conviction in “becoming Japanese,” and transcends the 
barricade of socio-economic class. The protagonist’s immediate association of Shinroku 
with Japanese blood due to the extent of his Japaneseness also exposes the hierarchical 
framework in colonial Taiwan. His calculated study of another’s background suggests 
the presence of an essentialist discrimination which accentuates class division through 
one’s degree of “Japaneseness.” The existence of  such measurement indicates that the 
assimilation policy slogan “impartiality under His gaze” ÀkȔ does not live up to 
its claim. 13 
Meiki further reveals that Shinroku unofficially uses a Japanized form of his 
surname, Takamine Wǫ, among his circle of friends, long before the authorization of 
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name reform policy. He divulges this detail with a burst of laughter but “I” does not 
understand what he found so amusing. Since neither “I” nor Meiki has followed the 
name reformation policy, Meiki’s ambiguous laughter can be read as ridiculing 
Shinroku’s approach of pursuing Japaneseness. This invokes the inherent question of the 
kouminka movement: “what constitutes being Japanese?” The government has decreed 
the four criteria to become “true subjects of the emperor,” but Meiki seems to find 
whether practicing the particular codes truly counts as “Japanese” doubtful. 
Though Meiki sets the same goal as Shinroku of becoming Japanese, his incredulity 
of how to become Japanese deepens as the characters delve further into the particular 
codes associated with Japaneseness. Upon receiving a cigarette case as a souvenir from 
Meiki, Shinroku politely declines by saying that he has quit the habit, because “I wanted 
to test myself. I wanted to see how much control I have over myself.”14 He credits his 
success in abstention to the Patriotic Youth Unit that he has joined and believes that he 
has become a stronger person owing to “the sacred training for deity-human union” Ï

ŷ (14). After Shinroku gives a detailed description about achieving deity-human 
union through the hand-clapping ritual, Meiki exclaims:  
“I don’t want to be controlled by ideas like that. […] It’s true we’re a small and 
insignificant race; you feel this keenly, too, don’t you? Culturally we’re an extremely 
backward race, and we can’t do anything about it. Up until now we’ve had no 
cultural education or training. But even if ‘training to become Imperial subjects’ is 
what’s urgently needed, isn’t it enough that we make up for what we have been 
lacking in education and training as soon as possible? All we have to do is to pull our 
level up to that of the inlanders, right? Do you have to clap your hands to achieve 
that?” (16) 
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Shinroku insists that cultural progress does not suffice, but that an injection of 
“Japanese spirit” to elevate the Taiwanese spiritually is imperative. Here we see their 
disagreement on the definition of “Japanese spirit,” a loosely defined term that the 
Japanized generation often use when speaking of their Japanese memory. Chou Chin-po 
does not attempt to give it a concrete explanation here either. Shinroku argues that it is 
achieved by simply “living the faith,” while Meiki believes that it is the capacity to be 
moved by the presence of Japanese symbols like the Double Bridge, the Yasukuni 
Shrine, or the Imperial Plaza. Although they agree on their having become Japanese, 
they are confused about the methodology to achieve this goal. I suggest that this 
exchange is particularly subversive and challenging to the colonizer’s ideal of reforming 
the colonized. Their debate illustrates the divergent perceptions of “becoming Japanese” 
that undermine the monolithic discourse that had been laid down by the master. Through 
their dispute and different practices on what seems to be an integral code—spirituality
—to Japaneseness, Meiki and Shinroku unintentionally subverted and mutated the 
revered Japanization process into a Taiwanized version. To be a Japanese by blood is 
simple, but to adopt the status through other means exposes how hollow the empire’s 
grip is on its symbolic expressions of power. Furthermore, that Meiki and Shinroku 
insist on their own paths, yet agree on their becoming Japanese, is suggestive that their 
conviction would render the recognition from the empire redundant. “In my case,” 
proclaims Meiki, “I can tell you definitively that I’ve become completely Japanese. Is 
becoming Japanese so hard? I don’t think so” (17). 
Ten days after this argument, “I” is shocked to find Shinroku’s ultimate pledge to 
the empire in the newspapers: “Volunteer application in blood oath: Mr. Ko Shinroku.” 
He hurries over to Meiki’s house to break the news, only to find an agitated Meiki at his 
door, who seems to have lost sleep over this:  
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“I went to Shinroku to apologize. He’s ahead of me. Shinroku is the one who will 
move Taiwan for Taiwan’s sake. I am after all a powerless human being who can do 
nothing for Taiwan. My head is too big. I told him that.[…] He didn’t tell me 
anything about it beforehand. He pledged himself by slicing into his little finger. I 
can’t do anything like that. So, like a man, I went and bowed to him.” (21; emphasis 
mine) 
Meiki vows to remake himself and asks “I” to supervise him. As they ascend the narrow 
staircase, “I” notices that their procession is slow and the staircase seems long. 
Chou Chin-po’s arrangement of having the less educated, but more conviction-
driven Shinroku to pitch himself to the battlefields seems to indicate that in order to 
become Japanese, one needs to “theorize less/think less,” a move forward like “horses 
with their blinds on.” In Shinroku’s words, “we can only pray, we can only act. Unless 
you act, you gain nothing” (16). Shinroku, convinced in instilling “Japanese spirit” to 
approach the core of Japaneseness, ultimately chooses the spilling of his Taiwanese 
blood into the empire. The act of slicing one’s finger to pledge allegiance symbolizes 
the purging of one’s Taiwanese blood in exchange for a Japanese identity. In the end, 
though Meiki admits his defeat to Shinroku in their quasi-competition to become 
Japanese, it is unclear if he will follow suit. 
The temptation of becoming a “real Japanese” here is ironic. For to enter this 
symbolic order, what one needs to trade in is ultimately his life, his sworn loyalty to die 
for the Japanese empire. But even the surrendering of life does not warrant the 
eradication of discrimination. Despite the “impartiality under His gaze” slogan, the 
government makes a distinct separation between “ethnicity” ìƼ and “citizen”zì—
so that being Japanese by blood automatically grants one the political and economic 
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rights, while being Japanese by way of cultural recognition does not warrant such 
privileges. Leo Ching illustrates this point with the example of the enshrinement of 
Taiwanese soldiers in the Yasukuni Shrine along with the Japanese who died on behalf 
of their nation. Their souls were consecrated as “Japanese.” However, after the war their 
family’s pleas for compensation were denied because they were not recognized as 
proper Japanese citizens when they were living.15 
In a 1943 interview regarding the Japanese military’s conscription, Chou said that 
the theme he set for “The Volunteer” is “how will one correctly live in this era?” (237; 
emphasis mine). He distinguished two types of Taiwanese—one type that calculates 
every move, the other type holds no theory and proclaims oneself as Japanese—and 
believed it was the latter who would shoulder the future of Taiwan (236-7). This passage 
is quoted by critics as evidence of Chou’s admiration for Japanese launching into the 
Pacific War.16 To criticize Chou on his inclination towards colonial policy only allows 
for partial presentation of the colonized collaborator, oversimplifying the identity 
formation of the volunteer soldier Chou depicts. Through Meiki’s observation, it is 
evident that Chou was aware that the Taiwanese is “a small and insignificant race” in 
the eye of its colonizer. Chou’s contemplation on what the colonized needs to do to 
“shoulder the future of Taiwan” specifically assigns the role of Taiwan’s future-
shouldering to the colonized, instead of leaving it in the hands of his master. His 
question is no longer “should we become Japanese?” but “how to do it correctly?” 
Namely, how does the colonized balance acquiring Japaneseness and a responsibility for 
bettering the conditions of Taiwan? For Chou, Meiki’s reasoning for becoming Japanese 
is too utilitarian: “I was born on Japanese territory, raised by Japanese education. I only 
speak the Japanese language, and if I don’t write with katakana I cannot write at all. 
There is nothing for me if I can’t be a Japanese.” Chou’s arrangement of Meiki and “I” 
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admiring the Shinroku’s proactive attitude seems to suggest that, despite Shinroku’s 
ambling on like “horse with blinds on,” his uncalculating purity and integrity is what 
would eventually elevate the Taiwanese. True, this may sound like the propaganda 
message of the kouminka movement. However, Chou’s conclusion of intellectuals 
losing the bid to become a complete Koumin to a gung ho character who does not 
question, in fact, raises suspicion of an intellectual’s anxiety, or incredulity of being 
fully recognized. 
Redeeming Chou Chin-po 
In historical reality, the uncertainty that Meiki and “I” demonstrate in “The Volunteer” 
ran parallel with the Japanese colonizer’s own uncertainty about the Taiwanese fidelity 
to the Empire. As the war intensified, the political situation compelled the colonial 
subjects to prove themselves to the colonizers. At the Taiwan Decisive Battle Literature 
Convention ĎƲĐàdF in 1943, Japanese members proposed to mobilize the 
Taiwanese-run journal, Taiwan Literature ĎƲdF, to conscript the writers’ loyalty 
and literature to aid the imperial war. The Taiwanese attendees were reluctant to hand 
over the journal. As arguments of Taiwanese dedication to the Empire seemed to be 
spiraling out of control, Taiwan Literature’s founder, Chang Wen-huan ºdŌ, quickly 
came to the defense of the Taiwanese writers: “There is no non-koumin literature in 
Taiwan! Anyone who writes non-koumin literature shall be shot!”17 Chang’s manifesto 
was seen by many as a desperate attempt to salvage the Taiwanese writers from the 
suspicions of disloyalty and consequent prosecution. After the war, the table completely 
turned, ironically leaving all impassioned writings that endorsed the colonial policies in 
an awkward situation. 
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The year 1979 saw the publication of Pre-Retrocession Taiwanese Literature ³ŗ
nĎƲdF]Š,18 indicating Taiwan’s renewed interest in the colonial literature. In 
their introduction to the anthology, editors Yeh Shi-tao ǄƓɡ and Chung Chao-cheng 
ȸɮũ stated their intention: “any conscripted works with strong Kouminka flavors are 
omitted from this collection, as our silent and lenient criticism.” In 1987, Yeh Shi-tao 
reiterated his view on Chou Chin-po’s literary status in his History of Taiwanese 
Literature ĎƲdFƒɤ:19 
 “As the darkness of war thickens, and the tidal waves of the Koumin movement 
sway, some writers leaned towards the colonial government’s propaganda, down the 
path of pandering to Japan. Such as Chou Chin-po’s ‘The Volunteer.’”20 
This was around the time of the lifting of martial law, the Taiwanese writers were still 
manifesting their adherence to the KMT authorities which deemed koumin literature 
intolerable. However, in 1990, Yeh Shi-tao delineated all literary activities in Taiwan 
after 1937 thus: “there is no such thing as ‘koumin literature, all that were written were 
part of ‘resistance literature.’” 21 He pleaded for understanding the plights of the writers 
writing under colonial censorship: “please forgive their sometimes cowardly decisions 
[…] Under the doubt constriction of survival and oppression, at times it was necessary 
for them to cater to the rulers, against their convictions. In general, they are heroes, not 
people who surrendered.” 
Noting the drastic transition from Chang Wen-huan’s “all are koumin” to Yeh Shi-
tao’s “all are resistant,” Taiwanese historian Lin Ruey-ming contends that the redress of 
certain wartime works to non-koumin literature has restored certain dignity to Taiwan, 
and even those which cannot shake off the koumin literature stigma (in Lin’s view, Chen 
Huo-chuan’s The Path) deserve the readers’ sympathy and that they still retain value 
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serving the nation as a cautionary tale.22 However, what is the predicament that  koumin 
writers should “caution” at? What, exactly, did “becoming Japanese” betray? While I 
agree with Lin that readers should sympathize with the conflicts that the colonized 
underwent in the wake of a complete identity reformation, I argue that his dogged re-
affirmation of certain pieces as evidence of a writer’s dishonor, contrarily, offers the 
once-colonized little sympathy. The foundation of his statement lies within the traitor/
hero binary, where literary expressions exist to serve the nationalistic discourses. 
According to Professor Nakajima Toshio’s analysis, there have been various redress 
actions to strip the koumin writer label off of the stigmatized writers, carried out either 
by literary critics or the writers themselves. But by 1987, it was only Chou’s 
stigmatization that arbitrarily remained uncontested and undiscussed. Chou himself 
seemed to have fallen off the edge of earth, except for making two rare appearances at a 
literary symposium held in his honor in 1993 and 1994,23 before he passed away in 
1996. While Chou kept his silence, Japanese and Taiwanese scholars alike took an 
interest in reexamining his koumin literature label. The recent studies have shown that 
Chou Chin-po’s works are always discussed in relation to Chou’s identification and 
koumin status. Their contributions to the research of this enigmatic writer are often 
grounded in either affirming or reversing Chou’s stigma as a collaborator. 
For example, though he acknowledged Chou’s discussion on reforming Taiwan, 
Professor Hoshina Hironobu remarked on the complete absence of the “Taiwanese 
anxiety and despondency under Japanese rule” in his works,24 further perpetuating the 
undesirable label. Contrarily, both Professor Tarumi Chie and Nakajima Toshio hailed 
Chou Chin-po as a writer who “loved his land, and truly loved Taiwan.” Both critics 
concluded that rather than being drawn to the politics of Imperial Japan, he, in fact, 
identified with the prospect of modernity. Since what posed as a substantial problem for 
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Chou was “[Taiwan’s] lagging behind in the modernizing progress” instead of the 
forcible imposition of a foreign culture, Tarumi concluded that “it is with this conviction 
that he made contributions to the kouminka movement. And this is evidence that he, in 
fact, has a deep love for Taiwan.”25 Taiwanese studies on the writer also follow a similar 
vein of argument and tended to his identity struggle.26 Taiwanese historian Chen Pei-
feng concurred with Nakajima that Chou’s works focused on breaking feudal culture 
and vulgar old habits. However, he departs from Nakajima’s view by contending that 
Chou’s naiveté “cost [him] his subjectivity.” And that to sing the tunes of his colonizers, 
Chou’s inclination towards the kouminka movement is one out of “convenience,” and 
“lacks proper consideration.”27 Taiwanese literature student Huang Wen-que stated in 
her thesis that Chou Chin-po’s later works displayed a departure from Japanese 
spirituality and a desire to return to “the native, traditional” cultural and spiritual 
faculty. She then concluded: “it is only when he returned to his own identity that he can 
discover his value.”28 My reading of “The Volunteer” departs from those of the critics 
who brand the work as literature of an opportunist Koumin, whose political and literary 
integrity were considered as lacking. But it does not mean that I necessarily side with 
critics who are eager to redress the work as non-koumin literature, either fueled by a 
form of patriotism (“love for Taiwan”), or representing a mere reflection on the 
powerless life of the colonized. 
In order to redress Chou Chin-po as a non-koumin writer, his critics resorted to the 
binaries of, not Japan/Taiwan, but the rival Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms. By 
considering Chou’s endorsement of the kouminka movement as a means to advance his 
native island, the critics either dissociate Chou from Japanese colonialism and its 
political implications, or explain away his willing compliance as a form of thoughtless 
“naiveté.” Neither dissociating (from “Japan”) nor explaining away (as Taiwanese 
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gullibility), however, actually suffices to delineate Chou Chin-po’s ambiguous stance as 
what Mo Su-wei calls a “colonized native’s body with the gaze of a colonizer.”29 
Instead, they aggravate the sense of displacement—neither fully Japanese, nor fully 
Taiwanese—which so many of the colonized experience today. I argue that may 
obfuscate the objective to truly come to terms with the traumas of the colonial past. 
Furthermore, the “love for the land” approach to rid Chou (and other writers of the 
same category) of the koumin epithet is problematic. As proposed in Judith Butler’s 
theory “Frames of War,” wars and conflicts divide lives into those that are mourned and 
considered valuable, and those that are “ungrievable,” expelled from the frame of 
grievability. By rectifying the koumin writer through his identification with, or “love” 
for Taiwan, we run the risk of expelling the colonial subjects who simply embraced 
“becoming Japanese,” who possibly had no vision or resources to improve the 
“backwardness” of Taiwan. Should the struggle of those who did not display a “love for 
Taiwan” be relegated as “ungrievable” and consequently, unworthy? If the attempt to 
atone certain oppressed subjects results in the damning of yet another group of colonial 
subjects, the purpose of the atonement itself is defeated. 
Literary scholar Chu Yo-hsun concludes powerfully in his essay on Chou Chin-po: 
“I refuse to write him as the gullible type who succumbs to the monolith of history, or to 
present him as a victim of colonialism who lost all hope. I see [Chou Chin-po] as one of 
those who fought for their existence—sometimes consciously, other times 
subconsciously—but always did so in their way.”30 Indeed, if we remove the political 
frameworks of Chinese nationalism to study koumin literature—which might be less 
strenuous for readers of a new generation, being distanced from colonial trauma—Chou 
would no longer be a colonial writer who was plagued by guilt or “wrong identities,” 
but simply a “common man” making the best of what the state apparatus dealt him. 
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Instead of re-envisioning a new meaning for, or completely discarding the koumin label 
off of writers like Chou Chin-po, what we should do is to vigorously revisit it as an 
integral part of Taiwanese past because koumin, along with its definition of the 
colonized subjects as “a work in progress,” is as an arbitrary, constructed identity as the 
Taiwanese, the Japanese, the combination of both, or the rejection of either. 
If Yeh Shi-tao’s 1990 plea for understanding is any indication, it is that the fate of 
the so-called koumins are entangled in the precariousness of history. The koumin 
writers’ works are a repository of wartime memories. Criticisms of this defamed 
category and their paced revisions through the course of time are telling in how the 
changes of political climate affect the critics’ interpretations of the stories. In other 
words, moral decoding of the koumin writers relies heavily on the volatility of the 
political context in which the critics live. Following this vein, we could also consider 
the trajectory of koumin literature critiques as a chronicle of various manifestos 
responding to the domineering nationalist discourse at the time. Should the winds of 
identity politics change, the categorization of koumin writers would shift again. 
Postcolonial Koumin  
In 1946, a 22-year-old Iwasato Masao stepped off his ship in Keelung Harbor, the 
location where Chou Chin-po’s characters first congregate at the beginning of “The 
Volunteer.” Formerly an agriculture economics student at Kyoto Imperial University, 
Iwasato had “volunteered” to go to war for the Japanese Empire.31 His brother, also a 
volunteer soldier, had just been killed in a bomb attack in Manila in the previous year. It 
was now 1946, and he found himself standing in the rubbles of Keelung as a second 
lieutenant officer of a capitulated empire. 
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However, unlike Chou, he would not recede into history. He instead would become 
a renowned scholar, later a politician, then by a stroke of luck be handpicked by Chiang 
Ching-kuo ɨ^,—then chairman of the KMT party and President of Taiwan—to be 
his vice president, and then continue to inaugurate as a mover and shaker of Taiwan. His 
name was no longer Iwasato Masao. He was Lee Teng-hui, who served as the President 
of Taiwan for 12 years between 1988 and 2000. 
During his presidency his effort went into centering Taiwan in KMT’s Sinocentrc 
politics, which had promoted the ideology of an union with China. Since leaving office 
in 2000, he was expelled by the KMT party for his alliance with pro-independence 
groups. Furthermore he became increasingly vocal about his nostalgia and ties with 
Japan. Although having experienced a certain degree of discrimination, he harbored—
and still harbors—fond memories of his Japanese education, often relating in public 
speeches his inspiration by Japanese philosophers like Nitobe Inazo ȿĉɦĞ and 
the Japanese spirit of Bushido. However, his prominent position in Taiwan does not 
immunize him against the derisions regarding the koumin.32 Rather, his reverence for 
the Japanese spirit 4hÅÏ has led his opponents in the Pan-Blue Coalition 
(consisting of political parties affiliated with KMT) to portray him as a lackey for Japan. 
 In June 2007, his visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, against oppositions 
from both Pan-Blue and Pan-Green coalitions, was berated as inappropriate.33 Lee 
explained to the swarm of journalists who congregated outside the shrine: “it is 
completely personal. Please don’t think of anything political or historical. As family, to 
show respect to my brother by visiting the shrine is something I must do.”34 His brother, 
Iwasato Takenori, or Lee Teng-chin, had died in the Philippines in 1945 serving the 
Japanese navy. His spirit is consecrated in the Yasukuni Shrine. Despite his emphasis 
!                                                                                                                           76
that this was a personal wish to fulfill his filial duty as a younger brother, his trip was, 
as expected, fraught with political innuendo. The procedure of the former president of 
Japan’s former colony visiting a symbol of Japanese militarism provides an all-too-
common trope for KMT’s and Beijing’s condemnation of his separatist intentions and 
damaging the China-Japan relationship. 
Lee submitted an essay to the September 2015 issue of Japan’s Voice magazine, in 
which he discussed Taiwan’s process of democratization and his support for Abe 
Shinzo’s domestic policies, among several other issues. When the Taiwanese media 
caught wind of this publication, only Lee’s recount of his and his brother’s past as 
volunteer soldiers grabbed the headlines, which reported that they were “fighting for the 
Japanese motherland”35 (see Figure 3.2). Lee’s mentioning of his memories is an 
attempt to differentiate a domestic resistance of the people against their government 
from the transnational scale of the Chinese resistance against Japan. His intention was 
to rebuke the KMT administration’s official commemoration of the 70th anniversary of 
“victory in War of Resistance against Japan,” calling it an attempt to “curry favor from 
China.”36 According to the translated report of South China Post, he argued that 70 
years ago, Taiwan (then a Japanese colony) and Japan were one country” and that 
“Taiwanese people at the time were no doubt Japanese subjects and they did what they 
could to fight for their motherland.”37 Taking Lee’s words out of the context of Taiwan’s 
position as a Japanese colony, news media hint at Lee’s “treason,” insinuating his 
proclamation of “Japanese motherland” as a koumin’s postcolonial allegiance and desire 
to continue colonial relationship. The then-incumbent President Ma Ying-jeou 
responded immediately with vitriol, calling him a traitor and accused the former 
President of “selling out Taiwan, humiliating its citizens, and lowering himself with his 
statements pandering to the Japanese.” He demanded that Lee retract his remarks and 
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apologize to all the people of Taiwan.38 Other KMT politicians threatened to revoke 
Lee’s annual stipend as a former president, seeing him unfit to represent Taiwan as a 
former president. 
Interestingly, according to another (Taiwanese) media which published the full text 
of Lee’s essay, however, Lee reportedly has written: “until 70 years ago, Japan and 
Taiwan were parts of the same country. Since we were the same country, ‘war against 
Japan’ (Ƥ4, referring to the Sino-Japanese wars) was not a fact in Taiwan. I 
volunteered to join the army, and my brother Lee Teng-chin volunteered for the Navy. 
We were undoubtedly fighting as a “Japanese,” fighting for our motherland.”39 The 
slight disparity between the two translations carries significant weight. In South China 
Post, Lee’s memory of “the Taiwanese people” is spoken on behalf of an entire 
generation, while in Storm Media, he is articulating his colonial experience from his 
personal and familial background. Mistranslations and mutilated headlines alike deliver 
confusing messages to the public. Yet this discrepancy between different translations 
went unnoticed by the public, apparently agitated by the sensationalism of the former 
President’s proclamation of “being Japanese.” 
Taiwanese historian Chen Fang-ming weighed in on the issue, and maintained that 
the battlefield of contestation enters on “historical view.” He stated that “under Taiwan’s 
currently deformed political structure, the [shaping of] historical view is correlated with 
who is in power.” In short, Chen suggested that Ma administration’s own view is but 
one way of remembering history. Furthermore, Chen also buttressed Lee’s view that the 
70th commemoration of “victory in War of Resistance” that Ma’s administration 
organized is incongruous to the island’s particular historical context. In his view, Ma’s 
historical view embodies a “Chinese experience” that has little to do with the island, 
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and actually sits more comfortably with the historical narratives of the People’s 
Republic of China. While the Taiwanese should remain critical of the presentation of 
colonialism, skepticism towards colonial nostalgia does not necessarily indicate that 
Taiwan should adopt a Sinocentric view of history.40 
Others, like legislator (of Democratic Progressive Party, a main opposing party to 
the KMT) and political scientist Kuo Cheng-liang, lambasted that Lee’s “koumin 
historical view” belongs only to a small percentage of Taiwanese and should not be 
inflated as to represent others. Kuo cites several facts with which to measure the 
scantiness of such percentage: the total population in 1943 was 6,590,000, and the 
number of Taiwanese soldiers who were conscripted (whether forced or voluntary) was 
200,000, taking up a mere 3%; by December 1943, the families who had officially 
Japanized their names amount to 17,526 households, taking up less than 2%. 
Furthermore Kuo contends that postcolonial pro-Japan parties, in which Lee plays an 
important part, exaggerate a “koumin historical view” that wipes out all Taiwanese 
efforts of resistance against Japanese colonialism. He blames Lee’s “sympathy offered 
to the colonizers by the colonized” for exasperating Taiwan’s image as a victim of 
“Stockholm Syndrome” and as an international laughingstock, claiming that “compared 
to how postwar Koreans reflect on their Japanese colonial experience, the Taiwanese 
should be ashamed.”41 
Although Kuo believes that providing hard numbers could render the weight of 
Lee’s historical view measurable and provable, the accuracy of such measurement and 
proof is questionable. Historical views and memories are abstract constructions that 
involve more than numbers. Ultimately speaking, the smallness of consensus cannot 
render Lee’s memory faulty, or invalid. And more importantly, the question we need to 
ask is: why render the “koumin” shameful to gain respect in the international 
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community? The koumin is only “shameful” when considered in a Sinocentric and 
nationalistic framework. Kuo’s and others’ similar criticisms of Lee’s “shameful” 
“koumin-hood” not only accentuate Sinocentrism, but perpetuate Taiwan’s colonial 
trauma. 
As I have discussed, due to its repeated appearance in Taiwanese media, koumin is 
an term that refuses to die out with the times. The recent episodes of its use to deride or 
to identify a specific group of people indicate that the term deserves our scrutinization. 
While its users assume to know its definition, it is in fact a slippery word whose 
meaning transforms in different contexts. Originally, it was an honorific word that 
represented the exaltation of the identity of the colonized subaltern to “imperial 
subjects.” Though a forceful imposition by Japanese colonialism, it evoked an 
existential desire to be officially affirmed as a “good Japanese” and was seen as a 
potential portal to equality with the actual Japanese.42 (In the radical case of Chou Chin-
po’s character Shinroku, it has more to do with dying as a good Japanese rather than 
living as one.) At the same time, for many during the colonial period, it also represented 
an annihilation of native identity and culture. To ensure absolute loyalty from the 
subjects, the kouminka movement saw a ban on publishing in the native language, as 
well as abolishment of Taiwanese temples and beliefs. Hence, the notion of koumin 
bears two conceptualizations that are diametrically opposing—that of a confident, 
model “citizen” and that of a brainwashed, objectified instrument in aiding Japan’s 
militaristic ambitions. 
 Under the specific historical conditions of postwar KMT regime, the word koumin 
was further laden with the connotation of enslavement by their wartime enemy. KMT’s 
antagonism towards Japan constructed the image of the native Taiwanese as an 
Japanized Other. Due to their Japaneseness, the former koumins were rendered 
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incapacitated and not to be trusted. As the result of KMT’s banning of Japanese culture
—including speaking and publishing in Japanese language—koumin also represented 
the unmentionable and the shameful. In modern day the usage of this term is still 
negative, albeit sometimes used humorously to casually dismiss one’s fondness for 
Japanese culture. It is often used with hanjian, (ƻɂ, traitors to the Han Chinese race), 
riben zougou (4hcĬ, lackey for the Japanese), and has amassed another denotation 
of betrayal to a “Chinese” nation. However, koumin is the only word used to imply dual 
identities of Taiwanese and Japanese. In addition to traitor, drawing on the example of 
Lien Chan’s recent defaming of Taipei Mayor Ke Wen-je, it also denotes a traitor who is 
wealthy and enjoys privileges by collaborating with the rulers. 
The evolution of the application of the term koumin is not a mere reflection of 
change of times. My effort to chart out the changes in its meanings in this chapter was 
to elucidate its quality as a palimpsest. Its meaning at any given time is never singular, 
but pluralistic and multiplying. When new meanings are introduced, the original 
message is temporarily overwritten, but cannot be erased, not while people who 
associate the word with modernity, or status symbol still remain. In Lee Teng-hui’s case, 
he acknowledges how his opponents use it to deride his amiability with his past 
colonizer, and reversely employs this label to sarcastically refer to himself and his 
contemporaries. “Lee Teng-hui is still called a koumin! What this means I do not 
know!” He coyly said to reprimand a political incident that incited antagonism between 
different ethnic groups.43 Here, his metonymic use of the word is an attempt to invoke 
in his audience an understanding of the Japanized generation and their strife with 
balancing multiple identities. Koumin, when used by a President or an entertainer, to 
berate or to ridicule or to delineate an identity, no longer singly represents a Taiwanese’s 
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struggle with identities under the Japanese rule. Rather, this highly politicized locution 
can generate a new, densely nuanced site that demands thoughtfulness and scrutiny from 
its users. 
That it is deemed inappropriate for a former President to articulate his colonial 
memories and identity as a former subject reveals a blind spot—that Taiwan’s current 
view of its colonial past is similar to the identity crisis caused by the kouminka 
movement. The reality of the colonial, if not presented as rife with unbearable strife 
against oppression and exploitation, is not acceptable in terms of national dignity. This 
problematic is that of an existential anxiety of “becoming Taiwanese,” that a colonized 
subject is expected to completely denounce his former master in order to emerge as a 
“good Taiwanese.” Where the kouminka movement instilled an uncertainty of “cannot 
be Japanese” in the formerly colonized, the ridicule of koumin at this historical juncture 
disseminates an anxiety of “cannot be Taiwanese.” In either case, the term koumin was 
and is an indication of one’s state of incompletion, that one is en route to becoming and 
yet has not achieved. A koumin is “not really Japanese” in the past, and “not really 
Taiwanese” in the present, but held in the perpetual state of liminality. 
On September 13, 2015, just a few weeks after news of his essay in Voice magazine 
broke out, in reference to the recent discontent over his “Japanese motherland” rhetoric, 
former President Lee Teng-hui responded: “However, I will say that Japan was also an 
alien regime. Being a Japanese slave was, in fact, a tragedy.”44 If Chou Chin-po’s 
optimistic volunteer soldier, Shinroku, lived through the war, perhaps he would also 
make this disillusioned observation in hindsight, that the strife of “becoming Japanese” 
was all for naught. Interestingly, juxtaposing Lee Teng-hui’s postwar confession and the 
fictional Shinroku’s pre-war conviction seem to piece together a jigsaw puzzle of a 
koumin’s lifelong struggle over identity, showing how adoration and disenchantment 
!                                                                                                                           82
can paradoxically coexist within this struggle. The complexity of koumin is a key to 
understanding the colonial structure. Koumin is an agent that delineates the colonial 
operation with its colonial benevolence and cultural violence, beyond the dichotomy of 
master and slave. To paint koumin singly as a traitor to its kind, a victim or an 
instrument for its master, is only a partial presentation of a greater picture. By 
circumventing examination of the stigma, or reading the category of kouminka literature 
merely as colonial trauma prevents the Taiwanese society from fully coming terms with 
its colonial history. 
Chou (1920- 1996) and Lee (1923- ) are contemporaries who lived through the 
same historical background. Though one lived a quiet life as a closet former writer, 
while the other made the ultimate grade navigating nationalist politics, the likeness of 
their codes of identity politics are uncanny. Similar to Chou’s refusal to defend his 
works, Lee’s repeated vocalness of his memory as a former Japanese and serving as a 
Japanese soldier seem unapologetic and equally patient in waiting for the other 
Taiwanese to come to terms with the colonial past. 
It is interesting that Lien Chan and Hao Pei-tsun chose the word koumin over 
hanjian ƻɂ to attack their opponent with questionable national identity in the episode 
with which I opened this chapter. In order to revoke images of traitors to the nation, 
Lien and Hao’s choice of word is telling in their need to drag in the ghosts of colonial 
Japan. Their reliance on “Japan” in delineating the boundaries between a “good 
Taiwanese” (fit for a mayoral election) and a “compromised, bad Taiwanese” reflects 
their own anxiety of being unable to completely override past definitions of koumin and 
other memories. Not only do Lee’s accounts of colonial memories repeatedly transgress 
the boundaries of between “good” and “bad” Taiwanese subjects, but more importantly, 
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the repeated intrusion of a benevolent Japanese presence threatens KMT’s ideology that 
the Chinese Taiwan (perhaps including the People’s Republic of China) and the colonial 
Taiwan share one common enemy. Moreover, Lien’s enlisting of the word koumin 
reveals that he himself is, too, entangled in Taiwan’s colonial past. 
An ideal postcolonial world for a colonized is perhaps one that, as Chou allegedly 
said at the end of the 1993 symposium, does not “need anyone to redress [one’s] 
works.” As the most vilified “collaborator” or “traitor” in wartime Taiwanese literature, 
Chou had refused to offer any explanation. His silence appears to hold, ironically, most 
steadfast to his (now anachronistic) convictions of “becoming Japanese.” Rather than 
hastily remaking a memory or rectifying the interpretation of a piece of work to fit into 
the mold of a certain political discourse a la mode, what truly matters is coming to terms 
with the colonial past. The ideal would be a world where stigmas like koumin and 
kouminka literature are neutral, objective examples of colonial reality, where neither a 
redress movement nor justification of one’s political inclination is necessary.45 
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Chapter Three 
Unfinished Ending: 
Cinematic Presentations of “Japan” and Re-Envisioning History 
In the previous chapters, I discussed the social categories of comfort women and 
koumin, both of which are colonial constructions that have acquired multiple definitions 
in postcolonial Taiwan. Their new definitions and significance are not monolithic, but 
mutate in different contexts. In this chapter, I shift my focus to the unfinished ending of 
Japanese colonialism by way of examining three exemplar films: Cape No. 7 (2008), 
Seediq Bale: Warriors of the Rainbow (2011), and KANO (2014), directed or produced 
by Wei Te-sheng ɴŬǭ. Each film is a modern attempt at interpreting history and 
making sense of the Taiwan/Japan colonial relationship. Under a postcolonial context, it 
is tempting to believe that the colonial past is analyzable through an omniscient 
viewpoint. However, as the continued re-presentations of comfort women and koumin 
prove, while Taiwan’s colonial period bears a definitive end, emotional constructions 
tend to exceed their shelf life. It is easy to see the commencement of Japanese 
colonialism in Taiwan, but even from hindsight, to discuss its sudden, unintended 
ending is problematic. 
Though the topic of Taiwanese colonial history is nothing novel to Taiwanese 
cinema, the creations and images of Japanese characters have recently taken a 
significant shift from that of a stereotypical abuser to something that is more complex. 
From the ruthless, faceless killing machines in patriotic films such as Eight Hundred 
Heroes ĴáǤļ (1975), and the more humanized portrayal of colonizers in Hou 
Hsiao-Hsien’s The Puppetmaster òÔ
$(1993), to a little guy’s disconsolate sense of 
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nostalgia for the Japanese past in Wu Nien-jen's A Borrowed Life ȟ (1994), the 
depiction of Imperial Japan has taken on numerous facelifts. In the context of the recent 
burst of interest in cinematic re-presentations of “Japan,”  I will examine three films to 
trace the discursive navigation of how Taiwan is coming to terms with its colonial past. 
While the readings of these modern films can be subjected to national allegorization, I 
contend that the roles of the “Japaneseness” presented in the films bear more tasks than 
portraying the villain or foiling the heroic (de)feats of the colonized, and that the 
presentations’ migration into the mainstream of popular culture reflects the desires and 
anxiety of a “nation” struggling to find its current position in the world by re-examining 
its roots. 
The three selected films, whether fictional or based on true stories, are 
characterized by not only the elements of the Japanese colonial empire but also by 
irresolute, unfinished endings. The jilted Tomoko Kojima in Cape No. 7 finally learns of 
her Japanese lover’s true affections, but he is no longer alive; the warriors in Seediq 
Bale fight an impossible battle to resist the imposition of modernization, but are 
defeated; the baseball team that never expected to win in KANO stir high hopes as it 
finally picks up pace, only to fail anti-climatically at the championship game. Although 
the outcome of the storyline is predicted since the facts are etched out in history, why 
are we obsessed with retelling history? Why did the films construct the escalations of 
emotions and sympathy for the protagonists only to let down when the films end? By re-
presenting the endings, do the popular texts reshape memories of the past? To examine 
how the Taiwanese audience is processing re-presentation of memories, I will use not 
only the films, but also the “paratexts” generated by discussion in internet forums as 
well as academic papers as my texts. 
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As the Japanized generation perish with age, Taiwan has witnessed an increasingly 
enthusiastic race since the 1990s to excavate and chronicle memories of the past which 
were, until then, dominated by an official version of history. However, given the 
conditions that after WWII, Taiwan was consigned to another authoritarian regime that 
vehemently opposed and negated the Japanese, the nation had been deprived of the 
chance to engage in proper decolonization. This, combined with the younger 
generation’s upbringing by a more Sinocentric education and compounded by an 
emotional factor that is inherent in the familial history, means that the navigation 
process would be complex, varying, and discursive. 
In the race to preserve and reinterpret past memories, Wei Te-sheng’s presentations 
of “Japan” have carved out a hefty chunk of space in Taiwanese popular culture and the 
public’s collective consciousness, not only because of his films’  remarkable 
performance at the box office, but also because of their ability to simultaneously amass 
copious amounts of praise as well as controversy, creating interstices in the traditional 
anti-/pro-Japan binary when we discuss colonial history. The success of Wei’s films can 
be linked to a particular historical context, in which Taiwanese society endured a series 
of blows from major political and financial failures on the government’s part.1 Wei and 
his blockbusters became an affirmative brand of “nativist pride” that delves into events 
which took place in Taiwan but which are lesser known, concentrating on marginalized 
people and populations coming together to work towards self-realization. 
As a fledgling director, Wei Te-sheng did not directly experience the colonial time 
himself. The historical references in his films, often obscure to most Taiwanese people, 
are the results of years of fieldwork and historical research. He dramatizes his findings 
and churns out popular productions that featured attractive shots of photogenic actors 
and compelling storylines that lured a massive audience. Wei visually etched in his film-
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viewers’ minds a space for collective memory: micro-narratives of personal 
relationships that were deflected or obstructed by a grand historical narrative—a lost 
love interest, marginalized memories of the aboriginal tribes, or forgotten roots of a 
favorite national sport—all of which share the common theme of Taiwan’s past ties with 
Japan. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the historical backdrop of colonialism generated heated 
discussions regarding Taiwan’s national identification. Some accused Wei of pandering 
to the Japanese market, romanticizing a colonial rule that in essence exploited its 
subjects. While others, contrarily, saw him as anti-Japanese due to his presentation of 
the Seediq tribe’s violent revolt against Imperial Japan. In both camps, Wei’s films and 
their paratexts offer a text with which we can study how Taiwan’s younger generation 
attempts to mitigate guilt, process shame and humiliation, and consequently commence 
the process of decolonization. 
The Films 
In 2008, Wei Te-sheng’s Cape No. 7 was released and became a sensational cinematic 
success and an instant media darling, nothing short of a social phenomenon. The 
colonial past, which is presented in the form of seven undelivered love letters from a 
Japanese teacher to his Taiwanese pupil when he is repatriated to his home country after 
WWII, received little actual screen time, but sparked so much conversation/controversy 
regarding “national dignity,”  and “desire to become re-colonized”  that the prematurely 
terminated relationship, too, could be read as a national allegory. In summary, Cape No. 
7 is a romantic comedy that evolves around the coming together of a musical group, 
whose singular mission is to foil a Japanese singer in the town’s upcoming music 
festival. The male protagonist, A-ga, is a frustrated musician who fails to make a name 
for himself in the big city. Back home2, he lands a job as a mail carrier and finds a 
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packet from Japan, penned to an antiquated address to a Kojima Tomoko-san 'ĚQ*. 
Because both the Japanese address and name have long been replaced by new Chinese 
signifiers, they are unrecognizable to the mailman and cannot be delivered. The packet 
of love letters lie in quiescent existence until a Japanese girl, also named Tomoko, 
discovers them in A-ga’s room and urges him to deliver them to their designated owner. 
Cape No. 7’s success created a lasting buzz for Wei’s next film, Seediq Bale (2011). 
Prior to the release of Seediq Bale, Japan’s Tohoku area experienced one of the most 
devastating earthquakes in its seismic history, and witnessed a continuous outpour of 
affection and aid from Taiwan.3 Under an amiable atmosphere that underscored the 
mutual confirmation of a Taiwan-Japan kizuna,4 Seediq Bale’s presentation of a 
historical trauma that Imperial Japan inflicted on the Seediq tribe nevertheless made its 
grand entrance, premiering on the Ketagalan Boulevard in front of the Presidential 
Building, attended by presidential candidates of two main opposing parties, Chinese 
Nationalist Party (KMT)’s incumbent president Ma Ying-jeou ęĥű, and Democratic 
Progressive Party's Tsai Ying-wen ɍĥd. At this juncture, this specific screening of an 
indigenous tribal history is telling in Wei’s ambition to revisit a beginning, a time well 
before the conflicts of waishengren (£Ơ
, Chinese mainlanders that migrated to the 
island after WWII) and bendigren (h0
, native Taiwanese that had been residing on 
the island prior to WWII) commenced, to reconstruct collective memories. 
The 4.5-hour-long version of the film draws attention to the historical event, the 
Wushe Incident5 (ȜŢ@, 1930), and describes in great detail how Mouna Rudo Ƨ3
ȐB, one of the chiefs of the twelve indigenous tribes, comes to the difficult decision of 
embarking on a war against Imperial Japan, despite his ready knowledge that it would 
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result in the annihilation of the tribal clans. Convinced that subjugation to Japanese rule 
would result in the loss of their faith and hunting grounds, the tribes pitch a little over 
one thousand sword-wielding warriors against Imperial Japan’s modernized troops. The 
uprising ends with the demise of Mouna Rudo and his cohorts, whose integrity “wins” 
them recognition as “Seediq Bale,”  or a true man, and who are thereby approved to 
continue their afterlives at the ultimate hunting ground on the other end of the rainbow. 
The film also casts a spotlight on two figures: Hanaoka Ichiro Ƀș  and Hanaoka 
Jiro Ƀ{ș, two Seediq men raised and educated by the Japanese to serve as “model 
savages”  to their people. Their in-betweenness best illustrates the entangled identities 
between becoming a Japanese and not quite an aboriginal: on one hand, they struggle 
with their desire for modernization through colonial transformation but are plagued by 
the discontent of not being fully recognized as “proper Japanese”; on the other, their 
strife to bring “civilization”  to their tribe to match the colonizer’s standards contradicts 
with their wish to remain loyal to their people’s conviction. 
In 2014, Wei Te-sheng wrote and produced KANO (directed by Umin Boya), a film 
about how a shoddy high school baseball team eventually makes the grade to compete 
at the prestigious Koshien ǔ*Ļ6, the baseball mecca of Japan. This film is based on 
the true story of the scruffy team from Chiayi Agricultural and Forestry School (ȉţǁ
ſGė, Kagi nourin gakkou, abbreviated as Kano) which has never won a single game 
due to the players’  lack of skill and focus in their practice. The team consists of a 
mishmash of Japanese, Han Taiwanese and aboriginal players, which is considered 
inferior to a team consisting of purely Japanese players. Things start to look up when a 
new Japanese coach, Kondo Hyotaro ¼ɚǑJș, arrives in town. Perhaps alluding to 
the ideal colonial template of interracial co-prosperity, Kondo sees the amalgamation of 
!                                                                                                                           90
races as a “golden combination,”  an opportunity to enhance team performance by 
bringing in diverse qualities peculiar to each race: “the Japanese are good at defense, the 
Taiwanese excel at batting, and the aborigines are fast runners.”  With a sharp eye for 
talent, his Spartan trainings lead them to islandwide victories, and ultimately propel 
them onto the grander stage of the Koshien Baseball Tournament in Japan. Aside from 
the main plot of the ball games, Kondo’s story offers an important side thread as a 
dejected baseball coach from Ehime, Japan, who previously walked out on the sport, but 
then recovers his sense of worth and love for the game through the team’s success. His 
memories of the failed experience with the previous team he coached—which was 
constituted of all Japanese players—are often juxtaposed with his training with the 
mixed ragtag team in Taiwan, whom he feels to be more resilient to his rigorous 
maneuvers. As underdogs of the sport, together they become one of the strongest teams 
at the Koshien. Interestingly, the year that the Kano team represented Taiwan at Koshien 
was 1931, just months after the bloodbaths in the Wushe mountains in 1930. 
Juxtaposing the boisterous bantering in Kano and extreme violence in Seediq Bale, 
Wei’s presentations explore contrasting aspects and sentiments towards the colonial 
rule. 
Wei’s refashioning of “Japan”  mirrors a younger Taiwanese generation’s gaze on 
Japan. The three films examine the colonial relationships of thirty-five years into 
Japan’s acquirement of the island. From the brutal clashes between supposedly “tamed 
savages”  and the colonial machine that claims their ancestral hunting ground in Seediq 
Bale, to the ideal state of multi-racial collaboration in Kano, to unresolved romances 
after the war in Cape No. 7, the image of Taiwan and Japan’s colonial relationship that 
Wei outlined is multifaceted and at times contradictory. Yet, even in his portrayal of 
Japanese as suppressors, his application of typical Japanese symbols, such as cherry 
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blossoms or Bushido spirit, follows the aesthetics of Japanese culture and ethics in a 
favorable light. For example, as in Seediq Bale the man responsible for having ordered 
the poisonous gas7 on the “savages,” General Kamada Yahiko ʆǍȨɸ is portrayed as 
hot-tempered and cold-blooded, but his identification of the spirit of bushido, or the 
ways of a true warrior, in the tribesmen towards the end of the film consigns a capacity 
in him that allows him to recognize noble Japanese traits in a “savage.”  Perhaps, the 
materialization of a romantic, well-learned general, is as fictitious as the buck-teeth 
ruffians who lined anti-Japan war propagandas.8 The “Japanese”  elements in Wei’s 
cinematic creations can be considered as conjectural forms of memories to see how 
different images of “Japan”  fit into Taiwan’s current identity politics. The insertions of 
sentimentalized Japanese symbols and characters, I contend, are a practice similar to 
what Marianne Hirsch terms  “postmemory”—  memories of the “generation after,” 
whose relation with its object is indirectly connected with the past, but mediated 
through “an imaginative investment and creation.”9  Rather than as an attempt to revise 
the colonial past, I see Wei’s invocation of the past as a critique on the flat profiling of 
colonizers as singularly abusive, which cannot explain the complex nostalgic sentiments 
that some Taiwanese have towards “Japan.” 
Between Chinese Nationalism and Japanese Colonialism 
A similarity that Cape No. 7 shares with the 1980s Taiwan New Cinema, which features 
art-house films that pioneered the cinematic presentations of Taiwan’s turbulent past, is 
the attention drawn to the portrayal of the “Japanese.”  However, the image of the 
“Japanese colonizer” here differs greatly from its portrayal in previous Taiwanese-made 
or Hollywood films that tackle this period. In previous films, the images of the wartime 
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Japanese are either portrayed as brutes who treat their subjects with an unfair hand, or a 
featureless, albeit Japanese, face representing a mere part in compliance with its state 
apparatus. In Cape No. 7, the created Japanese colonizer takes the form of a man of 
education, filled with remorse towards his Taiwanese subject, and capable of seeing his 
“subject”  in a compassionate, even romantic light. More importantly, he conveys in his 
letter an attempt to distance himself from the imperial system: “I am but a poor teacher. 
Why must I bear the cross for the faults of an entire empire?”  In this context, the 
viewers are able to humanize a small component of the colonizing apparatus, and even 
empathize with his sense of powerlessness. Wei’s invitation for the viewers’ empathy is 
further extended in Seediq Bale and Kano, where the faces of the colonizers are further 
given a point of reference, from which explanations could be drawn for each decision 
and action. In this sense, it is possible to view the acting agents of the imbalanced 
power structure separate from the structure itself. 
For critics who read the film from a nationalistic perspective, the characters 
represent their nations, and their relationship with one another symbolizes a state-to-
state relationship. Hence, the relationship between elder Tomoko and her teacher 
prematurely ended by repatriating polices at the end of WWII, depicts “Taiwan’s 
longing for Japan’s love.”  Social science researcher Chen Yi-chung sees Cape No.7 as 
an accusation against KMT’s “China,”  whose intrusion upon Taiwan’s historical 
timeline tore apart the two lovers. He describes the two Taiwanese/Japanese 
relationships (colonial Tomoko’s with her teacher and modern-day Tomoko’s with the 
Taiwanese A-ga) in the film as a “Taiwanese yearning to be recolonized,”  and further 
reminds his readers that representation of the “Chinese” or “mainlander” is absent in the 
film, which makes it a point to present the diversity in Taiwan’s ethnic backgrounds. 
From these points he drew two doubts: does this yearning for “Japan’s”  love indicate 
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that the reconciliation between “Taiwan” and the “Republic of China” is not within the 
foreseeable future? And since the younger generation chooses Japan over China and 
paints a former colonizer in such a romantic light, what’s to become of the Taiwanese 
subjectivity? 
Chen’s doubts over Taiwan’s identity formation voices the questions of those who 
believe that a Taiwanese identity should be a fixed one, that is, those who “uphold the 
continuity and sovereignty of a tradition and culture, and perceive no problem in the 
internal differentiation of that particular community,”10 and that one must choose one 
cultural heritage over another and stick with it. Wei’s inclusion of the Hoklo characters 
(A-ga and Mou-bei), the aboriginals (Rauma and his father), the Hakka people 
(Malasun), the Japanese (Dada and Tomoko) is a conscious effort to present the 
hybridity of Taiwanese society. It is a manifesto of a desire to come to terms with its 
heterogeneity and dissimilarities, as there is no single, monolithic legacy to adhere to. 
Sidetracked by the nostalgic presence of “Japan,”  Chen’s essentialist bewilderment
—“the Chinese is absent”—really underscores the ramification between the multiple 
camps of the “Chinese,”  especially when in fact Hoklo and Hakka are, ethnically 
speaking, Chinese. 
Another critic, Hsu Chieh-lin, interestingly stated that Cape No. 7’s success owes 
much to Japanese support, and commented that the love letters scripted by a Japanese 
“rambled on about his nostalgia for his previous colony.”11 In an interview, Wei said that 
he had penned the letters himself12, first in Chinese, and had them translated into 
Japanese. The letters are narrated in Japanese throughout the film, reiterating the 
Japanese teacher’s remorse and request for his lover’s forgiveness for jilting her. “I am 
not deserting you,”  the teacher says in one letter, and “Please forgive me and my 
cowardice,” in another. These words of penitence deviate from the general observations 
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in reality that the Japanese government has not yet come to terms with its roles and 
behaviors during the war. As Leo Ching pointed out in Becoming Japanese, “Japan’s 
subordination to American imperialism […] freed Japan of any responsibility regarding 
the dissolution of its empires.”13 Contrary to essentialist/nationalist observations that the 
popular film panders to Japanese sentiments, the fact that the fictional letters spawned 
from a Taiwanese author, who mimics the language of a former colonizer and puts 
words of apology in his mouth, is an arbitrary trespassing on the subaltern’s part. Here, 
the Taiwanese screenwriter/director takes the initiative and attempts to speak for the 
silent Japanese empire. 
The “subaltern”  has spoken, and he channels the voice of the dominant ex-
colonizer. We can hear the Japanese colonizer’s narration of his remorse, and at the 
same time we are well aware that the film is a Taiwanese production by a Taiwanese 
director, and that the director is conveying “Japanese”  emotions by mimicking a 
“Japanese.”  Hsu and Chen’s concerns may lie in the fact that the Taiwanese gaze 
towards the “Japanese”  would only reflect its own “otherness,”  which further pushes 
itself into the periphery, but they overlook its potential for deconstructing the commonly 
expected notion of “Japan.”  Moreover, they also lack “an apprehension of colonial 
consciousness”  and the need to constantly construct and deconstruct taken-for-granted 
cultures, nationalities, and identities before forming one’s own identity. 
Wei’s second film, based on a historical event in 1930, the Wushe Incident, would 
receive less critiques for “pandering to Japan”  for its portrayal of the Seediq Tribe’s 
resistance against Japan. Wei has stressed that the film is shot from the perspective of 
the aboriginals rather than the dominant Han-Chinese ethnic group—unlike its 
predecessors’ take (Bloodshed on the Green Mountains, Ch’ing-shan-pi-hsieh, ċÛȰ
!                                                                                                                           95
Ĩ  1957; Disturbance in Musha, Wu-she-feng-yun, ȜŢİ 1965) on the same 
incident, which were inclined to nationalizing the riot as a heroic uprising against 
Japanese rule for the sake of Chinese integrity.14 The repeated process of re-presenting 
the Wushe Incident is a cinematic form of palimpsest, in which the act of writing over 
the dramatic texts does not necessarily override them. As layers of texts are laid over the 
previous texts, the covered texts are not obliterated but temporarily hidden. The 
construction of Mouna Rudo as a Chinese war hero, though now casted aside as an 
antiquated cultural memory, may resurface and obfuscate the present reconstruction of 
the Wushe Incident outside the Sinocentric framework. While the media applaud the 
production of the film as “pride of Taiwan,”  and a “presentation of Taiwanese 
subjectivity,”  the film triggered a string of fervent discussions, political and historical, 
surrounding the presentation of historical realism, heroism versus savagery, and the 
presentation of the Japanese characters.15 
Though history enthusiasts debate how closely the film adheres to the “truth” or 
historical facts, and question Wei’s position to represent another group of subalterns, 
Wei consciously stresses his departure from Sino/Han-centric narratives. In an 
interview, Wei mentions that when he was casting Japanese actors, he made it a point to 
stress to them that “the film is not going to vilify the Japanese.”16 Indeed the focal point 
of the film is placed on the clash between two very different sets of “civilizations,” 
revisiting the incident from the perspectives of the Taiwanese aboriginals, whose side of 
the story has often been unheard. Whichever version of “truth” the film offers, it is clear 
in its ambition to reconstruct the viewers’  mindset that the significance of the Wushe 
upheaval excludes the long-established notion that the incident is a Taiwanese 
representative in China’s resistance against Japan. 
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Historical records of the tribes and the infamous uprising were mostly written by 
the Japanese officials, because the access to the mountainous regions was denied to 
Taiwanese peoples after the outbreak of revolts. After WWII, the nationalists misused 
the indigenous tribes’  revolt for their own agenda, branding the act of revolt against 
Japan as martyrdom for the Chinese nation. Wei’s effort to give the indigenous their 
voice extracts the incident from a Chinese historical framework and gives an alternative 
take on the event. As stated in the opening of the film, the film script is an adaptation 
from historical facts, historical facts from the perspectives of the mountain people. As 
much as Wei underscores the importance of reasoning and the presentation of “objective 
facts,”  his re-centering of those who have been marginalized and re-reading of the 
Wushe Incident, however, run the risk of undermining his own efforts: Whose history/
memory did he adapt the story from? Where did the fact end, and where did the 
“adaptation”  begin? Several viewers who profess to be descendants of the Seediq 
warriors challenged the film’s interpretation of subjects—the meaning of the 
headhunting tradition, Mouna Rudo’s possibly less than noble motivation to spark the 
upheaval, and misinterpretation of their tribal Gaya (instructions of the way of life)—
and took their issues to the media.17 Stepping outside the traditional China versus Japan 
binary framework, the “voicing”  of indigenous people reveals a plethora of internal 
dynamics regarding various notions of the “truth,” which suggests the necessity of 
further study. 
However, the aspiration to transcend current-standing political squabbles is met 
with ambiguous results, as internet forums fill up with comments expressing 
gratification from the onscreen slaughtering of the Japanese by the Seediq rebels.18 The 
reluctance to modify a traditional perspective and the desire to vilify the Taiwanese 
interpretations of Japan memory, on the part of viewers, reflect limitation and hurdles 
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that the search for Taiwanese subjectivity encounters. Wei explains in several interviews 
that his ambition in Seediq Bale was to explore the motives behind the actions of each 
character, whether Seediq or Japanese.19 He dismisses an interviewer’s comment that 
some interpreted Cape No. 7 as pro-Japan, which perhaps implicates that Seediq Bale 
would be received as anti-Japan.20 The effort needed to repel the dichotomized 
framework of anti-/pro-Japan is possibly more herculean than the making of the film. It 
is interesting to note that meanwhile in the blogosphere, the screening of Seediq Bale in 
Japan has also caused some stir, marveling that “the director who made the pro-
Japanese Cape No. 7 has made an anti-Japanese film!”21   However, Wei attributes the 
nature of the bloody conflict to the different faiths of the Japanese and Seediq people: 
“One of them is a people who believe in rainbows, the other in the sun. […] They fight 
for their faiths, forgetting that what they believe in belongs to the same sky,”  thus 
downplaying the opposition of political stances while underlining the “sameness” of the 
two peoples.22 
While Wei’s presentation of the Wushe Incident disaffiliates the feats of Mouna 
Rudo and his warriors from a grand Chinese national discourse, a law professor Huang 
Rei-ming posted in a China Daily column that Seediq Bale  “reminds us that the 
Japanese colonial rule is absolutely not anything as wonderful as pro-independence 
parties believe. The suffering of the aboriginal people is also part of our collective 
memory.”23  Meanwhile Wei’s history consultant, Seediq historian Kuo Ming-cheng 
stated that despite his gratitude to the popular film that greatly raised the visibility of the 
history of his tribe, he found it necessary to publish two volumes of Truth Bale to rectify 
“untrue historical details” in the cinematic presentation.24 As a descendent of the Seediq 
tribe, Kuo’s attempt to distinguish “true”  history from the film suggests the tribe’s will 
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to reclaim the right to articulation. It also highlights an anxiety from a long 
marginalized group that a presentation of their history from the perspective of the 
dominant Han Chinese/Taiwanese would be fraught with misunderstanding. Professor 
Huang Rei-ming’s claiming the right to the Seediq memory on behalf of “all 
Taiwanese”  perhaps appears to be too eager to incorporate the aborigine’s plight as a 
general Taiwanese resistance against Japanese rule. 
According to Taiwanese historian and ethnographer Huang Chih-hui, the 1991 
constitutional reform of changing the official name of Aborigines from shanbao (ÛǛ, 
mountain comrades) to yuanzhumin ( ¥ì, indigenous people) not only signifies that 
the Taiwanese government affirms their status as the original inhabitants on the island, 
but also establishes that the waishengren (£Ơ
, mainlanders) arrived last. As a result, 
the myth of a singular Chinese race25 that the KMT government constructed “lost its 
legitimacy.”26 Regarding the inclusion of the aboriginal’s conquest of the island into a 
presumably ethnic-Han Taiwanese discourse, the borders that define ethnicity and 
nation need to be reconsidered. If the Seediq warriors fought the Japanese exclusively 
for their belief, what makes the Wushe upheaval a “Chinese”  or “Taiwanese”  one, 
especially since in Wei’s version of the story, the presence of the ethnic-Han people is 
so insignificant? More interestingly, and perhaps more importantly, as Michael Berry 
asks, “to what extent can the violence committed upon or by “the Other”  be 
reconstituted into national narratives?”27  Similarly, the Seediq tribe’s historic view of 
and relationship with the Japanese should not be readily assumed as uniform to those of 
other Taiwanese peoples. As presented in the film, according to the Seediq belief, hatred 
is terminated once one’s enemy breathes his last breath, which means the headhunter 
and the hunted would continue their relationship in amity in the afterlife. From this, one 
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could extrapolate, perhaps with some difficulty, that for the Seediq, the slaughter of the 
Wushe Incident can easily be transitioned into an effort to turn foe into friends. 
Perhaps for the sake of a “balanced reportage,” both the “good Japanese cops” and 
the “mean ones”  received equal coverage and detailed portrayal in the film. Even 
General Kamada Yahiko  who ordered the illegal use of poison gas in the film is made 
more humanized to the viewers in his furious bouts and desperate attempt to terminate 
the riot. Upon the orders of pitching gas bombs against the aboriginals, the hushed 
hesitation voiced by Kamada’s subordinates at the round table depicts the softer side of 
the colonial machine. Prior to participating in the making of the film, Wei revealed that 
the Japanese actors he hired were not familiar with this part of colonial history.28 In 
particular, one of the actors, Ando Masanobu, struggled with the dramatic change in his 
character, Kojima Genji ('ĚƐƗ), an officer who befriended the tribes under his 
supervision but later switched to an extreme retaliation mode after discovering that his 
wife and children were murdered in the Wushe slaughter. “I explained to [Ando] I truly 
believe that anyone would seek revenge under such circumstances, whether he is 
Japanese or not,”  Wei said. While this may sound merely like one of the behind-the-
scene tidbits, it is significant in reflecting the rawness and sensitivity in dealing with the 
imaging of a colonial figure, despite the passing of three quarters of a century. 
Towards the end of Seediq Bale, General Kamada Yahiko comments that he sees 
the “long lost bushido spirit” in the Seediq warriors. Again, the ex-subaltern’s imagined 
gaze of the ex-colonizer reversed upon the Taiwanese self is manifested through the 
general’s voice. Initially, the tribesmen are regarded as simple-minded savages 
incapable of organizing a revolt against their colonizers, and their revolt is regarded as a 
series of disorganized “animalistic attacks”  by the general. By assigning Seediq 
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behavior of bravery to the Japanese bushido, the on-screen general not only deems the 
tribe’s unique brand of valor worthy and noble enough to be “Japanese,” but he also de-
constructs particularity of the Bushido tradition belonging exclusively to the Japanese 
civilization. His eulogy for the warriors is an embodiment of Wei’s, and perhaps 
Taiwan’s, desire to contend with a seemingly monolithic establishment from the 
margins. The film invites contemplation upon the contradiction between civilization and 
savagery, especially as noted in Mouna Rudo’s catchy and often highlighted lines: “if 
your civilization means to have us buckle under in submission, I shall show you the 
pride of a savage.” It is through the Wushe uprising that they prove themselves capable 
of complex mental labor, and also worthy of being recognized as a Japanese samurai. 
The linking of Mouna Rudo to a samurai is also an ironic one, because, in historical 
actuality, after the war, Mouna Rudo was labeled a national hero by the KMT for his 
“anti-Japan” resistance. Wei’s ruse of the linkage sets Mouna Rudo apart from his long-
time malapropos status as a historical Chinese patriot, and emphasizes that his cause is 
simultaneously very personal and transcendental—he is fighting for his way of life, just 
as the Japanese are fighting for their emperor, and other peoples fighting for their 
beliefs. Wei’s arrangement of a Japanese general to affirm how the warriors reflect an 
honor code he upholds says less about the savages successfully “learning”  Japanese 
ways than recognizing how the “other” is really the “same” (See Figure 4.1). 
The 2014 presentation of KANO is equally fraught with politics regarding its 
reimagining of the colonial era. Like Cape No. 7, it was also released at a time when the 
Taiwanese society was undergoing a series of internal turbulence of mass protests and 
reformation movements.29 The protests, including the March for the Death of Corporal 
Hong Chung-chiu, and the Sunflower Student Movement,30 articulated the people’s 
mounting discontent toward the then ruling KMT’s opaque administration. Wei and 
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Umin Boya’s upbeat, hot-blooded portrayal of an underdog team on its way to glory 
offered certain relief to movie-goers. In fact, during the standoff, student organizers of 
the Sunflower Movement contacted Wei, who gave his consent for a special screening 
of KANO inside the Parliament Hall during the occupation period to show his support 
for the students’  “defense for our democracy.”31  This event led supporters to comment 
that “the spirit of KANO and the spirit of the student movement are essentially the 
same.”  They further voiced their concern that this would tie Wei’s works to a 
“perpetually anti-China stance.” It is interesting to ask, under what framework can a 
film about a baseball team’s struggles in the colonial times share “essential sameness” 
as a student movement fighting against a political mechanism to reject its pro-China 
cultural agenda? Ostensibly, they might be referring to the air of innocence and passion 
privy to young protagonists who, in hope of making a change, pitch themselves against 
a monolithic structure in a David-and-Goliath manner. In their struggle to become a 
force to be reckoned with, the student players in Kano work against Japanese 
bureaucrats’  dismissal of their then unimpressive ability and refusal to back them with 
more funds. This is indeed reflected in the Sunflower students’ clashes with “the adults” 
manning the political machine. However, the combination of a film that harks back to a 
romanticized period of colonialism and the people’s rejection of economically cozying 
up to China suggests a far more complex process in the collective re-remembrance of 
Kano in postcolonial Taiwan. Although the film and the social movement are common 
in their passion to make a change in an established system, one cannot overlook the 
complication that the Kano baseball team achieved recognition under the guidance of a 
member of Japanese colonialism. Essentially, the Sunflower students’  real-life 
skepticism towards Taiwan’s governmental policies sharply contrasts with the celluloid 
presentation of ingenuous acceptance of the Japanese coach’s instructions. To embrace 
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KANO at the site of protest indicates not only a critique of KMT’s leadership, but also a 
selective remembrance of Japanese colonial ruling. 
As cultural studies scholar Andrew D. Morris notes, in Taiwan, “explicit 
recognition of the importance of the colonial era provides an important political context 
for Taiwanese people’s […] notions of exactly how “Chinese”  they are.”32  I agree with 
Morris that it is feasible to gauge one’s (lack of) allegiance to the People’s Republic of 
China with one’s perception of the colonial past, hence the concern of Wei’s artistic 
creations being permanently linked to an arbitrary “anti-China”  stigma. However, I 
argue that the sequence of this cause-effect should be reversed. It is an anxiety of losing 
one’s identity to a “Chinese” one that has resulted in a desire to revisit memories of the 
colonial. Historian and ethnographer Huang Chih-huei observes the revival of a 
previously suppressed memory as “an unique form of resistance.”33 Those who may 
have resisted the colonial ideal to acquire “Japaneseness” found themselves learning its 
culture “with enthusiasm once it had been forbidden by the KMT.” 
A terrain of such contestation is manifested in Kano’s sideline inclusion of Hatta 
Yoichi ĴǍw, an actual hydraulic engineer whose design of the Chianan Canal and 
Wushantou Reservoir improved the irrigation system in southern Taiwan, and 
dramatically upped rice productivity. KANO’s Hatta is engineered to be a cheerful 
advisor to the local farmers, and his achievements are literally spelled out on the screen 
when a Japanese teacher teaches the students at Kagi Agriculture and Forestry School 
the plans and progress of his work. In reality, Taiwan’s Chianan Irrigation Association 
materialized the memory of Hatta in a bronze statue in his usual pose as he sits 
contemplating in his work clothes in 1981. Either wittingly or unwittingly, KANO 
reenacts this philosophizing posture as Coach Kondo sits next to the baseball diamond 
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brooding over his possible role in the baseball team, further reinforcing the image of a 
colonizer contemplating about his subjects’  future (see Figure 4.2). In another poetic 
scene, a strong gust of wind blows off Hatta’s straw hat and carries it through a luscious 
field of rice. In an attempt to retrieve it, the baseball students chase it, frolicking 
through the blades of grass until one of them leaps in the air to grasp it. This sideline, 
irrelevant to baseball training, serves to anchor Kano team’s connection with the land 
and its agricultural roots, as well as the particularity of its spatial and historical context. 
However, the romanticized symbol of colonial modernity that Hatta represents, for 
some like writer Huang Rong-zhi, is a hagiographic advertisement of Japan’s colonial 
legacy.34 Granted, Huang does make a valid point in calling out the exploitive nature 
inherent in colonialism—that Hatta’s dedication to improving the farming conditions 
could be in service to the empire, rather than the benefit of the Taiwanese farmers. 
However, his criticism of Wei’s remembrance of colonial legacy appears to be 
sidetracked by the normative “pandering to Japan”  rhetoric, which he demonstrated 
with an example of an elder he knew who grew up in “pseudo Manchukuo.”35  He 
commends this particular elder for upholding his ethno-national principle and cultural 
integrity (as a Chinese), although having received a full Japanese education as well as 
being a fan for the baseball sport. His use of such example highlights the Sinocentric 
desire to incorporate Taiwanese colonial memories as one with a “Chinese ethno-
national principle.” It also highlights the precise “principle” that many Taiwanese resist 
when appealing to a heritage that would depart from a Chinese one. For others, like 
sociologist Albert Tseng, the colonial benevolence portrayed in KANO is not a betrayal 
to the tragic sacrifices that the Seediqs made in exchange for liberation in Seediq Bale,36 
countering what Huang contended. 
Rather, I suggest that the two films should be juxtaposed to present a better rounded 
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dialects regarding the malevolence and virtues of colonial modernity. Indeed, the 
excavation of Kano’s obscure history is more than finding material for an inspiring 
bildungsroman. Colonial nostalgia extracted from Hatta Yoichi’s contribution to 
Taiwan’s native, farming landscape and its link to a story of Taiwanese youths (as well 
as a handful of Japanese) achieving glory under Japanese guidance offers an effective 
fabric of contestation to examine, in Wei’s words, our “insecurity with the Japanese.”37 
Where Seediq Bale’s General Kamada finds similarities between Seediq warriors 
and the aesthetics of bushido, Kano’s Coach Kondo and the team’s new fans at Koshien 
affirm not only their yakyuu damashii (ƺĀǥ, baseball spirit. Its use in the film is 
close to that of the Yamato damashii 1ǥ), but also their stupendous tenacity in face 
of struggle. When the Sapporo team coach comforts his star pitcher who has stormed off 
the field during their match with Kano, he prematurely admits defeat, saying,  “look at 
them. […] Not a single ball is given up. We have already lost the game.”  The 
affirmation of the Taiwanese team’s performance is further strengthened when a news 
reporter who initially insulted the non-Japanese members proclaims his “complete and 
utter transformation into a Kano fan.”  The “Japanese”  trope of appreciation for 
Taiwanese quality is well-rehearsed in Wei’s brand of films. 
However, the “Japanese” gaze here departs from that in Seediq Bale or Cape No. 7 
by admiring the Otherness in the players. Their naiveté, machine-like relentlessness, and 
hybridity  render them an alien and exotic quality that sets them apart from other native 
Japanese teams. The aforementioned journalist describes their winning over the Sapporo 
team with a headline that matches both teams to elements from their origin: “Under 
attack of the blazing sun, thousand-year ice melts”—the fieriness of heat and frigidness 
of cold predicated upon the standard climates of the metropole of Tokyo in mainland 
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mainland Japan. As a result, in KANO, Wei has reversed the essentialist sameness 
discovered by the “Japanese”  gaze on “Taiwan,”  to one that divorces Taiwanese as a 
separate, albeit admirable, entity. 
The trope of the “Japanese” gaze runs the risk of perpetuating the cultural hierarchy 
of Imperial Japan as the definer of colonial Taiwan’s worth. However, the transitioning 
of the imagined gaze from recognizing sameness with a “savage”  to the othering of a 
highly Japanized team—which serves as a template of “three race under one union”—
suggests that the binarism of self/other that many postcolonial sovereignties use to 
construct their national identities is, in fact, consistently inconsistent in the Taiwanese 
context. 
  
Cultural Liminality: Neither Here nor There 
In a few instances of cultural exchange, certain texts demonstrate their resilience against 
the tests of cultural intermixing and renewing, and emerge as something neutral and 
transcendental, its integrity seemingly unscathed. We see an example of such cultural 
texts in the presentation of Franz Schubert’s Heidenroslein in Cape No. 7. After 
delivering two well-received songs at the concert, A-ga’s band’s short repertoire runs 
out of songs to satiate the crowd’s appetite for an encore. Mou-bei breaks out his yueh-
qin, a traditional string instrument that the other members previously voted off the band, 
and strums the notes of Heidenroslein. He gives a solo performance with his traditional 
instrument until, one by one, his band rejoins him and delivers the Mandarin Chinese 
version of this 18th century German Ballad. In the backstage listening in is the Japanese 
singer, Atari Kosuke, the actual star of this show. He expresses his familiarity with the 
number and joins A-ga in his song. Upon Atari’s appearance on the stage, A-ga takes a 
step out of the spotlight, but Atari holds him by the arm and pulls him back. Side by 
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side they continue the song, but in different tongues, A-ga singing in Mandarin Chinese, 
Atari in Japanese. This juxtaposition of the two men, unsurprisingly, invited accusations 
of and compliments on the “reconciliation between Taiwan and Japan”  in not only the 
Taiwanese media, but also online forums in Hong Kong and China, as well as from a 
Japanese column writer, Arai Hifumi, who remarks that the concert, for her, symbolizes 
“the funeral for Taiwan’s Postcolonial era.”38 
Cape No. 7’s use of Heidenroslein, or The Wild Rose, is an ultimate and important 
example of cross-cultural exchange. It has its origin in Germany, but has grown roots 
everywhere else around the globe. A piece of classic that enjoys canonized status in the 
west, it is interesting to note that it was so incorporated into Wei’s consciousness that 
prior to making of Cape No. 7, he believed it to be a Taiwanese children’s song. It 
belongs “here,” and also “there.” His choice of Heidenroslein, whether he is aware of it 
or not, is a manifestation of a foreign culture’s seamless integration into a local culture, 
so seamless that it has lost all its exoticism and otherness. Could this be the ideal result 
for the search of a Taiwanese identity? With internal dynamics welded into each other, 
can the negotiation between imperialism, nationalism, and colonialism be resolved? 
This “melting pot”  idealism does not seem to happen soon. A-ga and his band’s 
performance is well received, and the film ends with a feel-good factor. But if we have 
been reading the formation of the band as the formation of Taiwanese subjectivity, we 
have to wonder: what becomes of the amateur, mishmash band after this one lucky 
strike? Where is Taiwan going? After Cape No. 7, films in search of Taiwanese 
identities performed well in the box office. The titles 1895 (2009), Monga (2010), and 
Din Tao: Leader of the Parade (2012) are self-evident, as the new generation of 
directors weave their narrations around themes with strong local flavors, like gangster 
culture and religious festivities, while continuing Cape No. 7’s example of incorporating 
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scenes or languages that are distinctively vernacular (the dialogues in Cape No. 7 
contain Hoklo, Hakka, aboriginal dialects, as well as Japanese and a mere sprinkle of 
Mandarin Chinese, the official language). This concentration on the marginalized, in my 
view, represents a desire to make a legitimate claim to something particular, something 
more than a product of hybridity and ambivalence. The position of the very 
marginalized almost guarantees that it filters out any influences that are foreign, and 
carves out an exclusively Taiwanese subjectivity. 
Given the complex matrix of Taiwan’s multi-ethnicity, history of colonization by 
various imperial powers, and the subsequent endlessly repetitive process of 
constructing, deconstructing, and renewal of its subjectivity, the Taiwanese identity 
seems to be perpetually “in progress.”  On the surface, it was en route to “becoming 
Japanese”  prior to KMT’s arrival in 1945; before Japanese assimilation, learning the 
Chinese classics was integral to establish oneself; and at present, it seems that Taiwan is 
preoccupied with identifying the vernacular in search of a subjectivity free from foreign 
pollutants, or absorbing the foreign elements to make it one’s own. The only perpetual 
certainty for the Taiwanese is, as historian Chen Fang-ming notes, that, due to its geo-
political marginal status, the Taiwanese seem to have a tradition of struggling against a 
central power.39 
This predicament of being “stuck”  in a liminal status can be found in all the three 
films. In Cape No. 7, liminality is manifested in the form of the seven undelivered 
letters, and the rainbow, a prevalent image in Wei’s films. The love letters, when 
scattered about in A-ga’s bedroom, are trapped in liminal space before they could reach 
their rightful owner, the elder Tomoko. Before the letters could reach her, they are read 
by the Japanese teacher’s daughter, intercepted by A-ga (who fails to understand the 
letters’ significance because he does not know the Japanese language), and then 
!                                                                                                                         108
“rediscovered”  by the younger Tomoko. However, before reaching their rightful 
recipient, the letters are mere words on paper, their emotions bound by paper and ink 
and their messages suspended. Their meaning is only released when they arrive at their 
destination. The “purloined”  letters40 are a moving pivot around which shifting sets of 
human relationships revolve. 
At the end of the film, Kojima Tomoko finally receives the sixty-year-old letters. As 
her wrinkly hands open the packet that contains the letters from her now-deceased lover, 
her face is concealed from the viewers, making it impossible to read her emotions. Does 
it provide her closure to a suspended love affair? Is she relieved, or have the letters 
summoned the unwanted memories of a bitter past? Is forgiveness granted as he has 
pleaded? Although Wei lets the Japanese teacher’s voice permeate the film, he does not 
let this particular subaltern speak. Her reaction is left to the imagination of the audience, 
thus preserving the air of ambivalence between the imagined Taiwan/”Japan” 
relationship. Has the apology arrived too late? Had the letters been returned to the 
teacher’s daughter, or lost in transit, the teacher who begged for forgiveness would have 
remained un-forgiven, and the elder Tomoko who believes herself to be jilted would 
also have remained “jilted.”  In the end, the letters are retrieved and restored to their 
rightful owner, restoring power to both. 
In Cape No. 7 and Seediq Bale, Wei frequently enlists the image of the rainbow to 
convey the connection of two different ends. Utilized to signify the bridging of 
differences and the process of crossing over to reaching the other end, the rainbow 
appears when the lovers converge, and when A-ga toughens up for his performance and 
becomes a true warrior, according to aboriginal legends. This rainbow theme continues 
in Seediq Bale, aptly titled in English as Warriors of the Rainbow. The arched bow of 
colors is so ubiquitous in the film that one can hardly “unsee” it. As a Seediq symbol of 
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a bridge that leads the deserving to an abundant afterlife, the rainbow’s repeated 
appearance poses more as a reminder of transitioning between stages than the 
connection of two separate ends, more than an ultimate reward or destination. The 
Seediq tribe observes the Gaya (set of instructions for way of life) states that a 
tribesman needs to earn his right to cross the rainbow to a promising afterlife by 
fulfilling certain tasks (offering blood sacrifice via headhunting is one criterium). The 
rainbow here represents the passage between a Seediq (a man) to a Seediq Bale (a true 
man), and to pass it one needs to pay a toll. The bloody slaughter of the Japanese people 
in the Wushe Incident would provide the Seediq men the seal of approval to cross that 
critical bridge. The closing scene depicts the Seediq men crossing a bright rainbow path, 
symbolizing their admission to the Seediq version of heaven. Yet the overly colorful 
CGI effect renders the scene kitch, almost to the extent of comedy.41 The replacement of 
realistic presentations of gory battles by the fantastical quality of the rainbow seems to 
indicate the ambiguity, or non-completion of their journey home. 
This jovial gang in the closing scene probably excludes two characters: Hanaoka 
Ichiro and Hanaoka Jiro, two tragic figures who kept themselves out of the bloody 
incident, their reluctance to conquer their enemy via traditional methods barring them 
from ancestral recognition. Seediq by birth, but raised Japanese as prototypes of the 
“tamed savage,”  the Hanaokas’ credentials over-qualify them for their restrained career 
paths. In spite of their relatively superior educational background, their colleagues of 
true Japanese blood still put them down as banjin (savages), albeit “civilized”  ones. 
Their efforts to “educate”  and persuade their people with Japanese civilization, 
however, are met with jeers from the other Seediqs, who point out the difference 
between themselves and them. Historians debate whether the Hanaokas are accomplices 
in the Wushe uprising, but Wei portrays them as powerless agents that struggle in vain 
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to prevent the eventual clash. Wei’s portrayal of Hanaoka Brothers’  dilemma, neither a 
“true Japanese”  nor a “true Seediq,”  is telling in the past treatment of “becoming 
Japanese”  status of all non-Japanese on the island (neither Japanese, neither Chinese, 
neither Taiwanese), and poses a posthumous question to the ex-colonizers: “what would 
it have taken to be recognized?”  In this sense, the question, when directed at the 
Taiwanese viewers, is also a quest for a definition for “Taiwaneseness.” 
In a debate regarding whether to modernize, or conserve tribal life, Mouna 
questions Ichiro, “when you die, will your spirit enter the Japanese shrine, or our 
ancestral hunting ground?”  His hesitance implies his ambivalent faith in either option 
for an afterlife, and is revealing in how recognition by a singular authoritative figure 
could sway one’s identification. For the Hanaokas, the dilemma lies in their 
unwillingness, or inability to choose between his blood ancestors and Japanese values. 
To select one indicates betrayal to the other, no connecting rainbow seemingly available 
to bridge the two polarizing ends. After the uprising when the remaining tribespeople 
commit mass suicide, we see him taking his own life by means of seppuku, suicide by 
means of slicing one’s guts, all decked out in a formal kimono. In the end, his 
simultaneous commitment to his tribe and to Imperial Japan means betrayal to both. 
Therefore he is caught in liminality, his identity forever suspended. As he directs his 
sword at his stomach and questions whether he is Seediq or Japanese, Jiro encourages 
him to  “do it, cut open your entangled guts. We do not have to go anywhere. Let us be 
free wandering spirits.” However, his and Jiro’s deaths leave more questions than relief: 
is ceasing to “be” the only solution for the predicaments of ineffective “becoming?” Do 
their “free wandering spirits”  symbolize liberation, or rather, displacement? Or, more 
optimistically, perhaps one can interpret Ichiro’s gesture of taking his life in the 
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traditional Japanese way as a compromise, because he assigns his body to the Japanese, 
and his soul to his tribe, and therefore, striking a balance in the tug of war between the 
two. Instead of a completion of reconciliation, however, the tragic scene embodies the 
current entanglement of conflicting identifications in Taiwan. While there is ongoing 
debate, based on historical findings, about how much the Hanaokas knew of the plans of 
the revolt and to what extent they participated in it, Wei’s decision to portray them as 
sympathetic spectators punctuates the emotional struggle of their liminal situation, 
which echoes the ambivalent situations of some of the Japanese-educated Taiwanese 
after the war. 
Continuing Wei’s theme of ragtag groups of small potatoes coming together to 
form communal solidarity, KANO’s characters follow the tradition of reinventing a 
predetermined status of being unruly and constantly ridiculed. Parallel to Seediq Bale’s 
presentation of the warriors’  and the mountains’  boundless vitality, the Kano baseball 
team’s youthful, unbridled energy holds out the promise of transcending the boundaries 
defined by political hegemony, cultural hierarchy and ethnicity. However, KANO’s 
presentation of the recalcitrant state of this primeval energy soon undergoes a process of 
reorganization. Though each team member demonstrates impressive strength, it is not 
until Kondo proclaims: “I am here to bring you to Koshien.”  He systematically maps 
out their individual roles on the baseball field, so that their team may redeem the stigma 
as “the one that has never won anything.”  In Kondo’s process of reining in and 
assigning energy to pour into different types of skill training, the film’s insertion of rain/
water motif that is so connected with the destruction and irrigation farmlands also 
constitutes the recurrent act of reinvention. With water from torrential bouts of tropical 
storm securely stored in the reservoir, then redirected to where it is needed, previously 
barren or flooded lands are given new life and purpose. The ultimate dream of attaining 
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seal of approval to play at the sacred Koshien symbolizes a reservoir where the players’ 
focus is properly gathered. They chant the hallowed name of their goal at the top of 
their lungs as they navigate through the streets and fields of a then-developing Kagi 
town. However, after they finally earn their entry ticket to the once unattainable dream, 
the philosophy that has guided the team thus far shifts from winning for Koshien to 
“don’t lose.”  Whereas winning marks a definitive end to a battle, the tenet of “not 
losing”  bears a suspended uncertainty to when one’s struggle is terminated. Hence, the 
film barely dwells on their successive victories in Koshien. It is in the final game for the 
championship, where the pitcher Akira (aka Wu Ming-chieh) injures his right index 
finger, that Wei positioned the weight of the film. 
As blood streams from his cracked fingernail onto the baseball, Akira’s 
performance is weakened by his aggravating pain and the consequent loss of grip over 
the ball. The optimistic tone that has been hitherto escalating sharply declines. But 
Akira refuses to step down to let another player pitch, for fearing it indicates his defeat 
to himself. Some of his teammates confront him, questioning whether his appeal for 
holding out is borne out of selfish heroism. Hirano Yasuro, an aborigine player comes to 
his aide and, with great conviction, convinces the others that Akira’s desperation would 
only prompt him to outperform himself. Akira is indeed desperate, for the game is his 
last with the team, his last chance to materialize their baseball dream. With the consent 
of his coach and understanding from his teammates, he steps back on the field. The 
shots alternate between a grimacing Akira, a Kondo who is reaffirming himself for 
letting his student make the call, and the recorded 50,000 attendees at the stadium biting 
their lips in anticipation, who at this point have become supporters of the team. The 
game continues, with Akira as the last batter facing the dramatic opportunity of hitting a 
grand slam and reversing their losing position of 0 to 4. He hits. The ball is sent soaring 
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through the sky, and all the players at the base start scramble madly towards the home 
base. As they dash from one base to the next, the shot cuts to the ball being caught, anti-
climatically putting them all out at once. The moment of truth has irreversibly decreed 
their opponent winner of 1931 Koshien Tournament. However, Akira keeps running 
until he collapses at the home base, symbolizing his own completion of the game (see 
Figure 4.3). Moved by this scene, the Koshien crowd burst into a deafening chant: tenka 
no kano ʨȉǁ, “Kano of the world,” in honor of their heroic performance. 
 Base by base, as Akira traces the contour of the baseball diamond, his advances in 
spatial context delineates the borders of his battlefield, and elongates the temporal 
boundary of his state of liminality. Imbued with the qualities of a tragic hero, the 
moment of his simultaneously futile and meaningful “home”  base-coming, 
paradoxically, places the team as neither a victor, nor a loser. Like Mouna Rudo and the 
Seediq warriors, the Kano team “wins”  recognition as true sportsmen after their defeat. 
Practiced through a dogged perseverance, the mantra of “don’t lose”  projects not 
towards a utopia that seems to offer a way out of the crisis of not winning the game in 
reality, but is emblematic of a desire for self-determination. Winning the championship 
is defined within the framework and by the rules of Koshien, however, “not losing” 
calls for an autonomous assessment on the Kano team’s part. On the homebound ship, 
the students asks Kondo how the folks back home would greet them upon their 
homecoming, whether they would be happy or disappointed. Kondo does not give an 
answer, but replies that no matter how they are greeted, they will be home in time to see 
the golden waves of bountiful rice fields. The reference of a rich harvest again echoes 
not only the baseball team/farm boys’  allegiance to their land, but also signifies the 
Japanese teacher’s own transition to identify with the island.  “Thank you for bringing 
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me to Koshien,” he quietly tells his Taiwanese students, indicating a reversal of his role 
as the instructor to that of a beneficiary. Initially Kondo’s dream of returning to Koshien 
indicates a movement in the homebound direction, but at the end it is the fields of rice 
across the ocean that awaits his homecoming. While it is typically assumed that colonial 
influence flows outward from the metropole—in this case, Koshien—KANO blurs the 
categorical distinction by suggesting Kondo’s own liminality and state of becoming. 
If Kano embodies “the good old days” of the colonial period, with the modernizing 
irrigation facilities in a thriving farming town, Seediq Bale is the poster child of colonial 
suppression and tragedy under the same movement towards modernity. Strategically, 
Wei’s successive production of Seediq Bale and KANO reflects the postcolonial 
generation’s attempt to comb through varying memories and reconfigure Taiwan’s 
relationship with its ex-colonizer. Such is not an attempt to put behind past memories, 
but to delve further into them through the dialectics of remembering and sifting through 
the stories of another generation, or to collectively forge a “postmemory.”  Its 
application of imagination and creativity is akin to the form of memory proposed by 
Marianne Hirsch, whose connection to history is mediated not by recall but via 
imagination and creative faculty.42  Nevertheless, Wei and his generation’s postmemory 
would be complicated by nearly 40 years of Chinese nationalist education under martial 
law, which further removes the memories from their origins by additional layers of 
deliberate obfuscation and paradoxical interpretations. 
As Wei digs into the past, his re-creation or revisiting of Taiwanese characters 
under Japanese rule often invokes a nativist pride, amid nationalist arguments, that 
speaks to Taiwan’s actual frustrations with its unsettled (non-) national status and 
ambiguous identity. Cape No. 7, Seediq Bale, and KANO all reveal a collective desire to 
see the construction of an identity that can be claimed as particularly Taiwanese 
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although this “Taiwan identity”  is highly mobile and transposable as suggested by A-
ga’s professing of his affection to the young Tomoko before the concert: “stay, or I’ll 
come with you”  (see Figure 4.4). In conclusion, I read Wei’s rainbows as a conveyer of 
a sense of cultural liminality: that before reaching the other end, one’s existence is 
indeterminable and therefore unsettled. And to read Wei’s three productions as a 
national allegory, one cannot avoid this sense of in-betweenness as the Taiwanese 
identity oscillates between Chinese nationalism, Japanese colonialism, and its own 
internal dynamics between various ethnic or demographic groups. Nevertheless, despite 
the fact that the term “liminal” suggests a neither-nor-situation, it also implies that at the 
end of the transit, there is a destination to be reached. The rainbow, after all, is also a 
symbol of hope. 
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Chapter Four  
Homebound 
War history has long been a contested subject for postwar Japan. History textbooks are 
rebuked by its Asian neighbors for not delving deeper into Japan’s role as a perpetrator 
in Asia. At the same time, they have been criticized for the opposite reason, for 
promoting an image of self-deprecation as a defeated nation. As Japan struggles to 
regain its footing in the post-war international order, little dialogue could be spared 
between Japan and Taiwan regarding their colonial relationship. Although former 
Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui and his favorable view of Japanese colonialism enjoy 
media coverage in Taiwan as well as in Japan, colonized ordinary people’s memories of 
their Japanization experience are met with limited response from their Japanese 
counterparts. Without documentation or acknowledgment, the Japanized generation’s 
invocations of the past are mere communications with a living ghost, that is, their story-
telling serves no other ends other than the mere action of telling it. 
As Taiwan attempts to reconnect with its colonial history through new 
documentaries and films, in recent years Japan has also seen a rise in interest in 
reconnecting with this shared past. I will examine recent cinematic texts produced by 
two young female Japanese producers, Sakai Atsuko ÿȪŕ* and Tanaka Mika Ǎ
ʼu, whose projects, I contend, actively invite the missing dialogue from the Japanese 
part, albeit from private sectors. Sakai’s documentaries, Taiwan Jinsei (2008) and 
Taiwan Identity (2013), aim to expose to the Japanese audience how the generation who 
received Japanese education as colonial subjects in their formative years, known also as 
“Japanese-speaking generation (nihongo sedai, 4hă|Þ),” carried on with their 
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lives after Japan’s withdrawal from and KMT China’s arrival on the island. Sakai 
defines her subjects as “the people who were once Japanese,” and in the films they still 
demonstrate a strong sense of belonging to the “Japan” in their memory. 
Tanaka’s production, on the other hand, is a discourse progressing in the exact 
opposite direction. Her Wansei Back Home (wansheng huei jiaʑƲ$V/ʒ for the 
Taiwanese audience, or wansei kaikaʗǟ$V/ʘ for the Japanese) uncovers the 
neglected history of wansei Ʋ$, Japanese people born in Taiwan between the years 
1895 and 1946 but forced to return to Japan by Taiwan’s new Chinese Nationalist ruler 
when Japan lost the war. On the surface, the subjects in her documentary were 
beneficiaries of a colonial mechanism while it lasted. However, when they returned 
home to a war-torn Japan where people distrusted the returnees as outsiders, they soon 
realized they would identify themselves more as “Taiwanese” than anybody else. The 
social constructions of the nihongosedai and wansei are peculiar to colonial Taiwan. 
They emerge from the same backdrop of history and space, but interestingly their 
identity and identification move in opposite directions like two parallel lines. While 
wartime relationships between the two nations seem to be garnering more attention 
from Japan’s younger generation, does this signify a more promising response from 
Japan to begin a dialogue on the two nations’ tumultuous past? It seems that before 
official reconnection occurs, writing from the margins, as Sakai and Tanaka’s 
productions manifest, is an effective starting point. 
Taiwan Jinsei (2008) and Taiwan Identity (2013)
Aimed to enlighten the modern Japanese on “those who were once Japanese,” Taiwan 
Jinsei, (literally meaning “Life in Taiwan”), Sakai Atsuko’s 2008 presentation features 
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the lives of five Japanized Taiwanese from varying social backgrounds and ethnicities: a 
tea farm worker who learned her Japanese while working in a Japanese-owned coffee 
farm; a doctor’s wife who graduated from an elite school and boasts of proficiency in 
tea ceremony and Japanese flower arrangement; an aboriginal legislator who fought as a 
Japanese soldier; a former worker at the Japanese navy who fondly remembers his 
Japanese teacher and annually visits his grave; and a history museum volunteer who 
also fought as a Japanese soldier and is also a victim of the atrocious 228 Incident.1 
Sakai’s documentary attempts to map out the nostalgic discourses in Taiwan, and her 
presentation reveals that although the subjects share fluency in the Japanese language 
and a sense of colonial nostalgia, “Japan” is derived from various fibers of 
remembrance. 
In the documentary, Chen Ching-hsiang ǈ§Ă (1926- ), for instance, attends her 
elementary school class reunion in a private box in a restaurant. The large group of men 
and women are all in their 80s, but the atmosphere is buoyant as they converse with 
each other loudly in Taiwanese and Japanese. Then the crowd sang their old Japanese 
school anthem in unison, the heaving of their chests suggesting their enthusiasm. Chen 
later tells the camera that she is more Japanese than the Japanese, and that if she were a 
man, she would have volunteered herself for the Kamikaze during the war. This may 
sound unsettling even for Japan today. However, as William Cunningham Bissell notes, 
nostalgia is a longing for something that is lost, and could not be repeated.2 Her strong 
stance is not based on a desire for the return of the colony but on the knowledge that 
those days are firmly grounded in the past. In fact, later in the documentary, she solicits 
Japan’s support for Taiwanese independence. On the other hand, Hsiao Ching-wen’s ɕ
ȧd memory of his loyalty foregrounds his discontent and disillusion against “Japan.” 
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Hsiao fought in Burma as a Japanese soldier. He indignantly protests to his interviewer: 
“we have been deserted by Japan. Of course, different blood ran in our veins from the 
Japanese, but our minds are alike when it comes to protecting the nation!” Unlike 
Chen’s fantastical wish of dying for the Empire, Hsiao’s statement reads more like an 
accusation against colonial discrimination, and a demand to Japan to recognize the 
sacrifices he and other Taiwanese soldiers made. The contradictory juxtaposition of 
Chen’s and Hsiao’s testimonies renders a strong sense of futility to their lives as former 
Japanese. Although they have sworn allegiance to the Japanese empire at certain points 
of their lives, it is now rendered useless, or even inappropriate. 
In her second documentary, Taiwan Identity, Sakai shifts focus onto Taiwan’s 
colonial nostalgia across nations and regions, their locations spanning from the high 
mountains of Taiwan’s Mount Ali, across the waters to Yokohama, Japan, and Jakarta, 
Indonesia. Though continuing the vein of multiplicity in nostalgic discourse and the 
“Japanese-language generation’s” sense of “having been deserted,” her quests depart 
from the indulgence in nostalgic feelings for the past to their struggles to survive under 
a new government, the KMT regime, that saw them as enemies. Compared with subjects 
in Taiwan Jinsei, their nostalgic discourse is further complicated by a truly dark time of 
torment as they suffered prosecution or the Pacific War first-hand. Each subject also has 
at least double identities, proven by an array of names given to them at different 
historical junctures. Their postwar struggle to survive in a transnational context deepens 
an overwhelming sense of being “left behind” by the Japanese empire. 
 Director Sakai says that she, as a woman, felt most connected with, among other 
interviewees, Kao Chu-hua WȾ (1932- 2016) known as Yata Kikuko ɽjâ*, a 
Tsao tribeswoman who has demonstrated resilience against her misfortunes. Neither 
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Taiwanese nor Japanese audience may be familiar with her, but she is a prominent 
figure to historians documenting Taiwan’s White Terror period of suppression. Shortly 
after the end of WWII, her famous father, Kao I-sheng W$, a highly educated 
aboriginal man was imprisoned for two years before being murdered by KMT 
government officials. Since her father’s captivity she had been constantly coerced by 
secret agents to do their biddings and placed under government surveillance for more 
than two decades. She told Sakai that before the end of the war, she had always believed 
herself to be Japanese, living the life of a Japanese. Her family wore wafuku (Japanese 
clothes), ate miso soup, and mingled with neighbors who were also believed to be 
Japanese. After the war, they returned to the traditional way of life in the Tsao tribe, and 
she found herself unable to eat with her hands in accordance to her traditional tribal 
manners. Her nostalgia for the past is evident, but it is not clear whether it is geared 
towards its Japaneseness or life with her Japanized father. In the documentary, at her 
childhood home, now reformed into a tourist information center, she tells Sakai about 
her childhood, when her father played the piano for the children. She quickly turns her 
back and leaves the scene when Sakai asks about her father’s arrest. 
Kao’s life before and after the end of WWII is a drastic contrast. Her description of 
life under the wings of her father offers a glimpse of her Japanese era through rosy, 
idyllic lenses. The somberness conveyed through her words, however, deepens the 
discrepancy between her life as Kikuko and life as Chu-hua. In one scene, Kao displays 
her father’s numerous letters sent home during his time in imprisonment. Sakai notices a 
repeated emergence of a word, Usanao, written in katakana alphabet. Kao explains that 
it is a code used by her father to evade police scrutiny, and means that he wished for his 
family to visit him. Until he was executed for treason, his wish of seeing his family 
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again was never granted. As Chu-hua, she was a fatherless young woman who had to 
learn quickly to conceal her Japaneseness for protection. 
Cheng Mao-li ȭɢƨ (1927- ), also known as Tejima Yoshinori DĚţɘ or Awai 
Teyakiana in his tribe, is Kao’s uncle and a soft spoken man nearly in his 90s. In the 
documentary, he tells Sakai that he did not despise the war, much to her surprise. Like 
many other young men of his time, he felt that being a soldier was an honorable symbol 
of masculinity.3 At that time he considered himself a “complete Japanese” (kanzenna 
nihonjin, ]ʦ4h
), and made plans to study in Japan proper after the war. When 
Japan lost the war, he cried when he realized that his hopes were dashed. “I wasn’t … I 
couldn’t become a Japanese,” he said, followed by a quiet laugh. “We were all working 
for Japan,” he quietly chuckles again, but stops himself abruptly as if feeling awkward, 
and runs a hand through his hair. Suddenly his eyes swell with tears, his voice cracks: 
“when Japan lost the war, we also lost. If Japan hadn’t lost, we would still be working 
for Japan, and we would be taken care of.” At this point Sakai must have started 
weeping off camera, because the old man started comforting his interlocutor, “Don’t 
cry, don’t cry. This is our fate. There’s nothing we can do.” As he says this, his niece 
Kao Chu-hua sits next to him in complete silence. 
Cheng’s nostalgic discourse seems to depart from Chen Ching-hsiang’s and Hsiao 
Ching-wen’s in Taiwan Jinsei and somehow falls in a category somewhere in between. 
His embarrassment at his “inappropriate” strife to become Japanese, and his connection 
of the capitulation of the empire to the demise of his family gently remind Sakai and her 
Japanese viewers of how he has been “left behind” by Japan. After the war, the souls of 
about 280,000 deceased Taiwanese soldiers were enshrined at the Yasukuni Shrine, yet 
ironically their family and other Taiwanese soldiers are rejected compensation because 
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they were not truly considered Japanese citizens.4 As revealed by his light chuckling, 
Cheng’s nostalgia is convoluted by the recognition of his naïveté and memories of his 
family’s subsequent suffering under the new Chinese ruler. The empire that had 
indoctrinated him about the glory of war not only refused to reward him for his loyalty, 
but in a sense had left him to fend himself against its enemy. This scene where he 
comforts his interviewer is significant in that Sakai, a post-war Japanese woman who 
set out to study and document her nation’s former colonial subjects, becomes so 
enraptured by their colonial discourse that her emotions could not be contained within 
the boundary between an observer and her subject. Cheng’s reversed role as a consoler 
to an emotional Sakai to curb her sadness is also telling in how the nostalgia discourse 
traverses across generations and boundaries of a former colonized and (a representation 
of) a former colonizer. His memories invoked in Sakai not only empathy for his fate, but 
perhaps something related to her reflection as a representative (to the elders she 
interviews) of a lost empire and her effort to understand it. 
Sakai’s next subject takes the Taiwanese nostalgic discourse across the South Seas. 
The life of Miyahara Eiji ȇ ĊƗ (1922- 2013) is a more fortunate, yet equally 
fraught with twists, version of Taiwanese Japanese soldiers. Born in Taiwan as Lee Po-
ching ƨɎċ, he would later use the name Miyahara in compliance with colonial 
Japan’s name reformation policy. He was conscripted as a volunteer soldier, and was 
dispatched to the Philippines, Burma, and eventually Indonesia, where he continued to 
fight as a Japanese, even four years after Japan was defeated. Along with 900 other 
Japanese soldiers who refused to surrender to the allies after Japan lost the war, they 
fought guerrilla wars for the Indonesian National Revolution (1945-1949) that 
eventually won the nation’s independence from the Netherlands. Subsequently, he and 
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300 Japanese surviving soldiers declined repatriation to Japan. He and his comrades 
were acknowledged as national heroes by the Indonesian government, who gave him his 
third alias, Umar Hartono (see Figure 5.1).  
In the documentary, Miyahara leads Sakai to tour the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery, 
where many of the Japanese heroes and his former friends are interred. “I will lie here 
one day,” he tells the camera, and will be forever enshrined as an Indonesian hero. Sakai 
asks Miyahara/Lee/Hartono “when the time comes, what nationality will you die with?” 
(ʑʦʧ
ʥʟʣoʰʣʙʝʰʣʟʬʚʛʿʒ) To which he gives an ambiguous 
reply, “me? I would go with Indonesia. […] But on my tombstone they will also have to 
write my Japanese name and state I am Japanese” (see figure 5.2). Here, the Taiwanese 
identity seems to have been ruled out, which is understandable or not surprising, given 
that he has few ties with modern-day Taiwan. Nevertheless the intermittent pauses that 
punctuate his sentences reveal the discursiveness of his thoughts. He tells Sakai that he 
returned to Taiwan briefly in the 1974 on a business trip. At his father’s behest, he left in 
haste due to the precarious circumstances during the White Terror period. After another 
short pause, he quotes former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s “sorrow of being 
Taiwanese” (ʑ$ĎƲ
Žǝʒ) and grieves over the absence of innocence in his 
youth due to the wars.5 While he is certain what would be engraved on his tombstone, 
his rambling on his thinning ties with Taiwan and the island’s precarious state of 
nationality is telling. Yet even if he does consider Taiwanese identity an option, his 
definition of being Taiwanese would differ from the others who still live there. Sakai’s 
question about which country he would commit himself to after death is especially 
provoking. What is identity to a dead man? Though death may not necessarily finish off 
shifty, unsettled issues, it delineates a finite boundary. How the dead is remembered 
!                                                                                                                         124
seems to be a final call, an undebatable definition of the person. Sakai’s question is an 
attempt in finalizing Miyahara’s choice, but that he is unable, or unwilling to adhere to a 
singular identity reveals the possibility of multiple, distinct allegiances co-existing. 
The documentary closes with Kao Chu-hua’s visit to her parents’ grave. As 
requested by her father before his death, she and her siblings bring beer to pour over his 
grave, and play him a particular piece of classical music. Here, after a long hike up to 
reach the site, Kao’s brother realizes that he has brought the wrong music. He 
embarrassingly calls out to his older sister in Japanese, “Kiku-chan! I forgot the CD.” 
“You forgot?” Kao Chu-hua/Kikuko solemnly looks on as the group scramble to locate 
and play the correct music on a mobile phone. This comical episode in an otherwise 
somber scene is a stark reminder that the Kao siblings, and the audience, are situated in 
a vastly different historical and spatial context from the nation’s scarring White Terror 
period that marred the siblings’ lives. Not only is the “correct” item easily replaced, but 
mistakes are not irreparable. With things in order, the siblings align themselves in front 
of the grave. Her younger brother starts speaking to the ghosts, in Japanese. For the 
surviving Kao siblings, 70 years after the end of the Japanese era, Japanese remains the 
language they use to communicate within their family and the language that Kao Chu-
hua is most comfortable in. In other interviews with Taiwanese historians, her 
articulation in Mandarin Chinese are often punctuated by a slip of Japanese words, or 
cut short by her halting search for words. In the documentary, Sakai has not pressed her 
on how she identifies herself. But if she must choose, and if the choice of language is 
any indicator, it can be deduced that it would be the identity she shared with her father 
before his persecution. 
Upon examining the background of Sakai’s subjects, their identity formation seems 
to be dominated by accidental incidents. Through almost no fault of their own, their 
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lives fortuitously unfolded as one historical happenstance led to another: The Pacific 
War took an 18-year-old Miyahara to Indonesia where he became an Indonesian hero 
but dared not return home to a Chinese nationalist Taiwan; Yokohama resident Wu 
Masao Ȅ missed his window of opportunity to return to Taiwan due to his 
detainment in Siberia after the war; Kao Chu-hua had plans to study at Columbia 
University in the year of her father’s arrest and the family’s public fall; By a stroke of 
luck, Kao’s uncle, Cheng Mao-li who was also arrested during the White Terror period, 
was spared and remade his life as a tea farmer; Chang Mikio ºƑ lost eight years out 
of the prime of his life in a dissident prison, for having translated a Japanese pamphlet 
on Taiwan independence. Their articulation of their life stories expresses a yearning for 
subjectivity, which was stolen from them by a grander historical narrative. “The times 
were bad,” (ʑ!Þʜʊʛʢʡʾʒ) said Kao Chu-hua. “It was a time that nothing 
could be helped,” (ʑɻʎʜʦʙ!Þʾʒ) said Wu Masao. Neither the Japanese 
empire nor the Chinese Nationalist-ruled Taiwan treated them well, and neither was 
held accountable for the misfortunes of the people. In this vein, their words indeed echo 
President Lee Teng-hui’s “sorrow of being Taiwanese,” a  sorrow  of being passed on 
from one foreign power to the next.  
However, the “Japanese generation’s” postcolonial sensibility of destitution and 
nostalgia for the Japanese past should not be read as a collective desire for the return of 
the colonizer. Chang Mikio, for one, stresses his belief that Taiwan needs to be its own 
master despite having gone through eight years of reformation by the nationalist KMT. 
Their shared sensibility does not mean that their nostalgia is unified, and can be lumped 
together as one monolithic discourse. As ethnographer William Cunningham Bissell 
points out in his study on postcolonial Zanzibar: “[nostalgia discourses] circulate in a 
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social terrain in which diverse forms of memory are at play.” When enlisting the 
nostalgic discourses to reexamine and reshape postcolonial relationships between 
Taiwan and Japan, it is crucial to “account for multiple strands of remembrance.”6
Sakai describes her subjects as “people that were once Japanese,” and their fate as 
living “at the mercy of the undulation of the era after Japan left Taiwan,” conveying a 
strong sense of helplessness of the ordinary people in a struggle against the changing 
tides of global politics. Perhaps, Kao Chu-hua’s segment illustrates this best, when the 
camera pans over to a small herd of scrawny cats that the old woman has taken in: 
“Everyone here are stray cats,” she tells the camera, “mi-ahn! Mi-ahn!” (interestingly, 
the onomatopoeic locution she chose to beckon the cats is Japanese, instead of the 
Mandarin Chinese “meow” ). As former subjects of an empire that molded them to its 
liking but subsequently forsook them, their fate was no less capricious than stray cats 
(see Figure 5.3). Some, like Miyahara/Hartono, managed to survive the war and 
displacement unscathed, while others, like Kao Chu-hua, were knocked off their feet 
and had their hands tied down. Their varying remembrance of “Japan” renders this 2013 
presentation of nostalgia more complex than the simple indulgence in the lost good 
times and “having been Japanese.” 
Wansei Back Home (2015) 
In a short 1941 essay “Wansei and Wansei [ǟ$ʥǟŰ],” Chou Chin-po ÍÄƱ, who 
would later be dishonorably labeled a Koumin writer, enlisted wordplay to reinvent the 
meaning of wansei ǟ$.7 Originally a derogatory term that people from Japan proper 
used to refer to a second generation Japanese born in Taiwan, Chou’s replacement of a 
character modified the word as wansei ǟŰ to mean “made in Taiwan,” which, for 
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Chou, represents the blurring of the boundary between the Taiwan-born Japanese and 
Taiwanese. Chou vividly recounted his initial reluctance to greet a Taiwan-born 
Japanese at a gathering in Tokyo. He described the tension that instinctively rose in him 
when they were introduced. But the tension was soon replaced by a surge of familiarity 
when the Japanese said: “I am a wansei, too! (Chou’s rendition was: I was made in 
Taiwan too.) Pleased to meet you.” The word play flipped the original connotation of a 
belittled origin into a code of identity that blurred the boundary between Taiwanized 
Japanese and Japanized Taiwanese. Chou’s play on the meaning of wansei is lost on the 
modern-day Taiwanese as well as Japanese. As a term that belongs to a specific 
historical and spatial context, it has—as Taiwanese historian Chung Shu-min points out
—become “an extinct language,” forgotten in history archives and no longer in active 
use.8 
In 2015, the term and the amicable exchange between a wansei Japanese and 
Taiwanese were revived, with much fanfare, in Tanaka Mika’s documentary Wansei 
Back Home. The film opens with a Taiwan-born Japanese man in his 80s, Tominaga 
Masaru’s ʺĊƍ (1927- ), searching for his Taiwanese childhood buddies. With a 
crumpled list of names in his hand, he returns to his village in Hualien, Taiwan, asking 
locals that cross his path if they have information of the people on his list. The camera 
captures a series of blows to Tominaga as he crosses one name out after the other when 
he hears that they have already passed away, his pained frown and teary eyes magnified 
in closeups. He reminisces how his circle of friends included Taiwanese children as well 
as children from the Atayal tribe, and proclaims that there was no discrimination in his 
play group. After many disappointments he manages to find three of his playmates. The 
men remember each other well, and the joyful reunion dissipates the previously 
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downcast mood. They stand on the plot of land where Tominaga’s home once stood, 
discussing how large it was and how its yard was full of fruits that Tominaga’s family 
never ate. One of the old men recalls that because his family was poor and he was 
always hungry, he would sneak into the Tominaga yard and steal fruits. The men 
chuckle gaily, immersed in past memories. However, this innocent exchange seems to 
offer a glimpse into the colonial divide between the Japanese boy and his Taiwanese 
friends, though as playmates they were unaware of this difference. 
Tanaka’s documentary, however, does not intend to explore the discriminatory 
structure in colonialism. Instead, her intention is to uncover the story of wanseis and 
their affection for the island that they consider as their homeland. Either consciously or 
unconsciously, she uses very little language associated with the colonial mechanism in 
her presentation. Her project highlights the wanseis’ continual longing for their lost 
“homeland,” and bring to the fore different narratives between colonial Taiwan and 
Japan. As she maps out the “frontier villages” in the remote locations of east coast 
Taiwan, the Japanese citizens who answered the government’s calls for land reclamation 
in the untamed east were not aggressive expansionists who robbed the natives of their 
established enterprise. Rather, they are characterized as adventurous, hand-picked 
immigrants who harbored dreams of starting anew. The camera moves back to 
Tominaga’s residence in Japan, where Tominaga is joined by a Japanese friend for his 
interview. The non-wansei friend chimes in and recounts a memory of what he learned 
from his grandmother, neither of them having been to Taiwan: “it was challenging to be 
approved to go [settle in Hualien]. First you must not have any criminals in your family, 
secondly you can’t have a record of being arrested, thirdly you can’t have been spoken 
ill of by your neighbors! And lastly you must be a property owner. […] I always joke to 
Tominaga, your ancestors must be quality folks.” These prerequisites disabuse of the 
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notion that the settlers were possibly thugs and vagabonds, or other marginalized 
plebeians that the Empire cast away to Taiwan. On the contrary, the carefully selected 
crew demonstrates the engagement of the Empire to advance the remote “backlands” of 
the island. For Tanaka, the empire’s resolve in developing the rural area at the expense 
of some of its “quality citizens” differentiates the settlers from the unilateral, 
exploitative faces of colonialism. 
A slideshow of Hualian in a primitive state around the time of 1910 in the 
documentary Wansei Back Home further delves into the definition of the Japanese 
presence in the rural context as settlers. Grainy images that contain farmers and laborers 
in work clothes depart from the official portraits of Japanese colonialism set in the 
metropolitan Taipei (see Figure 5.4). According to Tanaka, in order to ensure full 
commitment to the frontiers, the immigration policies decreed that the settlers must 
bring along all members in their family and dispose of all their real estate properties in 
Japan.9 This complete lack of a security net, combined with the suggested hardship, not 
only serves to underscore the Japanese settlers’ determination to permanently settle in 
Taiwan, but more importantly, to divorce Tanaka’s wanseis from the stereotypical image 
of colonizers who were guaranteed advantageous positions over the local subjects in the 
colonial mechanism. 
But precisely because the memories that she is rewriting emerge from the 
geographically marginalized region of Hualien, Tanaka might be able to get away with 
portraying her subjects as immigrants or settlers rather as the colonizers. Located on the 
rocky east coast, Huanlien was regarded as the “Back Mountain” (;Û, referencing the 
region’s quality of being barren, remote and untamed) by the Chinese Ching Empire and 
developed much later than the west coast plains. Its less approachable landscape and 
harsher elements further distanced it from the political heavyweight locales like Taipei, 
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granting it more leniency from the colonial hierarchy. The Japanese settlers she 
documented were more laborers than politicians: the memories that were presented were 
peppered with idyllic, innocent images of life in the countryside. Tanaka is careful to 
separate their nostalgia for “home” from a colonizer’s political yearning for a lost 
colony, so that the affection her subjects articulate cannot be interpreted as a lament for 
the empire’s loss. 
Iekura Taeko /ȥʻ* (1930- ), whose father worked for governor-general, is 
the only one of Tanaka’s interviewees in the film who brushes shoulders with the 
colonial ruling class. She visits the campus of Taipei Municipal First Girls’ High 
School, whose predecessor at the former Taihoku First Girls’ High School (ĎýĦĪW
aIGė) was Iekura’s alma mater. As she strolls through the buildings, she recognizes 
many features that she found familiar, including the crimson wooden cabinets that have 
been in use since her time: “the wood was bare back then. They must have painted over 
them many times…but it’s still the same.” In Iekura’s words, seeing the old structures 
feels like she is “going back in time,” and things are “just like they used to be” (see 
Figure 5.5). When she visits the Presidential Hall—which formerly housed the Office of 
Governor-General, the familiarity diffusing from the office building compels her to feel 
that “[her] father might come out from around a corner and start speaking to her.” For 
her, the building and the school cabinets represent a nostalgic form of constancy. 
Although they have been painted over many times, its integrity remains the same. The 
problematics of Iekura’s nostalgic discourse, however, lies in the fact that Taiwan has 
not been the same since its colonial times. While the shell of the Presidential building or 
her school cabinets remain, their contents have been long replaced. What she deems as a 
token that signifies her connection with the past and Taiwan may bear very different 
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significance. An alumna or alumni from another time could easily make similar 
comments about the same structures but refer to different symbolic meanings. This does 
not matter for the old lady, who was clearly elated to see her distant memories so 
tangible and within reach.  
Iekura’s indulgence in the past, however, does not indicate her desire for the return 
of Japan’s colonialism. She tells the camera that her high school only admitted a handful 
of Taiwanese students. There was an impression that the Taiwanese minority always 
performed exceedingly well academically. Years later after returning to Japan, another 
classmate revealed to Iekura the reason for their constant academic success—the 
Taiwanese seniors would advise the Taiwanese juniors that the only way to avoid being 
belittled by the Japanese is by excelling academically. “I was stunned to find out. […] 
As a Japanese student, one is admitted even with mediocre grades,” Iekura says quietly. 
Her contemplation on this matter suggests remorse in her unawareness of her Taiwanese 
classmates’ then struggle with the colonial construct of hierarchy, and implies a 
renewed perspective of the colonial past from the side of the colonizer. It is only in 
retrospect that the innocent members of the ruling class recognize the colonial structure. 
Iekura’s postcolonial reflection on her nation’s role in colonialism and war is 
continued when she revisits the shores of Hualian. At the height of the war, her family 
evacuated from the metropole of Taipei to Hualian. She remembers how fighting 
airplanes departed from the Hualian shorelines and glided into the unknown distance. 
Meanwhile, on land, she and other students dug protective trenches in the sand. In 
hindsight, she realizes the danger they were positioned in, and how foolish she was of 
daydreaming about bombing an enemy plane with a hand grenade from where she was 
digging. “It would have gotten all of us killed, too. But we wanted to do it for our 
country. War does that to you… this mind control thing.” This confession is significant 
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in representing her awakening from Japan’s imperial dreams, and it bears striking 
resemblance to the words of Sakai Atsuko’s Taiwanese volunteer soldiers. Her then 
placing the empire over her personal welfare resonates with the others’ visceral wish to 
fight in the imperial army. Be it a Japanese school girl or Taiwanese colonial subjects, 
Japan’s mobilization movement in the heat of the war seems to have provoked a shared 
sensibility in Japanese and Taiwanese subjects alike. In other words, its objectification 
of people to utilize as an instrument to fight the war was not privy to colonial subjects. 
Japanese subjects, too, were indoctrinated to die for the sake of the empire. 
Paradoxically, despite the wanseis’ dedication to the Japanese Empire, the actual 
Empire itself seems to be an abstract, exotic entity to the children born in its extended 
territory. According to Tominaga, when it snowed in Taiwan’s Niitakayama one year (
WÛ, referring to Mount Jade in Taiwan, Japan’s then “new highest mountain”), his 
teacher sent for someone to fetch snow from the mountain so the schoolchildren can 
learn about this climatic feature in Japan proper. It was a big event at school when the 
jug of snow finally arrived from the mountain. But having taken three days to reach the 
children, the snow had already consolidated into a large frozen chunk of ice. The 
fundamental difference in climate alone seems to trump other cultural efforts to 
construct a unified community. Despite the schoolteacher’s effort to make the Empire/
Motherland vivid and tangible to the pupils, it is abstract and distant to the child’s 
fantastical perception. The Japanese Empire—which had long held an exotic view of its 
untamed, tropical territory—reversely turned into the stuff of exoticism itself to its 
overseas subjects. 
Tominaga’s first encounter with snow in Hualian manifested the imagined 
motherland’s distance and disjuncture to a subject who had not set foot on it. It can also 
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be read as a precursor of the wanseis’ struggle to rehabilitate in the motherland after the 
war. As subjects of a defeated nation, they lost their estates and most of their 
possessions. What was left to take back to Japan was a stringent list of daily-use items 
and small sum of cash. In other words, they returned almost empty-handedly. Their 
return to an impoverished, war-torn Japan proved to be another chapter of hard knocks 
as they faced discrimination as losers that cost Japan the war, and carriers of foreign 
diseases and weak characteristics importable from a different climate. The 
discrimination pushed them further into the margins of the empire, as their fellow 
Japanese turned them out, unwilling or unable to accommodate them. What they 
returned to was not the metropole that represented the empire, but a scant prospect for 
survival, far removed from the modernization that had characterized colonial rule. This 
diasporic experience in their own land, compounded with their more advantageous 
positions in the colonial mechanism as one of the colonizers, contributed to their 
constant yearning for their Taiwanese days. 
After their repatriation, it became increasing evident to the wanseis that they were 
different from the Japanese in Japan proper. For one, they were not welcomed home. 
Once off the ship, according to Tominaga, they were doused with DDT, then 
quarantined at a stopgap facility at the port. Due to the shortage of medical facilities, 
they were confined with consumption patients, which exacerbated their chance of 
survival. The act of sanitization and isolation may have been executed out of necessity. 
However, the ensuing social assumption that the returnees’ body and spirit were 
contaminated, or compromised by their experience in the colony speaks volumes. Is 
there anything in need of cleansing other than possibility of disease? Many altered their 
names, or kept their wansei identity a secret to shun humiliation. When I met with 
Tanaka to discuss her work in August 2015, she revealed that among the 223 wanseis 
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she interviewed, only the 22 agreed to have their names and life stories exposed. She 
assumed that the others’ wish to remain in obscurity has to do with the then dominant 
view that their Japaneseness is compromised as a wansei.10 But otherwise, Tanaka 
stresses, when the two hundred plus wanseis speak of Taiwan, most of them express a 
strong sense of longing for the land and eagerness to return, which Tanaka defines as 
homesickness. 
Besides being treated as alien citizens, the wanseis also became aware of their inner 
aberrance. Matsumoto Kosei ŭhɵƍ (1937- ) attributes his relaxed and spacey nature
—which a succession of his teachers have criticized—to having been influenced by the 
Taiwanese climate. His daughter also testifies to his “exotic” personality, saying that she 
has often wondered whether her father is actually Taiwanese masquerading as a 
Japanese. Iekura Taeko, who spoke of her fervor to fight for the empire as a schoolgirl, 
paradoxically identifies herself as a “forever foreigner” (ʑĊâưɔ
ʒ) in Japan 
proper, due to a constant void she feels when she is homesick about Taiwan. Their 
identity comes from their memories which foreground their connection with the land 
they once lived in. Ethnicity or nationality has very little to do with the formation of 
such identity. Rather, the perception of their Taiwaneseness demonstrates the reciprocal 
influences between the empire and its colony. Furthermore, the overachieving tendency 
in a predominantly Japanese setting that Iekura observed in her Taiwanese peers is 
interestingly manifested in Tominaga’s story. Having been scorned due to his wansei 
identity and foreign accent after returning to Japan, Tominaga says that he strived to 
counter the notion of his inferiority by reading Genji Monogatari Ɛɖµă out loud 
everyday. Later when he built his house, the first in his area to be constructed with steel 
pillars, he announced to everyone that all this was accomplished by a wansei. He 
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proudly displays the name plate at his door, “this marble is from Taiwan, too. […] The 
[kanji characters of] my family name are coated in gold powder. People say I’ve made 
the grade.” Such nostalgic discourse not only contests against mutual influence between 
the colonized and the colonizer, but changes the ways in which we perceive Japan/
Taiwan relationship. Despite the Japanese empire’s effort to assimilate Taiwan, the 
wansei’s diasporic experiences and internalized foreignness reveal that the colony is not 
a mere recipient of Japanese influence, but is a contributor to societal and cultural 
changes in Japanese (at least, in the case of the wanseis). 
Wanseis’ nostalgia for Taiwan after their repatriation prompts them to re-examine 
the Taiwanese influence on their Japaneseness. But subversively, it also calls attention 
to how these self-proclaimed “Taiwanese” imagine postcolonial Taiwan. This is 
demonstrated in Matsumoto Kosei’s knowledge of Taiwan’s national anthem, as 
observed when he drops by an elementary school graduation ceremony during a trip in 
Hualian. He sings along with the choir when the ceremony commences: “[san min chu 
yi,] wu dang suo  zong [?ì_ţ] ȲȀpȘ…/ [The Three Principles of the People] is 
the foundation of our party….” His Taiwanese companions commend him on being so 
well-informed on the island. He explains that when the Chinese Nationalists took over 
Taiwan after the war, as he and his family were waiting to be repatriated, he learned to 
sing Taiwan’s new anthem. Perhaps, Tanaka inserted this particular episode with the 
simple intention to demonstrate the wansei’s knowledge of and engrossment with 
Taiwan. However, how the wanseis come to identify their Taiwan with the national 
anthem of Taiwan’s incoming ruler is interesting and problematic. The lyrics to the 
anthem is rife with allusions to the KMT party and its principle in its construction of a 
nation. The part that Matsumoto was filmed vocalizing translates into “the foundation of 
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our party,” which many contend refers to the KMT party.11 In this context, domestically 
speaking, the symbolic meaning of the Taiwanese national anthem is a contested terrain 
in terms of political representation. While many in the audience in Taiwan are 
impressed by the wanseis’ emotional embrace of Taiwan as a nation, one cannot 
overlook the possible disjuncture between wanseis’ imagined “Taiwan” and the actual 
multiplicity of the nation.12 Political symbolism observed in the nationalist anthem by 
many Taiwanese people appears to be lost in translation/ transition for wanseis like 
Matsumoto. His seemingly apolitical association of the anthem with his “homeland” 
indicates a disjunction between such imagined “homeland” and Taiwan’s political 
reality. Furthermore, because the anthem was taught to him by the “victors” of the war 
whose ruling eventually drove his family out of the island, Matsumoto’s link between 
the anthem and “homeland” suggests a disconnection with the lost empire he was 
repatriated to. 
For the wanseis, under the pretext that their nostalgia is disconnected with political 
disputes in Taiwan, the National Anthem is emblematic of their connection with Taiwan. 
By the same token, other popular Taiwanese ballades from the period could also 
sufficiently convey their tie to the island.13  Tanaka stresses that the nostalgic discourse 
has more to do with an emotional affiliation with the land, a form of “love” that 
“crosses national boundaries and transcends life and death.”14 She tirelessly iterates that 
her motivation to bring visibility to wansei is not political, but one that encourages the 
love of and ties between the lands and people. Given that wansei is, after all, a term 
born from the particular colonial discourse, it is not entirely possible to avoid politics. 
This is probably why Tanaka chooses to let visceral emotions dominate scenes of the 
Japanese elderlies retracing their lives in Taiwan, and especially when receiving printed 
copies of their birth certificate. When Iekura receives her copy with the help of officers 
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of a Taipei Household Registration Office, her eyes tear up and she is overcome with 
emotions. She tells the camera that she feels as if she is reuniting with her past and her 
family through the piece of form. After taking moments to recompose herself, she bursts 
out again: “it is wonderful to have been born in Taiwan.” The documentary then 
concludes with shots of other wanseis receiving their certificates in a formal ceremony 
in Hualian, against the backdrop of a female soprano singing Furusato (ʪʭʞʥ, 
homeland). This act of root-seeking and eventually receiving official affirmation of their 
connection to their “homeland,” according to Tanaka’s interview with the elderlies, is 
what dispels the sense of void that many of them have carried with them since leaving 
the island. 
Japanized Taiwanese and Taiwanized Japanese 
For both Sakai Atsuko and Tanaka Mika, their gathering of oral reports and making of 
the documentaries commenced in a manner of serendipity. On a trip to Taiwan, Sakai 
encountered a Taiwanese elderly woman at a bus stop who told her in Japanese that she 
misses her Japanese teacher. Before she could learn more, her bus arrived. She hopped 
on and spent her entire trip wondering about the old lady and her Japanese teacher, 
which prompted her to research more on the “Japanese generation” of Taiwan. For 
Tanaka, who is a descendent of a wansei grandmother who kept this identity secret from 
her granddaughter while she lived, it was at her funeral when the now grown Tanaka 
was offered a glimpse into the grandmother’s past from other wanseis who came to 
mourn her. Like so many of the young Taiwanese people, the initiation into the 
underground society of secret pasts came after the loss of a loved one, and the piecing 
together of memories and legacies is conducted through bits of clues and anecdotes. The 
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research is therefore personal and overflowing with emotions. Clues and connections 
come in forms of faded birth certificates, or carefully preserved scribbles in familial 
notes. To find a link that would successfully lead one to the next meaningful link 
depends solely on stumbling upon luck. Many times it also depends on their race with 
time, as the elderlies perish before facts can be confirmed. Sakai’s and Tanaka’s 
approach of unravelling the memories by befriending their subjects and gradually 
extracting personal tales provide an alternative, somewhat disorderly discourse that 
departs from official history. Theirs is a social history of the common people that is 
constituted of quotidian practices and personal desires. 
Sakai’s delineation of the Japanized Taiwanese as “people who have been teased 
and tossed about by the undulating tides of the times” can be extended to describe 
Tanaka’s Taiwanized Japanese. The particular historical and spatial context they once 
shared dictates their loss of and separation from family and home. It also compels the 
hybridity and complexity of their identity—of being simultaneously Japanese and 
Taiwanese—despite the Empire’s seemingly indomitable imposition of Japanization. 
When we juxtapose the documentaries, it becomes evident that both Japanese and 
Taiwanese subjects in Taiwan, more or less, appropriated the same indoctrination of 
conforming to an ideal that the Japanese empire had constructed for them, which is to 
selflessly dedicate oneself to the empire. 
Perhaps one can boldly deduce from the fact that Taiwan Jinsei’s Chen Ching-
hsiang ǈ§Ă and  Wansei Back Home’s Iekura Taeko /ȥƴ* both testified to 
their past fervor to die for the nation, that they were equally exploited and stripped of 
subjectivity in face of war. Strangely, even after the colonized and colonizer parted 
ways, they faced similar constrictions— albeit in different political climates—that 
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obstructed the articulation of their memories. Political persecution or social 
discrimination regarding their identity has taught them to be careful about articulating 
their nostalgia. That many of them felt the need to hide their past laid down the base for 
their constant feeling of displacement, and consequent experiences of diaspora in their 
respective actual homelands. Sakai’s Japanized Taiwanese and Tanaka’s Taiwanized 
Japanese both long to reconnect with a past that is irretrievable. Yet at the same time, 
they realize that their past memories are complicated by their awkward involvement in 
the colonial framework, and that their nostalgia runs the risk of being presented as a 
desire for colonialism. Hence, some of Sakai’s interviewees appear uncertain of their 
identity, while Tanaka’s subjects keep their nostalgia in check by speaking of 
redemption towards war and colonialism, and the importance of keeping peace. 
However, in spite of their similarities in historical background and wartime 
experiences, the trajectories of their nostalgic discourse move in opposing directions. 
Tanaka Mika recounted in a talk that when she met with the Japanese elders, they 
wanted her to sing Taiwan’s National Anthem, or Yu Yeh Hua (ðÖ, Flower in a 
Rainy Night). Contrarily, when she met with Taiwanese elders, they wanted to sing 
Kimigayo (ȚʜÞ, National Anthem of Japan) or Japanese military songs. Shots taken 
of the interviewees in front of their bookshelves interestingly reveal that they have been 
continuously studying each other since they parted ways: the Taiwanese man’s 
bookshelf was full of references on the Japanese language, and his Japanese counterpart 
stocked his shelf with books on Taiwanese culture and history. Where Taiwan’s 
“Japanese language generation” reveres the virtues of “Japanese spirit,” Japan’s wansei 
conversely heed the “Taiwanese spirit” as his moral guideline.15 In a way, each side has 
been seeking to maintain certain levels of understanding and connection to the other. If 
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Sakai’s and Tanaka’s subjects could meet, which songs would they sing? What dialogue 
would unfold between these two groups of people? It is my wish that they can regale in 
certain jovial moments during their reunion. But I also wish, after exchanging social 
pleasantries, they could delve into their old relationship as a colonized and a colonizer, 
and engage in a dialectics of loss and identities. 
Taiwan Jinsei’s Hsiao Chin-wen’s  ɕȧd accusation of having been “deserted” by 
the Japanese empire would make for an important thread for such fantastical dialogue. 
Hsiao acknowledges that “different blood running in our veins” fundamentally sets him 
apart from other “real” Japanese, but his belief in the Japanese Empire, which was 
coercively produced by Japan’s indoctrination, bears no difference from them. His 
determination to “protect the nation” was betrayed when the defeated Japan revealed 
that they were not Japanese. In Judith Butler’s view of war, the affected population is 
divided into two camps, one that is grievable, the other constituted of lives that “cannot 
be mourned because it has never lived, that is, it has never counted as life at all.”16 
Therefore, excluded from the empire’s frame of “grievability,” the Japanized 
Taiwanese’s loss went unacknowledged and uncompensated. Furthermore, to add insult 
to injury, a new nationalist government that held antagonist views against Japan, as well 
as a younger, Chinese-ized generation who were uninterested in their loss, exacerbated 
their notion of being left behind. For them, what could the wanseis’ own tales of being 
marginalized and discriminated against because of their presumed “Taiwaneseness” 
offer? Would they feel a strange sense of condolence that the “real Japanese” they 
competed with had also been scorned? Or would they see their constant revisiting of the 
island as an (unofficial) Japanese effort of saying they are not deserted? 
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Either way, Sakai’s and Tanaka’s quests to understand the generation with a 
complicated past highlight the precariousness of existence under a rule that requested its 
subjects to surrender their subjectivity. Their works provide a means of articulation for 
the elders as well as actively preserving and remembering these memories. In his 
observation of postcolonial Taiwan, historian Andrew D. Morris contends that the 
“explicit recognition of the importance of the colonial era provides an important 
political context for Taiwanese people’s notions of exactly how ‘Chinese’ they are.”17 I 
agree with Morris that colonial memories of “Japan” in Taiwan were used to separate 
itself from the Chineseness imposed on them by a Chinese nationalist government, and 
that memories of “Japan” are indeed instrumental in organizing and shaping what 
constitutes “Taiwaneseness.” However, I contend that there is more to the constant 
revocation of memories. It enables the coming to terms with a history of loss, the 
repatriation of the formerly ungrievable into the realm of the grievable. Dom DeLillo 
wrote in his novel Underworld that “longing on a large scale is what makes history.” 
The two female directors’ efforts of documenting the longings of the two groups of 
colonial subjects have supplemented an integral component of Taiwanese (Japanese) 
history. 
In April 2015, Taiwan’s Ministry of Culture announced Wansei Back Home the 
winner of the nonfiction category in its annual Golden Tripod Award ÄɅÁ. Later in 
September, the National Academy for Educational Research ,/ßŮƭƞĺ 
announced its decision to include the wanseis’ connection with Taiwan in 
supplementary material of history textbooks.18 Three weeks after its release on October 
16th, 2015, the film’s production crew announced its success as the 7th best film of the 
year for its blockbuster performance, a rarity for documentary films. However, Sakai’s 
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production has not received as much fanfare. Although this is probably a result of 
different marketing strategies, the vitriolic attacks on President Lee Teng-hui’s 
memories and experience of fighting for Japan during the war in August of the same 
year still manifest the challenges of coming to terms to with a Taiwanese’s nostalgic 
discourse.19 As the Taiwanese society embraces the wanseis’ “homecoming” (see Figure 
5.6) as part of its collective memory, it is important to see that the same sentiment is 
extended to the Japanized Taiwanese’s memories to ensure that they, too, can be at 
home.   
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Epilogue  
Becoming Taiwanese 
As a first grader in 1983, I learned at school in Taiwan that Chiang Kai-shek was the 
national savior who fended the clutches of Chinese communism and Japanese 
colonialism off of the island. Portraits of the late president Chiang adorned the walls of 
each classroom, and pupils were obliged to pay tribute by bowing their heads to the 
portrait at certain times in school. For my generation, the Japanese Devil was deemed 
the enemy by Taiwan’s postwar history education. We learned of its atrocious crimes 
against the comfort women and the Rape of Nanking, and its aggression in building the 
Japanocentric Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, which failed simply because 
justice prevailed. Colonial rule under the Japanese was a dismal period of time for all 
Taiwanese, until Chiang Kai-shek came and liberated “us” all. At private home, 
however, “Japan” was more amicable. My grandmother occasionally hummed old 
Japanese tunes, and appreciated the craftsmanship of Japanese-made products, saying, 
“The Japanese make fine things.” She also said, “their work ethics is really something.” 
Another elderly relative would reminisce his boyhood and speak of his Japanese teacher 
who was good and kind. The paradoxical views of the imagined “Japan” existed in 
strange harmony for me. Though the discrepancy between the two images, public and 
private, subtly suggested disconcertion, it was not until much later in adulthood that I 
started wondering. 
This experience is not privy to me alone. In 2011, Li-chin Lin (1973- ), illustrator 
and Taiwanese expatriate in France published Formose, an autobiographical graphic 
novel (roman graphique) about her experience growing up in Taiwan under the martial 
law (1949-1987) and her subsequent search for a “Taiwanese” identity.1 First published 
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in France, it won the Students’ Choice Literary Prize abroad before winning a 
nomination in Taiwan’s own Golden Comic Award (2013). Episodes of her book 
explore the politics of the “Chinese” identity being built on debasing native culture and 
language, and her discovery of a Taiwanese identity that had been previously concealed. 
Her grandparents, like mine, would occasionally sing Japanese songs. Her response, 
however, was more dramatic. She would slam her door to shut it out, while belting out 
“fight the Japs! Resist the Communists! Destroy the traitors ƻɂ!” at the top of her 
lung to purge her space of any Japanese-ness (see Figure 6.1). Much like the young 
daughter portrayed in Wu Nien-jen’s A Borrowed Life (1994), she developed a sense of 
hierarchy between the Chinese and the more vernacular Taiwanese, and felt that she 
needed to override the “wrong” accents and identities that her grandparents possessed. 
Her graphic novel, as she says, is a form of “penitence from a former high school 
student,” for having sided with the then mainstream politics and having held her 
family’s Taiwanese roots in contempt.2 
Interestingly, though her grandmother’s use of the Japanese language is essentially 
a result of foreign imposition from the colonial days, Lin regards it as part of her 
family’s private legacy. To Lin, “Japan’s” presence does not represent colonial 
oppression, but rather, stands as a potent symbol of KMT’s role in creating a 
generational divide within a familial context. Indeed, for the postcolonial generation, 
“colonial Japan” poses as an integral participant in constructing a Taiwanese identity 
that distinguishes the Taiwanese from KMT’s version of “Chinese.” However, over the 
course of my research, I have come to find that the grappling with colonial memory, as 
well as the mapping and creating of a postmemory is not targeting KMT or China 
proper as yet another Other or imagined enemy. Rather, the acts of revisiting the past 
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can be considered as an attempt, on the part of the second or third generation of the 
colonized subjects, to redress what had been previously framed and affixed as inferior 
and shameful. It can further be considered as an act of resistance against an official 
dictation of what was to be remembered and forgotten and on a more emotional note—
as displayed in the writer Lin Li-chin’s penitent confession—an endeavor to redeem 
one’s past role as an accomplice in nullifying the previous generation’s identity. 
Throughout this dissertation, I have examined Taiwan’s lingering gaze towards its 
ex colonizer Japan, and the postcolonial generation’s reinventing and rewriting of this 
memory of Japan, previously hindered by a politically motivated act of manipulation or 
eradication. By looking at radically incongruous narratives, such as comfort women 
testimonials, the quasi-honorific turned defaming epithet “koumin” label, former 
President Lee Teng-hui’s “Japanese spirit,” and documentaries about Japanized 
Taiwanese and Taiwanized Japanese, I juxtaposed discourses that were previously fixed 
as separate historical issues and tried to tease out the interconnectedness of their 
memories. With the exception of Chapter Two in which I closely read Chou Chin-po’s 
ÍÄƱ 1941 short story, “The Volunteer” ŅĆǑ, and compared its similarities with 
Lee Teng-hui’s postcolonial self-analysis as a former imperial subject, the texts I 
selected are cinematic presentations that share the same core theme: Taiwanese people 
under the colonial rule. Unlike words in historical texts, their images and soundbites 
communicate the subjects’ experiences more viscerally and directly (albeit still 
mediated by the screenwriter and the silver screen) to the viewers, and can be 
considered as a more physical reenactment of memory. Furthermore, marketing 
strategies that allow the post-screen sessions with the makers of the film not only boost 
the films’ box office performance, but offer an opportunity to clarify and intensify the 
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filmic experience. In turn, the heightened visibility of the films contributes to an 
effective imprinting of newly invented memory in Taiwan’s collective consciousness. 
Marianne Hirsch proposes that postmemory—the memories of the “generation 
after,” distanced from the actual historical circumstances of memory—is nevertheless 
connected to its source via an “imaginative investment and creation.” The once-
marginalized memories are now immortalized through the artistic rendition and mass 
(re-)production of images. Departing from the traditional nationalistic framework, the 
recent creations of the past evoke a plethora of emotions—empathy, nostalgia, 
sympathy, and even a nativist sense of pride—that greatly vary from mere disdain or 
hate for colonial Japan. My discussion of these texts centered on a recurring theme that 
writing from the margins is significant in toppling the myths of historical certitude. 
Throughout this dissertation, I deliberately refrained from taking the historian stance of 
examining the accuracy of the presented facts, or upholding the “correctness” of a self-
determined Taiwanese ideology. Instead, I highlighted the element of memory, and more 
importantly, the postcolonial generation’s “imaginative investment and creation” as a 
process rife with political and emotional intentions to uncover “other sides” of the story. 
In Chapter One, based on my study of the two makings of Taiwanese comfort 
women documentary, I argued that in order to garner nation-wide support for the redress 
movement, the trauma narrative needs to remove the highly politicized issue from 
accusatory, nationalistic framework that targets Japan as the enemy of the state. As 
previous studies suggested (Wu 2009, Shogo 2011), the comfort women campaign in 
Taiwan tends to be outweighed by the island’s identity politics. The studies contend that 
the comfort women’s redress movement is overshadowed by the attention drawn to the 
historical trauma inflicted by the Nationalist Chinese regime, and Taiwan’s inclination 
towards a benignant interpretation of Japanese colonial rule. In other words, the comfort 
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women issue seems to be deliberately overlooked to give way to constructing a 
Taiwanese identity distinct from KMT’s China, or China proper. 
I argued, however, that the “overshadowing” occurs only when the women’s stories 
are incorporated as part of a nationalist narrative, which somehow categorizes their loss 
as part of Chinese damages in the Chinese War of Resistance against the Japanese 
(1931-1937). Indeed, according to psychoanalyst and ethnographer Peng Jen-yu, the 
Taiwanese public does tend to link TWRF and its redress campaign with the KMT 
party’s political stance, a stance which mainly holds memories tinged with colonial 
nostalgic in contempt. Song of the Reed, the more recent documentary’s shift in 
focusing on the women’s individual subjectivity and healing process is instrumental in 
reclaiming their narratives from a nationalistic discourse, by highlighting the women’s 
therapy sessions, their own positive memories of “Japan,” as well as sympathetic 
Japanese supporters. The film does not exonerate Japan for the wartime violence against 
the female subaltern, but by moving the women’s plights away from an anti-Japan/Pro-
China context, it is able to accommodate symbiosis between the women’s trauma 
memories and their contemporary’s diverging remembrance of colonial Japan. The 
arguments surrounding the conscription process of the women—specifically, whether 
coercion was involved, or whether the women were innocent/untainted—demonstrate 
the limitation of each memory, and indicate that the full picture of history is constituted 
by memories of either side. Even without portraying the Japanese military as perverse 
kidnappers of innocent victims, the torment that the women experienced in the “comfort 
stations” should still be deemed valid and grievable. Memories of trauma, and 
memories of those who believed that the Imperial Army abided by a somewhat 
“legitimate” recruitment process should not be considered as mutually exclusive. 
Instead, they reflect a partial understanding of what had happened. 
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My investigation of the modernized, societal use of koumin (ǡì, recognized 
subjects of the emperor) in Chapter Two was geared towards the rapport of 
heterogeneous identities and memories. The term emerged from the historical 
background of the kouminka campaign ǡìØÐL during the peak of World War II. It 
was an intensified version of assimilation policy of “becoming Japanese,” implemented 
to ensure Taiwanese loyalty for the Japanese empire. According to Leo Ching’s 
definition, it is an internalization of subjective strife to find equilibrium between 
Taiwanese and Japanese identities which “represented the ways in which the onus of 
becoming Japanese had shifted from the colonial state to the colonial subjects.”3 Ching 
observes the kouminka movement until the end of Japanese colonialism after WWII. 
However, in today’s Taiwan, the once “honorific” term is very much alive, and is used 
to deride the former colonial subjects who had then collaborated with the kouminka 
policy. The epithet further expresses disdain for anyone who articulates a colonial 
nostalgia, or an admiration for Japanese culture. Tracking the trajectory of the term’s 
mutating meaning, I contended that it reflects part of the Taiwanese society’s incapacity 
to accept its colonial history. I used the writings of Chou Chin-po (1920-1996) and 
former President Lee Teng-hui (1923- ) as exemplar texts of colonial koumin and 
postcolonial “koumin” respectively to examine what it meant then to become a 
“Japanese,” and what it signifies today to be a former “Japanese.” 
A handful of Japanese scholars have tried to redress Chou Chin-po, who was 
stigmatized as a betrayal to his (Chinese/Taiwanese) subjectivity in the 70s and 80s. 
They state that Chou’s literary works express an aspiration to improve his environs and 
a deep connection with the land Ǚš (Hoshina 1994, Tarumi 1994, Nakajima 2002). 
Through a close reading of his contended short story, “The Volunteer,” which had been 
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stigmatized after the war as a form of betrayal to his (Chinese Taiwanese) roots, I 
suggested that Chou was deeply concerned with what methods would suffice in order to 
become Japanese. Specifically, I argued that “The Volunteer” is an important text 
precisely because it offers a glimpse of the pragmatism of a colonial subject responding 
to his political situation. Chou’s conclusion of intellectuals losing the bid to become a 
complete Koumin to a gung ho character who does not question, in fact, raises suspicion 
of an intellectual’s anxiety, or incredulity of being fully recognized. 
Lee Teng-hui, however, equipped with the 20/20 post-war hindsight that Chou’s 
anxious characters did not have, is known to have unequivocally reiterated how his 
Japanese education benefitted and shaped his character. He is known to have proclaimed 
that “before the age of 22, [he] was a Japanese.” Not surprisingly, for this he has been 
attacked by those who hold Sinocentric history views, depreciating him with the epithet 
of koumin. Like Chou’s stubborn silence after the war, Lee seems adamant in offering 
no self-justification for his “offense.” Yet unlike the silenced Chou, he repeatedly 
articulates his colonial past, thereby repeatedly upsetting his opponents. I see his 
repeated trespassing of the “etiquettes” boundary as a former Republic of China 
President as a subversive attempt to break the nationalist loyalist/traitor dichotomy, all 
the while invoking others of his generation to remember their colonial memories. His 
constant mention of Bushido, the aesthetics of the warrior’s way, to both Japanese and 
Taiwanese audience (but to Japan in most occasions), is yet another attempt to 
foreground his memory as something of value. Furthermore, combined with his 
advocacy for a Taiwanese subjectivity, the constant allusions to the past and to Japanese 
experience serve to illustrate the possibility of reinventing the thus far unsettled 
Taiwanese identity. For Lee and his generation, the colonial nostalgia does not pose 
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merely as a form of indulgence in the times that are lost, but a means to preserve an 
integral part of themselves as something of significance. 
In Chapter Three, I examined the ways in which director/screenwriter Wei Te-
sheng’s three cinematic texts (Cape No. 7 2008, Seediq Bale 2011, Kano 2014) offer 
new images of “Japan” that became sites of contestation and memory invocation. In his 
making of Seediq Bale, a film based on the actual events of the Wushe Incident, a 1930 
violent clash between the aboriginal tribes and the Japanese colonizers resulting in the 
near total annihilation of some of the tribes, Wei gave the characters each a li-chang Ī
, a standpoint from which they perceive what is happening to them, in order to make 
sense of the characters’ (including “bad” Japanese) decisions, and gauge how the 
incident unfolded the way it did. The creation of the characters’ standpoints, though 
adapted from history, was essentially Wei’s own artistic rendering and “imaginative 
investment.” The remaking and re-presentation of the trauma suggest that the memories 
are open sites that viewers can weigh in to fill in the gaps, and generate more meanings. 
Previous analyses of Wei’s films (Wang 2012, Tseng 2014, Huang 2015) linked them 
with the (im)possibilities of construction of Taiwanese subjectivity through the 
vernacular. Other scholars highlighted the discrepancies between Wei’s artistic 
presentation and historical facts (Lin 2011, Chiu 2011). While I agreed that the 
underpinning of the films correlates with the shaping of Taiwanese identity, I argued 
that other than approaching this objective through the vernacular particularity of 
Taiwan, Wei’s presentation of an imagined “Japan” greatly reflects the said identity’s 
essentialist anxiety and its liminal state constantly in the process of becoming. 
Since the 2008 production of Cape No. 7, Wei’s “Japan” has often been criticized 
for being over-romanticized and sentimentalized.4 The contestation carried over into the 
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2014 production of KANO. With its idyllic portrayal of a burgeoning Taiwanese town 
excitedly enveloped by the modern conveniences of train rides, radio broadcasts, and 
the modernized irrigation as an “unconditional embrace of modernity,” Wei was again 
berated for turning a blind eye to the fact that modernity emerged from the exploitive 
nature of colonialism.5 It has been reiterated that colonialism should not be as peachy as 
Wei has depicted.6 However, I argued from the perspective of Marianne Hirsch’s 
postmemory that, though a product of imagination, projection and creation, Wei’s 
“Japan” is nevertheless a valid form of memory. Hirsch describes this “powerful and 
very particular “ memory as indirect and fragmented, and “shot through with holes.” 
But as she claims, postmemory affirms “the pasts’ existence and, in their flat two-
dimensionality, they signal its unbridgeable distance.”7 When we see Wei’s films as a 
second, or third generation’s representation of postmemories, the question of their 
incongruity with certain “facts” (namely, other threads of remembrance) is invalidated. 
What we really should be asking is, why does Wei present colonialism in such 
mannerism? Wei had once described his emotional encounter with the obscure history 
of Kano thus: “it was as if, at the age of 40, I was just beginning to find out about my 
family background.”8 In this impassioned vein, I suggested his practice of postmemory 
could be considered a subversive act to invoke memories that were politically 
suppressed after the war, and an endeavor to reconnect with the memories that had been 
obfuscated through a discontinuation of knowledge of events. 
From the prematurely terminated romance between a Japanese teacher and his 
Taiwanese student in Cape No. 7, to a coup d’etat against the Japanese colonizers that 
resulted in near annihilation of tribal lineage in Seediq Bale, to the anti-climactic 
“almost champion but not quite” feats of a local baseball team in KANO, the characters 
of the three films share a common theme of failing in various epic, glorified ways. 
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However, they all have, in their strife, earned some kind of validation such as “true 
love,” “true man,” or “true sportsmen.” Though the films maintain an invigorated, 
bolstered rhythm, their strife “to be” (as opposed to the perpetual state of “becoming”) 
and subsequent failure inevitably speak to Taiwan’s actual frustrations with its fluid, 
unsettled (non-) national status. Like the nature of postmemory, Wei’s “Taiwan identity” 
is highly mobile, transposable, and in the process of becoming. I read all Wei’s stories as 
a conveyer of a sense of cultural liminality: that before reaching the other end, one’s 
existence is indeterminable and therefore unsettled. 
Lastly, in Chapter Four, I continued the examination of the “generation after’s” 
recovering and orchestration of memory through an analysis of films. However, these 
films significantly depart from those I examined in previous chapters in that they were 
produced by Japanese female directors, Sakai Atsuko and Tanaka Mika (who is half-
Taiwanese). I read their documentaries on Japanized Taiwanese (Sakai) and Taiwanized 
Japanese (Tanaka) as the agents of the absent Japanese counterpart in Taiwan’s 
postcolonial discourse. 
 Sakai’s project targets the Japanese audience to shed light on postcolonial Taiwan 
after Japan left the island. To her own surprise, she found that instead of bitterness and 
vitriol directed at Japan, former subjects adhere to the values they acquired during the 
Japanese period, and their discontent stems from having been “left behind” by their 
former colonizer. As the people who had to “leave behind” their home after the war, the 
yearning of Tanaka’s subjects move in the diametrically opposite direction: as Taiwan-
born Japanese, their post-war displacement generates a diasporic homesickness for 
Taiwan. Many of them expressed an internalized foreignness that made their 
rehabilitation to the Japanese society difficult. The two demographic groups, each 
suffering a particular brand of diaspora in their respective homelands, are ironically 
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products of the same historical and spatial context. As the certified Taiwanese feels 
himself to be Japanese, and the bona fide Japanese proclaims to be Taiwanese, neither 
feels completely at home with their prescribed identity. Where Taiwan’s “Japanese 
language generation” reveres the virtues of “Japanese spirit,” Japan’s wansei conversely 
heeds the “Taiwanese spirit” as his moral guideline. More importantly, scrutinized under 
the colonial framework, both groups, colonized and colonizer, faced exploitation by the 
state and were equally stripped of subjectivity in the face of a much grander historical 
narrative. Sakai’s delineation of the Japanized Taiwanese as “people who have been 
teased and tossed about by the undulating tides of the times” also befittingly describes 
Tanaka’s Taiwanized Japanese. 
The “generation after” in Taiwan and Japan share many similarities. The Japanese 
second or third generation, like those in Taiwan, after the war learn little about the 
colonial past in formal schooling. Furthermore, akin to the Taiwanese youth who 
stumble into colonial nostalgia and the past, both Sakai and Tanaka unexpectedly waded 
into their projects, having happened upon their research objects through emotionally 
high-strung initiation. Their presentation of postmemory is therefore, like all concealed 
knowledge of events that is dispersed via intimacy, personal and brimming with 
emotions. 
A cross examination between different groups of elders from the Japanized era 
presents to us conflicting, multiple notions of identities. Take, for example, the comfort 
women and Kao Chu-hua, a tribal princess from an elite Japanized aboriginal family, 
who were born around the same time. When comfort women returned to Taiwan from 
sexual slavery at the end of the war, Kao’s and her father’s torment was about to 
commence. As women, they had their bodies used as small, frail bargaining chip to 
negotiate one’s position in the empire, their lives all too easily affected by a simple flick 
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of fate. Their memories of “Japan,” naturally, impose on the national psyche dispersed 
versions of self-definitions, self-negations and fractured outcomes. Due to Taiwan’s 
horrific history of politically maneuvered memories, there is a general anxiety that 
official history may devour memories, resulting in the defacement of certain “truths.” 
Because of this contested relationship between authorized history and dispersed 
discourses of the past, re-presentations of past memories should not be simplified to a 
faltering artistic rendition, but reified as a political action in itself to draw attention to 
deliberately obscured versions of the past. The texts that I selected for this study, I 
believe, are all earnest attempts to capture the memories before they fade into the 
background. My focus lay not on the factual accuracy of a recollection, but rather on 
how “historical actors constructed their memories in a particular way at a particular 
time.”9 
When the end of martial law lifted in 1987, among many restrictions, the ban on the 
“Japanese” presence in Taiwan, the island experienced a considerable political and 
cultural earthquake. The influx of Japanese substances came in the forms of the old and 
the new: the old being the “boom” of nostalgia and chronicling of memories of colonial 
Japan, the new being the allure of commodities much sought after by the mass known as 
Japanophiles. While the latter seems to be newly introduced to the locals, bearing no 
weight of the past and hence easy to embrace, the aforementioned memories bear deep, 
entangled roots in Taiwan. Forty years of being silenced did not guarantee the 
expunging of these memories. Instead, the memories reemerge behind layers of political 
curtains, albeit as something both familiar and distorted, reverent yet disoriented. 
In a lecture at Berkeley in 2000, Polish American writer and descendent of 
Holocaust survivor Eva Hoffman remarked how people who lived in Eastern Europe 
after WWII often relied on memory as the “only guarantee of a truthful history.”10 The 
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official writing of history had concealed fundamental facts, or simply provided blatant 
lies, hence “the passionate defense of local knowledge and of fidelity to the past.” 
Though I cannot compare Taiwan’s political circumstances with Hoffman’s Eastern 
Europe, I, too, observe a distrust in institutionalized history writing and a thirst to revisit 
concealed or distorted memories in Taiwan. However, when Hoffman discussed 
historical trauma that defines moments in history that affirms “group identity” and its 
“moral status,” such as the Nanking massacre for the Chinese, and the great famine for 
the Irish American, I see this is where Taiwan appears to be an anomaly in the cultural 
memory discussions. Unlike memories of the Holocaust or Nanking massacre, which 
are definitive paradigms that people speak of in a unified, consolidated narrative, 
Taiwanese societal memory of “Japan” has experienced dissipation and alteration as 
soon as the nationalist Chinese regime took over. For instance, while Taiwan fought the 
war on Japan’s side as its colony, the Taiwanese were later indoctrinated that they, 
alongside the Chinese, fought against it. This rupture in memory guarantees that the 
research and reshaping of memories would be discursive and layered by various 
editions of palimpsests. However, perhaps due to the emotional inheritance that so many 
of the aforementioned writers and film directors have illustrated, including Director Wu 
Nien-jen and comic writer Lin Li-chin, the “generation after” choose to redeem an 
obscured familial and communal memory, or in Hoffman’s words, practices of 
“avowal.” The term, contrary to Freud’s “disavowal,” which signifies a refusal to 
acknowledge disturbing things or notions that lie in plain sight, means to avow 
ourselves “to be faithful” to a past even which we have not participated in, in order to 
safeguard the memory. This avowed faithfulness of not questioning the memories does 
run the risk of romanticizing and sentimentalizing the past, where it should not be 
romanticized or sentimentalized. However, even with such a risk, for the second or third 
!                                                                                                                         156
generation of the colonized Taiwanese, it is crucial that the past and memory which 
constitute present-day Taiwan is acknowledged, deemed “something of value,” as well 
as vigorously revisited, and laboriously reexamined. What we may derive from the 
colonial legacy, as we comb through its knots of brambles, is an understanding that 
(post)memory could enrich the historical tapestry of Taiwan, as well as provide healing 
for those whose identities are split or wounded. 
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to let them go if “Butterball” consents to sleep with him. As a loyal French nationalist, 
“Butterball” initially refuses to give in to the enemy, but finally surrendered her body at 
the persuasion of the increasingly disgruntled group. As soon as the coach is released 
and approaching safety, her fellow passengers scathingly snubbed “Butterball,” refusing 
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2003.  
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ŏě=ĎƲwŤ,ǡìØÐL (1937- 
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Chun huei Publishing, 1987.  
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as gaichi £0.   
11 The Japanese colonial government operated two separate schooling systems. The 
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with limited access to resources and equipment for the common schools. Only a few 
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13 In the words of Kobayashi Seizo, the 17th Governor-General of Taiwan in 1937. 
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journals, Chang Wen-huan ºdŌ intervened with this powerful line to strike away any 
accusations against Taiwanese writers as “non-koumin,” or unfaithful subjects of the 
emperor. Originally published in ƺgY¿ (Noma Nobuyuki),  ⟨ºdŌʨdFMLʥ
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Identity. In the summer of 1944, when Japan was losing the war, Taiwanese students in 
all Japanese universities were requested by their military instructors to “volunteer” for 
military duties. According to the memoirs of Peng Ming-min who was studying at 
University of Tokyo, it was an offer that was dangerous to refuse and one that few 
turned down. Tsai, Shih-shan Henry,  Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 45.  
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Teng Hui Voice essay, Chinese translation of full text], Storm Media, accessed July 11, 
2016, http://www.storm.mg/article/63608. 
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www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20150823/676253/. 
42 Journalist Takeuchi Kiyoshi wrote in 1938, that since the people of Taiwan were 
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Chapter 3: 
1 In 2008, the year Cape No. 7 was released, the major events in the domestic news 
concerned with former President Chen Shui-bian's embezzlement scandals, economic 
decline under a newly elected government, and a less-than-stellar count of medals at the 
Beijing hosted Olympic Games, adding insult to the injury that Taiwan had long been 
battling over the dwarfing of nationhood in international arenas. See Wang (2012).  
2 It is significant that Wei Te-sheng removes his protagonist, A-ga, from the northern, 
metropolitan capital of Taipei to the peripheral town of Heng Chun, located at the 
southernmost tip of the island. In Taiwan there are (at least) two competing imagined 
communities: the (other) Chinese, and the Taiwanese, resulting in the opposing opinions 
of unification (or building a cozier relationship) with China, or Taiwan’s own 
independence. The group that leans towards a Chinese Nationalistic discourse is likely 
to give their votes to the KMT party, while the group that identifies itself as Taiwanese 
tend to support the pro-independence DPP party (Democratic Progressive Party).  Since 
the 2000s, the electoral results consistently manifest a geographical split of voting 
patterns, “north Blue (KMT), south Green (DPP),” which could serve as an indicator of 
the distribution of the ethnic populations. But, more importantly, it strongly suggests the 
relationship between locality and the fostering of imagined communities. See “The 
Geography of Voting Patterns in Taiwan,” School of Politics and International 
Relations, University of Nottingham, accessed November 17, 2016, http://
nottspolitics.org/2011/11/02/the-geography-of-voting-patterns-in-taiwan/. 
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Chapter 4: 
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Soldiers through the Analysis of the List of Enshrined Deities], PYDe [Historic 
Taiwan] Issue 10: November 2015, 69. In Becoming Japanese, Leo Ching recounts an 
incident in which a group of Taiwanese aboriginal representatives visit the Yasukuni 
Shrine. They requested that the shrine “return” to them the souls of their family 
members who had been enshrined there, but to no avail. See Leo Ching, “Becoming 
Japanese:” Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001), 1-4.  
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subjectivity. ēęɌJș[Shiba, Ryotaro], le[yWN@ [Notes of Travels in 
Taiwan], trans. Lee Jin-song (Taipei: Taiwan Tohan, 2011), 519-39. 
6 See Bissell, William Cunningham, 216.  
7 See ÍÄƱ [Chou, Chin-po],ʑƲ$wƲŰʒ [wansei (born in Taiwan) and wansei 
(made in Taiwan)], in 0,dQ  [Collection of Chou Chin-po’s essays], ed. Nakajima 
Toshio (Taipei: Avanguard publishing, 2002), 193-195. 
8 See ȸȹǪ [Chung, Shu-ming],ʑ!ÞLğƔƌŋĢʒ [Important 
testmonies for a turbulent times],  in e
 [Wansei Back Home], by Tanaka Mika 
(Taipei: Yuan-liu Publishing, 2014), 8.  
9 See Ǎru [Tanaka, Mika], e
 [Wansei Back Home] (Taipei: Yuan-liu 
Publishing, 2014). Prior to the official release of her documentary film on October 16th 
2015, Tanaka published a book of the same title in 2014 and held approximately 300 
talks in Taiwan as an effort to promote understanding of wansei and the advent of her 
film.  
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famous Taiwanese ballade “Yu Yeh Hua” ðÖ/ Flowers in a Rainy Night (1934) on 
his harmonica.  “Yu Yeh Hua” tells the sad tale of a maiden who, after being deserted by 
her lover, led a lonely and tragic existence. It has been interpreted by some as a national 
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s32.htm for example). When Placido Domingo performed this song in 2002 in his 
concert, it was elevated from a local ballade to international high art status and has since 
come to represent Taiwan in various situations.    
14 As stated on the book jacket of Tanaka’s book of the same title, Wansei Back Home 
(2015, second edition).  
15 See Tominaga Masaru’s letter to the Liberty Times. ʓKLˀv±ʑĎƲǥʒ
łȖ 89îƲ$ȂYʑóʒƦ
ʔ [Touching! 89-year-old Wansei writes Liberty 
Times in search of owner to a towel with imprints of “Taiwan Spirit”], accessed July 21, 
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2009). 
17 See Andrew D. Morris. Japanese Taiwan: Colonial Rule and its Contested Legacy. 
(London/ New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), 13. 
18 SeeʓŝƒƋŕßƬʑƲ$V/ʒˁʑKANOʒaĲʔ [Wansei Back Home and 
KANO to be included in supplementary history textbooks], Taiwan People News, 
accessed July 21, 2016, http://www.peoplenews.tw/news/120be1db-d7e4-4303-ab5b-
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Epilogue: 
1 See Lin, Li-chin. Formose was originally published in France in November 2011, its 
Mandarin Chinese version later published in Taiwan in August 2012.   
2 In her acceptance speech for the Students’ Choice Literary Prize in Paris, France on 
March 22, 2013, Lin Li-chin said: “we were blind and deaf. […] Because we could not 
learn the real history of our nation, we became pawns to the autocratic rule. When I was 
young, I had nothing but disdain for the street protesters against the government. Hence 
this book, Formose, is actually a form of repentance from an ignorant former high 
school student.” See ʑŚȢäőÁˁſȱɳ˃2APċĵɹǓʒ [Awarded at 
Parisian book fair, Lin Li-chin: repentance for an ignorant youth], New Talk, accessed 
August 5, 2016, http://newtalk.tw/news/view/2013-03-24/34828. 
3 See Leo Ching, “Becoming Japanese:” Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity 
Formation. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 97. 
4 See ǈƸ [Chen, Yi-chung], ʓʑĹōÒʒĎ4ąģ ʔ[The tragic love story 
between Taiwan and Japan in Cape No. 7], China Times Newspaper, October 9, 2008. 
And þǉɶ [Hsu, Chieh-lin],ʓʑĹōÒʒ˃ɣì0OdØǏÆʔ[ Cape No. 7: 
the residue of colonial subculture], United Daily News, September 25, 2008. 
5 SeeŎdʈ [Huang, Wen-yin], ʓɣìŝƒ®žwʑĎƲʒ˃+ɴŬǭʑĹ
ōÒʒʽʑųŬľ•ŚɆʒʽʑKANOʒǱʒʔ [Imagining “Taiwan” by 
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Remembering the Colonial Past: On Film Director Wei Te-sheng’s Cape No. 7, Seediq 
Bale, and KANO] (Masters Thesis, National Chung Hsin University, 2015), 40. 
6 See Huang, Wen-yin.  
7 See Marianne Hirsch,  Family Frames: Photography, Narratives, and Postmemory. 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 23. 
8 See interview by Shiang Yi-fei. See ʓ¢ªʑKANOʒ(ƕƚʔ[10 Questsions 
for Kano], originally published in United Daily News, accessed July 25, 2016, http://
blog.ilc.edu.tw/blog/index.php?op=printView&articleId=478876&blogId=145.  
9 See Barbie Zelizer, Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory through the Camera’s 
Eye, (Chicago/ London: Chicago University Press, 1998), 5. 
10 See Eva Hoffman, “Complex Histories, Contested Memories: Some Reflections on 
Remembering Difficult Pasts,” Doreen B. Townsend Center for Humanities (Berkeley: 
Univers i ty of Cal i forn ia , 2000) , accessed June 4 , 2015,  h t tp : / /
townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/publications/OP23_Hoffman.pdf. 
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Figure 1.1 Tousan spoiled his young daughter’s assignment of the national flag (of the 
Republic of China, Taiwan) by coloring in the white sun in the fashion of the hinomaru. 
Here, the girl asks her brother (Wu Nien-jen’s on-screen surrogate) “how am I supposed to 
hand this in?” (Shot taken from the film A Borrowed Life, 1994) 
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Figure 1.2  Tousan’s young son sits in the hallway of a bordello, peering through the 
curtain in an attempt to make sense of the adult world. (Shot taken from the film, A 
Borrowed Life, 1994) 
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Figure 1.3  A realistic replica of a propagandist mural from the Taiwanese film, Paradise in 
Service (2014). Murals like this—featuring classic nationalist symbols: a portrait of 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, a book of Three Principles of the People , and 
the territory of Chiang’s Republic of China—were common around Taiwan. Note that the 
delineated territory centers on today’s China. (Shot taken from the film Paradise in Service, 
2014) 
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Figure 1.4  A band of protesters congregate in front of a cinema to express their dissent 
about the release of a popular Taiwanese film, KANO, about a Taiwanese baseball team’s 
success under Japanese colonial rule. The boards they are holding read: “Refuse to be a 
Koumin, do not watch the film.” (Photo taken from http://newtalk.tw/news/view/
2014-02-27/44810)
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Figure 1.5  Concomitantly, a Japanese media defines wanseis as “tossed and teased by 
war $!&"” in its 2016 promotion while Sakai Atsuko prescribes her 
Taiwanese subjects as “tossed and teased by history '$!&"” in 2008. (above: 
shot taken August 3, 2016 from http://natalie.mu/eiga/news/196229; below: shot taken 
from the DVD cover of Taiwan Jinsei, 2008)
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Figure 2.1  DVD cover for Grandmother’s Secret, featuring a snapshot of former comfort 
woman, Huang A-tao, as she tells her story of abuse by Japanese soldiers.
!                                                                                                                              204
Figure 2.2  Re-presenting trauma memory: promotional poster for Song of the Reed in 
August 2015. Departing from the normative images that portray victimhood, the former 
comfort women are presented smiling with their hands raised to their brows, while the 
tagline underneath the film title states: “A tribute, to a life that never succumbs to 
defeat.” (Shot taken from wikipedia, retrieved August 5, 2016 from https://
zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/#/media/File:Song_of_the_seed_movie_poster.jpg)
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Figure 2.3  Lin Shen-chung (second left), a social worker, and Japanese supporter Shiba 
Yoko (first right) dance in unison to the song of Momotaro. (Photo from Song of the 
Reed) 
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Figure 2.4  Hsu-mei in her living room. (Photo from Song of the Reed) 
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Figure 2.5  The Taiwanese comfort women on the websites of TWRF and Ah-ma’s Paper 
Airplane highlight a generational divide in the presentation of the same subjects. They 
share similarities in presenting the photos in black-and-white. The latter, however, gave 
each woman’s testimony its own frame. (Photos from TWRF and Ah-ma’s Paper Airplane 
Webpages) 
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Figure 3.1  Cover of Bungei Taiwan , Volume 2, No. 6 (September, 1941), in 
which Chou Chin-po’s “The Volunteer” was first published. (Photo taken from The 
Taiwanese Literary Data Library of Aletheia University in Taiwan, accessed August 18, 
2016 from http://mttwn.mtwww.mt.au.edu.tw/front/bin/ptlist.phtml?Category=122 )
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Figure 3.2  Headline of a Taiwanese newspaper simplified Lee’s essay to “Lee Teng-hui: 
Taiwan waged no war against Japan ‘We were Japanese fighting for Motherland.’” (Photo 
from https://tw.news.yahoo.com/
--	-020528557.html)
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Figure 4.1  Seediq Bale’s General Kamada Yahiko, mourning the bushido spirit in the 
Seediq warriors and alluding to the cherry blossoms as a symbol of Japan. (Shot taken from 
Seediq Bale: Warriors of the Rainbow, 2011) 
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Figure 4.2  Above: Statue of Hatta Yoichi situated at Wushantou Reservoir. Below: 
Snapshot of Kondo Hyotaro contemplating about taking on the position of Kano’s baseball 
coach. (Shots taken from http://hces.tn.edu.tw/chianan/e06.htm, and the film KANO, 2014.) 
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Figure 4.3  Wu Ming-chieh arrives at home base after the game has already ended. (Shot 
taken from the film KANO, 2014)
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Figure 4.4  A-ga and Tomoko on the beach: “stay, or I’ll come with you.” (Shot taken from 
the film Cape No. 7, 2008) 
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Figure  5.1  Certificate that Miyahara Eiji was conferred the Order of the Rising Sun by the 
Emperor of Japan in 2008. He received the honor as an Indonesian. (Shot taken from the 
film, Taiwan Identity.) 
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Figure 5.2  The tombstone of one of Miyahara Eiji’s many Japanese comrades interred at 
the Kalibata Heroes Cemetery. Both his Japanese name and Indonesian name are 
inscribed in the stone. (Shot taken from the film, Taiwan Identity.)
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Figure 5.3  Kao Chu-hua/ Yata Kikuko and the stray cats she took under her 
care. (Shot from the film Taiwan Identity.)
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Figure 5.4  A picture from the early days of pioneering in Yoshino village in Hualien, 
Taiwan. The image of villagers in their work outfits set them apart from stereotypical 
portraits of colonizers in formal attire. (Shot taken from the film Wansei Back Home) 
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Figure 5.5  Juxtaposition of the present and past of a hallway in Iekura Taeko’s former 
school, Taihoku First Girls’ High School, now Taipei Municipal First Girls’ High School. 
(Shots taken from the film Wansei Back Home.)
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Figure 5.6  A picture of eight wanseis’ revisiting of Hualien, as reported in Liberty Times 
in May 2013. The banner reads “welcome home” (okaerinasai,  %#!). 
(Retrieved from http://news.ltn.com.tw/photo/local/paper/384060 )
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Figure 6.1  French edition of Lin Li-chin’s Formose. In this page, she depicts her contempt 
for her grandmother’s fondness of Japanese songs. Retrieved July 15, 2016, http://
www.actuabd.com/Li-Chin-Lin-Formose-Comme-Marjane
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